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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST mDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CVIS-1406

vs.

)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY

)

LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS OR ABATE
(I.R.C.P. 12(B)(8))

Plaintiff,

)

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION.
Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley TroxeJl") seeks dismissal of
the instant action because issues fundamental to Plaintiffs claims herein, including whether an
attorney with defendant Hawley Troxell formed an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff, has

been raised by Plaintiff Frantz and litigated in an action currently pending in the United States
Bankruptcy Court, District ofldaho: specifically, In Re: Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia N Frantz,

Debtors, Case No. 11-21337-TLM, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho (Coeur
d'Alene) and the Adversary Proceeding therein, No. 13-07024-TLM ("Adversary Proceeding").
Indeed that specific issue has been determined adversely to Mr. Frantz in that previously filed
action. The Honorable Terry

Myers, Chief Judge of the United
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information from Mr. Frantz or his counsel. As that issue is wholly dispositive of Mr. Frantz's

claims herein, this action should be dismissed. In the alternative, this action should be stayed
pending a final judgment in Frantz's bankruptcy proceeding.

Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2008, Plaintiff Martin Frantz found cause to sue his former attorneys, Witherspoon
Kelley Davenport & Toole ("Witherspoon Kelley") for legal malpractice. Mr. Frantz contended
that Witherspoon Kelley had failed to timely bring an action against Mr. Frantz's real estate
agent, Ms. Bennett. Mr. Frantz also contended that Witherspoon Kelley failed to disclose to him a
conflict of interest, based on the firm's representation of Ms. Bennett's father and an associated
business. Mr. Frantz was represented by the law finn of Owens & Crandall in the lawsuit he filed
against Witherspoon KeHey ("Witherspoon Suit"). (Exhibi1 I and Exhibit II to Affidavit of

John C. Riseborough.)

In connection with the Witherspoon Suit, Mr. Frantz's counsel recognized that they
needed expert testimony on the standard of care to properly present Mr. Frantz's claim of attorney
malpractice. Accordingly, in December 2008, Ms. McCrea of Owens & Crandall contacted
Merlyn Clark, a partner with defendant Hawley Troxell. In 2009, by letter, Owens & Crandall
retained Mr. Clark requesting that he advise as to whether he could testify to violations of the
standard of care required of attorneys in Idaho under the facts of the case. Ms. McCrae forwarded
to Mr. Clark materials to review in connection with that commission. (Exhibit IlI to Affidavit of
John C. Riseborough.) Mr. Clark reviewed the materials and authored a 21 page report dated

May 4, 2009, reflecting his opinions. He set forth in that report the materials that he reviewed in
connection with forming his opinions. As fowid by Chief Judge Myers, none of the materials
contained confidential client communications from Mr. Frantz or confidential information.
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Witherspoon Kelly, identifying Mr. Clark as a testifying expert witness. (Exhibit IV to Affidavit
of John C. Riseborough.)

Hawley Troxell billed Owens & Crandall directly for Mr. Clark's services. Owens &
Crandall paid two of the three invoices. Mr. Frantz paid one Hawley Troxell bill directly for
Mr. Clark's services on May 26, 2009. The Witherspoon suit was subsequently settled. (Exhibit I
and II to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough.)
On or about June 28, 2010, Mr. Frantz and his wife, Cynthia Frantz ("Frantzes") received
a demand letter sent by Hawley Troxell, on behalf of Idaho Independent Bank ("JIB") in regard to
commercial guaranties executed by the Frantzes in which they guaranteed outstanding and
matured obligations owed by one of their entities to IIB. (Exhibit V), to Affidavit of John C.
Riseborough. On July 19, 2010, a lawsuit was filed by Hawley Troxell on behalf of IIB in the
First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and For the County of Kootenai, Case No. CV l 06088, to recover on the Guaranty obligations when there was no payment made to IIB following
the demand letter ("Guarantor Lawsuit"). The Frantzes filed an Answer and Counterclaims
against IIB through counsel and the parties engaged in written discovery.
On October 17, 2011, on the eve of the scheduled depositions of the Frantzes in the
Guarantor Lawsuit, the Frantzes filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition, staying the Guarantor
Lawsuit, and all other lawsuits the Frantzes were involved in ("Bankruptcy Case"). Hawley
Troxell continued to actively represent IIB's recovery efforts in the Bankruptcy Case. In response
to the filing of a Motion for a 2004 Examination of the Frantzes (deposition) by Hawley Troxell
on behalf of a IIB in December 2011, in the Bankruptcy Case, the Frantzes filed an objection and
sought to disqualify Hawley Troxell, based on the fact that a member of that firm represented a
company,

which Mr. Frantz was a shareholder. This
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Troxell has not and does not represent the Debtors in any matters and therefore there is no conflict
of interest in the attorneys of Hawley Troxell representing IIB against the Debtor in this
bankruptcy case and any other dispute against the Debtors; .... " That Order was entered in the
Bankruptcy Case in January, 2012. (Exhibit VI to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough)

On August 23, 2013, Hawley Troxell filed the Adversary Proceeding on behalf of IIB,
specifically a Complaint for Determination of Non-Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§523(a)(2) and (a)(6), asserting that the Debtors had committed fraud and conversion and the
obligations owed to IIB should be held non-dischargeable ("Non-Discharge Action").
Trial of the Non-Discharge Action was scheduled to commence December 1, 2014. On
October 3, 2014, Mr. Frantz moved to continue the trial, but that motion was denied. Then on
October 31, 2014, in the Non-Discharge Action, Mr. Frantz again moved to disqualify Hawley
Troxell, this time claiming that Hawley Troxell, by Merlyn Clark, had entered into an attorneyclient relationship with Mr. Frantz alleging that he had acted as both a consulting expert and a
testifying attorney expert in the Witherspoon Suit. Mr. Frantz contended that during that
"representation," Mr. Clark obtained confidential financial information. He further contended that
the Hawley Troxell attorneys representing IIB in the Non-Discharge Action had access to and
were actually using confidential financial information provided by Owen & Crandall to Mr.
Clark. (See Motion and Memorandum to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP,
Document No. 55, Exhibit VII to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough.)
Hawley Troxell objected to the Motion with affidavits establishing that Mr. Clark had
never established an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Frantz, that Mr. Clark had never
received confidential information, and that Hawley Troxell was not using any confidential
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December 1, 2014, the original trial date, the Honorable Terry

Myers, Chief U.S.

Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho, held a two day evidentiary
hearing regarding the Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell. Witnesses were called, sworn and
subject to cross examination by counsel. Significantly, Regina McCrea, the attorney from Owens

& Crandall who had actually retained Merlyn Clark testified, as did Mr. Frantz.
After carefully considering the evidence, Judge Myers unequivocalJy held that Mr. Clark
had never formed an attorney-client relationship with the Plaintiff, Mr. Frantz. He further held
that Mr. Clark had not received any confidential information. (Exhibit IX to Affidavit of John C.
Riseborough.) Whereupon the Court entered an Order denying Mr. Frantz's Motion to Disqualify
Hawley Troxell. (Exhibit X to Affidavit of John C. RJseborough.) The Bankruptcy Court then
rescheduled the Non-Discharge Action for trial, which is set to commence shortly on May 26,
2015.

ID.ARGUMENT

A.

Abatement is An Appropriate Remedy in Idaho and in This Action as the Same
Issue is Currently Being Litigated in a Previously Filed Action.
Idaho law recognizes the defense of abatement and IRCP 12(b)(8) requires that such

defense be asserted by motion. The Rule does not create the defense, but rather provides the
procedure by which the defense· is heard and determined. Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106
Idaho 905,907,684 P.2d 307 (App. 1984).
Abatement is the power of the trial court to dismiss or stay an action where a similar
action is already proceeding in another forum. The policy behind such a defense is to prevent
concurrent litigation of the same issue in different Courts that could result in conflicting
decisions. The purpose of the defense is to allow a Court to consider the factors of judicial
economy, minimizing costs and deJay to the litigants, promoting the prompt and orderly
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR ABATE (IRCP
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independent courts, and is a necessary one because any other rule would unavoidably lead to
perpetual collision and be productive of most calamitous results.'' Id. at 22, citing 21 C.J.S.
Courts, §188 at p. 222 ( 1990).

Idaho Courts have determined that there are two tests that govern the determination of
whether a lawsuit should proceed where a similar lawsuit is pending in another court. Klaue v.
Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 988 P.2d 211 (1999). First, the court should consider whether the other case

has proceeded to judgment, in which event the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion
may bar additional litigation. Id; See also Wing, 106 Idaho 905, 908, 684 P .2d 307, 310 (Ct. App.
1984); see also, Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 101 Idaho 522, 616 P.2d 1058 (1980) (District Court
did not err in dismissing state court action where federal court had previously entered summary

judgment against Plaintiff for the same cause.) It appears that the Frantz Non-Discharge Action
has not proceeded to judgment at this point, but will shortly due to the pending trial date.
The second test is whether the court, although not barred from deciding the case, should
nevertheless refrain from deciding it. See Wing, 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P .2d at 310. The
determination of whether to proceed with a case where a similar case is pending elsewhere and
has not gone to judgment, is committed to the Trial Court's sound discretion. Rueth v. State, 103
Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982); Zaleha v. Rosholt et al., 129 Idaho 532, at 533, 925 P.2d at 926;
Wing, 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P.2d at 310. That determination will not be overturned absent abuse.
Diet Center Inc., at 22 citing Wing at 905.

In Diet Center, a class action lawsuit pending in California Superior Court in San
Francisco, Diet Center sent demands for arbitration to six of the fifty-two arbitrating plaintiffs.
Diet Center, Inc., 124 Idaho at 21. Arbitration came to a standstill when the parties failed to agree
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conducted. Id. Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds, inter aha, that there was another
action pending against the parties pursuant to LR.C.P 12(b)(8). Id The Idaho District Court
determined that it had jurisdiction over the dispute, however, the court refused to consider the
action on its merits on the ground that there was another action pending between the parties
pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(8). Diet Center appealed.
In Diet Ctr., Inc., supra, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 855 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Ct. App. 1994),
suggested several guidelines for whether to exercise jurisdiction:

In deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case when there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, a trial
court must evaluate the identity of the real parties in interest and the degree
to which the claims or issues are similar. The trial court is to consider
whether the court in which the matter already is pending is in a position to
determine the whole controversy and to settle all the rights of the parties.
Diet Center, Inc., 22-23, citing Wing, 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P.2d at 310 (internal citations

omitted) (emphasis added); see also Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 988 P.2d 211 (1999).
Ultimately, the District Court's decision to decline jurisdiction under LR.C.P. 12(b)(8)
was upheld. Id.
The fundamental issue in the instant action is whether there was an attorney-client
relationship between Mr. Clark and Mr. Frantz. Mr. Frantz chose to seek the determination of this
exact issue from the Federal Bankruptcy Court in an attempt to disqualify Hawley Troxell and
delay the Non-Discharge Action. That Federal Bankruptcy Court held a two day evidentiary
hearing, with testimony provided not only by Mr. Frantz and Mr. Clark, but also by Regina
McCrea of the law firm that represented Mr. Frantz and hired Mr. Clark as an expert witness.
After listening to the testimony, argument and reviewing admitted exhibits, Chief Judge Myers
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In both actions, despite his express acknowledgment in a signed Stipulated Order to the
contrary in January 2012 (Ex. VI), Mr. Frantz is contending that Hawley Troxel1, by Merlyn
Clark, had a conflict of interest by having purportedly represented Mr. Frantz in 2009, that
confidential materials were provided to Mr. Clark, and that the attorneys for Hawley Troxell in
the Non-Discharge Action are utilizing those confidential materials. All three issues were litigated
in the Bankruptcy Case and had been determined adversely to Mr. Frantz. But for the fact that

Chief Judge Myers' decision and Order denying disqualification of Hawley Troxell is not yet
final, collateral estoppel and/or res judicata would apply to bar hantz' s claims.

B.

Abatement is Appropriate as the Same Parties are Litigating the Same Issue.
Idaho law recognizes that abatement is appropriate where the same parties, or those in

privity with those parties, are litigating the same issue in another forum. I.R.C.P. I2(b)(8); see

also Klaue, 133 Idaho 439. As recognized in Diet Center, supra, the court must determine who
the real parties in interest are, i.e., whose interests are being addressed in each forum. Here, the
parties are essentially the same.

Mr. Frantz is a party in both the bankruptcy and the instant action. Hawley Troxell is a
defendant in this action, and in privity with JIB in the bankruptcy action. Hawley Troxell was the
direct party that was the subject of the Motion to Disqualify, with real interests at stake in the
outcome.

In Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., 280 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Idaho 2003), the Federal
District Court of Idaho made clear that privity is a flexible concept dependent on the particular
relationship between the parties in each individual set of cases. Id citing In re Schimmels, 127
F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 1997). "Even when the parties are not identical, privity may exist if there is
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"substantial identity between the party and the nonparty'' In re Schimmels, at 88L Privity was also
found where the nonparty ''had a significant interest and participated in the prior action,"
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 S.Ct. 970 (1979).
"The issue is one of substance rather than the names in the caption of the case; the inquiry
is not ]united to a traditional privity analysis" In re Schimmels quoting Alpert's Newspaper

Deliver Inc.,

v.

NY Times Co., 876 F.2d 266,270 (2nd Cir. 1989).

There is substantial identity between parties in this matter. Both Hawley Troxell and lIB
were placed in jeopardy by the Motion to Disqualify. Both Hawley Troxell and IIB had an interest
in utilizing the evidence they had developed for trial, an interest which would have been denied
had the Court found that Hawley Troxell was utilizing confidential materials. Both Hawley
Troxell and IIB had an interest in Hawley Troxell remaining as counsel in the case for practical
and economic considerations. Hawley Troxell had been counsel of record for IIB since July 2010
and had been actively pursuing IIB 's recovery rights against the Frantzes both in and out of the
Bankruptcy Case. Further, Mr. Frantz had waited until the eve of trial in 2014, to raise the issues,
after all discovery, motion practice, and trial preparation was complete for the Non-Discharge
Action and after he had stipulated in the Bankruptcy Case in 2012, that there was no conflict in
the representation of Hawley Troxell on behalf of IIB. The interests of Hawley TroxeH and IIB
were so aligned such that there is substantial identity between the parties for the purposes of
considering whether abatement is appropriate, not to mention that the Motion to Disqualify was
directly against Hawley Troxell.
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I.R.CP 12(b)(8) Allows a Court to Consider the Factors of Judicial Economy,
Minimizing Costs and Delay to the Litigants, Pro~oting the Prompt and Orderly
Disposition of each Claim or Issue, and Avoiding Potentially Inconsistent Judgments.
1.

Judicial Economy.

Reducing repetitive or unnecessary litigation is a legitimate goal as it frees up judicial
resources for legitimate disputes and promotes judicial economy. Hill v. American Family Mut.

Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619, 627, 249 P.3d 812 (2011) citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101
S.Ct. 411, 415 (1980). "Promoting an efficient judiciary ultimately benefits the public." Hill at

627.

In this matter, the fundamental question - whether an attorney-client relationship exists
between Mr. Frantz and Hawley Troxell - has already been litigated and determined by another
court. Re-litigating the exact same question in Idaho District Court does not promote the public's
interest in an efficient and expeditious judiciary. Precious court resources will be tied-up, again,
to re-]itigate an issue already soundly decided, and notably decided against the Plaintiff, Mr.

Frantz.

2.

Costs and Delays.

Expenses and delays are factors that should be considered in determining whether to
dismiss an action based on an issue previously litigated in another pending matter. See Diet

Center, 124 Idaho at 22 (citations omitted).
Here, a significant amount of time and expense has already been expended to thoroughly
litigate the issue of whether there existed an attorney-client relationship. The parties submitted
extensive briefing. IIB, by and through HawJey Troxell, was forced to pay some of the attorney's
fees and costs to litigate the issue. Hawley Troxell was invested in responding to unfounded
accusations. The Bankruptcy trial, scheduled to start on December 1, was delayed to litigate the
attorney-client issue. A two day evidentiary hearing with testimony was held. Chief Judge Myers
findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
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was

shortly. The bankruptcy remains pending. The additional cost and expense to Hawley Troxell to
re-litigate a previously decided issue would be unduly burdensome and underscores the propriety

of dismissing or abating this action now.
3.

Promnt Resolution of Issues or Claims.

"The court which first acquires jurisdiction over a controversy should retain that
jurisdiction and dispose of the controversy." Klaue, at 441 citing Diet Ctr., Inc., 124 Idaho at 22.
The Bankruptcy Court in the underlying matter sought to immediately address an issue of
fundamental importance despite its having been raised almost three years into the bankruptcy
proceeding. The trial in that matter was scheduled for December 1 of the same year. The
Bankruptcy Court moved promptly to set an evidentiary hearing which was held on December 1st,
the original trial date. After receiving the adverse ruling by the Court, Mr. Frantz filed this action.
Allowing this action to proceed does not promote the principle of prompt resolutions of issues and
claims. Rather, it allows Mr. Frantz to endlessly tie up the issue while he attempts to seek another
detennination, as he did not like the decision of the Bankruptcy Court where he initially pursued

it.
4.

Potentially Inconsistent Findings.

Finally, the Bankruptcy court in this matter resolved the ultimate threshold question: Did
there exist, at any time before the bankruptcy proceeding, an attorney-client relationship between
Mr. Frantz and Hawley Troxell. The Court answered "No." One can readily see the impact this
action could have on the bankruptcy proceeding, which is into its fourth year and is on the eve of
the Non-Discharge Action in which Hawley Troxell is proceeding on behalf of IIB, in accordance

with the findings and decision of Chief Judge Myers.
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Dismissal

this matter. Should

not

action, Defendant

willing to

respectfully requests this matter be stayed until such time as the aforementioned Non-Discharge
Action is adjudicated to finality.

DATED this~ day of May, 2015.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

.d/

//~/

By:_.....:·:....,,...t'L:kc..··!.:.1-.;~"'--c.--'./=-'---------~ Riseborough, ISB #7898
Attorneys for Defendant
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Attorney for Defendant Hawley TroxeH Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV15-1406

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

COMES NOW Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, by and through its

attorney of rec~rd, John C. Riseborough of Paine Hamblen LLP and for its answer to Plaintiffs
Complaint, admits, denies and alleges as follows.

I.
Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint does not contain allegations of liability creating
conduct or resulting damages and accordingly does not require an affirmative response. To the
extent paragraph 1 requires a response from this Defendant, it is denied.

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNlS

~~YaJ..lhnlroxell,

IT.

that

a

Defendant.
III.

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, except it is
admitted that Plaintiff Frantz filed for bankruptcy in October of 2011 and that Defendant
represents Idaho Independent Bank (IIB), one of the creditors in those proceedings. It is further
admitted that Defendant, on behalf of IIB, filed a Complaint for Determination of NonDischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) in an adversary proceeding in
the bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his wife Cynthia Frantz, including a claim that
Plaintiff and his wife Cynthia Frantz made false statements in writing regarding their :financial
condition to obtain loans and extensions of credit.

IV.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
V.

Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 5, 6 and 8 of Plaintiff's Compfaint. In
answering paragraph 7 thereof, Defendant admits only that jurisdiction and venue are proper in
this Court
VI.

Paragraph 9 appears to be historical background for which no answer is required. To the
extent an answer is required, the allegations of paragraph 9 are denied for lack of information.

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNJS

VIL
0,
admitted

it

~-L-UMW.

commenced a malpractice

alleging professional negligence by said attorneys.

VIII.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 11 and 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint, except
it is admitted that Merlyn Clark prepared a report within the scope of his retention by the law
firm of Owens and Crandall.

IX.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint, although it is
admitted that on May 26, 2009, Plaintiff Frantz paid the bill Hawley Troxell had submitted to the
Jaw firm of Owens and Crandall for the services Clark provided to that law firm.

X.
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint,
except that the first loan was a purchase loan, not a development loan, and it was later renewed
and became part of the development Joan.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 17 and 18, except that it is admitted that
llB retained Defendant to commence a lawsuit to obtain payment from Plaintiff Frantz and his

wife Cynthia Frantz for a loan guaranteed by Plaintiff Frantz and Cynthia Frantz that had

matured.
XI.
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 19 and 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint, except
the claim filed exceeds $6,400,000.

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS

XII.

LLVA,LU~•••v'u

SllIIliClel:U to allow it to

or

except

during

bankruptcy, Plaintiff

Frantz opposed Defendant's representation of IIB based on an alleged conflict of interest by
Hawley Troxell Ultimately, at a hearing before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Idaho, Plaintiff Frantz and Cynthia Frantz admitted that no such conflict of interest
existed. Further, Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz signed a Stipulated Court Order
which stated in relevant part: "There is no conflict of interest in the attorneys of Hawley Troxell
representing IIB against the debtors in this bankruptcy case, and any other dispute against the
debtors."

XIII.
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 22, except the words "shortly thereafter,"
and that there are additional claims for denial of discharge alleged in the Complaint for
Determination of Non-Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) filed by
Defendant in the bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz.

XIV.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 23, 24 and 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint,

except Defendant admits that Plaintiff did file a Motion to Disqualify Defendant in the
Adversary Proceeding that is the subject of the Complaint for Determination of Non-

Discbargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) filed by Defendant in the
bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz.

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS

xv.
I
its prior answer herein a.'1d further admits, denies and alleges as

XVI.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 27, 28, 29 and each of its subparts, 30, 31,
32, 33 and 34 of Plaintiff's Complaint.

XVII.

In responding to Count II of Plaintiffs Complaint, Breach of Fiduciary Duty Defendant
realleges and incorporates by reference its prior answers herein and admits, denies and alleges as
follows:

XVIII.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and
46 of Plaintiff's Complaint.

XIX.
Paragraphs 47 and 48 of Plaintiff's Complaint do not reqmre a response by this

Defendant at this time.

BYWAY OF FURTHER ANSWER AND AS ITS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES:

1.
Plaintiffs Complaint, in part, fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

II.
There is currently an action pending between the parties and/or their privies in the United
States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. Issues fundamental to Plaintiffs Complaint have

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS
M,&iffl@'lt,~~~ .:f!,)xell,

No.

!@009/012

or will

determined in that proceeding, which was

to the commencement of

Alternatively, this Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss this action in favor of
determination by the Court with first jurisdiction, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District

ofidaho.

III.
An element essential to the successful prosecution of Plaintiff's allegations is the
existence of an attorney-client relationship between Merlyn Clark and Plaintiff and that
confidential information was disclosed. Those issues, among others, were previously litigated in
the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. After a two day evidentiary hearing, the
Bankruptcy Court ruled that Merlyn Clark was never Plaintiff Frantz's attorney and that
Defendant did not receive confidential information. Thus elements essential to Plaintiff's claims
have been determined adversely to Plaintiff and res judicata bars his claims herein.
Alternatively, Plaintiff is coJ!aterally estopped from further litigating said issues.

IV.

Any losses or damages claimed by Plaintiff herein were caused and solely resulted from
his own acts and omissions. If not the sole cause of such losses and damages, Plaintiff's acts and
omissions were a contributing proximate cause thereof amounting to negligence which is equal
to or greater than that of Defendant.

Ill 010/012

acts or

acts

omissions of Defendant, Plaintiff's recovery must nevertheless be reduced in proportion to his
contributory negligence.

VI.
The Plaintiff's claims are barred on the basis of estoppel.
VII.
Plaintiff's claims are barred in this action based on the grounds oflaches.

VIII.
Plaintiff may have failed to act seasonably and reasonably to mitigate his losses or
damages.

IX.
The statute of limitations on Plaintiff's claims has expired.

X.
Defendant reserves the right to seek sanctions and other appropriate relief pursuant to
Idaho Jaw including IRCP 1 l(a)(l). Further, Defendant seeks recovery of attorney's fees and
costs incurred in defense of this action pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code 12-121, 12-123,
and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and any other applicable statute or common
law provision.

WHEREFORE, having answered Plaintiff's Complaint to the extent possible at this time,
Defendant prays that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that he take nothing

~ULt/Ul..i::

to

In the

Defendant prays that the Court stay th.is action pending decision and

judgment in the Non-Discharge proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of
Idaho, currently pending.

DATED this L/+J.iday

of May, 2015.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

J
C. Riseborough, ISB #7898
Attorneys for Defendant

l(!J U.lZ/U.lZ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

X
X

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83815

Theresa Henry
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R1SEBOROUGH,
#7898
HAMBLEN
West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007

Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

)
)
)
)

AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT

vs.

)
)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY, LLP

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Case No. CV15-1406

COMES NOW Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, by and through its
attorney of record, John C. Riseborough of Paine Hamblen LLP and for its answer to Plaintiff's
Complaint, admits, denies and alleges as fol1ows.

I.
Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint does not contain allegations of liability creating
conduct or resulting damages and accordingly does not require an affirmative response. To the

extent paragraph l requires a response from this Defendant, it is denied.

AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY
IJf~L. ENN!iSaj:litA<W;lefiJY, LLP -

It
paragraph
that

a

is

of Defendant

III.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, except it is
admitted that Plaintiff Frantz filed for bankruptcy in October of 2011 and that Defendant
represents Idaho Independent Bank (1IB), one of the creditors in those proceedings. It is further
admitted that Defendant, on behalf of IIB, filed a Complaint for Determination of NonDischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) in an atlversary proceeding in
the bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his wife Cynthia Frantz, including a claim that
Plaintiff and his wife Cynthia Frantz made false statements in writing regarding their financial
condition to obtain Joans and extensions of credit.

JV.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint.
V.
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 5, 6 and 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint. In
a."lswering paragraph 7 thereof, Defendant admits only that jurisdiction and venue are proper in
this Court.

VI.
Paragraph 9 appears to be historical background for which no answer is required. To the
extent an answer is required, the allegations of paragraph 9 are denied for lack of information.

AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY
11JUX1i;i11i;; ffli'Nffl3&:lll?AiWllHlV, LLP

VIL

that

attorneys

commenced a malpractice
i

alleging professional negligence by said attorneys. Defendant affirmatively alleges that Merlyn
Clark was retained by plaintiff Frantz's attorneys, Owens & Crandall, ti:i provide services as a
testifying expert on the issue of whether Plaintiff Frantz' s fonner attdrneys had vio1ated the
I

applicable standard. of care. Defendant further alleges that such ~tention constituted a
commercial transaction within the provisions of Idaho Code 12-120(3).

VIII.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 11 and 12 of Plaintiiff s Complaint, except

it is admitted that Merlyn Clark prepared a report within the scope of ~s retention by the law
firm of Owens and Crandall.
IX.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs cJmplaint, although it is
I

admitted that on May 26, 2009, Plaintiff Frantz paid the bill Hawley Trox~H had submitted to the
I

I

law firm of Owens and Crandall for the services Clark provided to that law firm.

I
I

X.
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 14, 15 and 16

01 Plaintiffs Complaint,

except that the first loan was a purchase loan, not a development loan,

·d it was later renewed

and became part of the development loan.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 17 and 18, except that it is admitted that
IIB retained Defendant to commence a lawsuit to obtain payment from

AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY
m ~ ~ 4 UJ\W!.tiiY, LLP ·

laintiff Frantz and his

I
I

II
wife Cynthia Frantz for a loan guaranteed by Plaintiff Frantz and C~tliia

that had

I

I

Xl

I

Defend ant admits the allegations of paragraph 19 and 20 of Plainfff s Complaint, except
I

I

the claim filed exceeds $6,400,000.

XII.

I
I

Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of
information sufficient to allow it to admit or deny except that, during

e bankruptcy, Plaintiff

Frantz opposed Defendant's representation of IIB based an an aJleged conflict of interest by
Hawley Troxell. Ultimately, at a hearing before the United States B

uptcy Court for the

District of Idaho, Plaintiff Frantz and Cynthia Frantz admitted that no s ch conflict of interest
existed. Further, Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz signed a tipulated Court Order
which stated in relevant part: "There is no conflict of interest in the atto eys of Hawley Troxell
representing IIB against the debtors in this bankruptcy case, and any ot er dispute against the
debtors."

XIII.
Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 22, except the wor s ''shortly thereafter,"
and that there are additional claims for denial of discharge alleged in the Complaint for
Determination of Non-Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a (2) and (a)(6) filed by
Defendant in the bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthi Frantz.

AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY
ri.f~:X&hl. eJhU.Sef;lirhMV,Ii61f, LLP - 4

XIV.
paragraph
exc:eot Defendant admits that Plaintiff

OJ

file a Motion to Disq1ify Defendant

Adversary Proceeding that is the subject of the Complaint for

the

etermination of Non-

Dischargeable Debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2) and (a)(6) file

by Defendant in the

bankruptcy case of Plaintiff Frantz and his spouse Cynthia Frantz.

xv.
In answering Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant realle sand incorporates by
reference its prior answer herein and further admits, denies and alleges as ollows:

XVI.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 27, 28, 29 and eac of its subparts, 30, 31,
32, 33 and 34 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

XVII.
I

In responding to Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint, Breach of Fiduciary Duty Defendant
realleges and incorporates by reference its prior answers herein and admits, denies and alleges as
follows:

XVIII.
Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and

46 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

XIX.
Paragraphs 47 and 48 of Plaintiff's Complaint do not require a response by this
Defendant at this time.

AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY

~@~~~~kl'<;TN~'W~EY,LLP~

ANSWER

I.
part,

to state

can be granted.

II.
There is currently an action pending between the parties and/or their privies in the United
States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. Issues fundamental to Plaintiffs Complaint have

been or will be determined in that proceeding, which was filed prior to• the commencement of
this action. Accordingly, this Court should stay this action pursua!rJt to IRCP 12(b)(8).
Alternatively, this Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss this action in favor of
determination by the Court with first jurisdiction, United States Bankruptqy Court for the District
ofldaho.

III.
An element essential to the successful prosecution of Plaintitf s allegations is the
I

existence of an attorney~client relationship between Merlyn Clark 4rtd Plaintiff and that
confidential information was disclosed. Those issues, among others, wer~ previously litigated in
the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. After a two day e~identiary hearing, the

Bankruptcy Court ruled that Merlyn Clark was never Plaintiff Frantz's attorney and that
Defendant did not receive confidential information. Thus elements essential to Plaintiffs claims
have been determined adversely to Plaintiff and res judicata bats his claims herein.
Alternatively, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from further litigating said i:ssues.

IV.
Any losses or damages claimed by Plaintiff herein were caused and solely resulted from
his own acts and omissions. If not the sole cause of such losses and damages, Plaintiff's acts and

AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY
!Wltt!PlxmtJM'.~E& BA~, LLP • 6

1 tl...Llin

ll.niILDJ...d:!il-,

LLr

1*i

VVO/ Vl.V

were

If the acts and omissions of Plaintiff were not equal to or greater than any acts or
omissions of Defendant, Plaintiffs recovery must nevertheless be reduced in proportion to his
contributory negligence.

VI.
The Plaintiffs claims are barred on the basis of estoppel.

VII.
Plaintiffs claims are barred in this action based on the grounds of laches.

VIII.
Plaintiff may have failed to act seasonably and reasonably to mitigate his losses or
damages.

IX.
The statute of limitations on Plaintiffs claims has expired.

BY WAY OF FUR1HER ANSWER AND AS ITS CLAIM FOR AN A WARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS:

I.
The gravamen of Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant and the basis for Plaintiffs
recovery is a provision of services as a testifying expert by Defendant, through Merlyn Clark,
which provision of services constitutes a commercial transaction within ithe meaning of Idaho

~

VVV/

I l

II.

Defendant seeks recovery of attorney's fees and costs incurred in defense of this action
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code 12-121, 12-123, and Rule 54; of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, and any other applicable statute or common law provision. Defendant reserves
the right to seek sanctions and other appropriate relief pursuant to: Idaho law, including
IRCP l l(a)(l).

WHEREFORE, having answered Plaintiffs Complaint to the extent possible at this time,
Defendant prays thal Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice ahd that he take nothing
thereby. Defendant further prays for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho
Code 12-120(3), 12-121, 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the alternative, Defendant prays that the Court stay this action pending decision and

judgment in the Non-Discharge proceeding in the United States Banl.auptcy Court, District of
Idaho, currently pending.
DATED

this/-¥

day of May, 2015.

PAINE HAMBLEN LLP'

/:1

/'' I

By:_~,c._.._C=-----'--{__ _ _ _ _ __
hn C. Riseborough, ISB #7898
Attorneys for Defendant

AMENDED ANSWER OF DEFENDANT HAWLEY
l ' f l ' ~ ~ E & lMW!slW, LLP- 8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
correct

~

that on the
day of May,
foregoing document to the following:

HAND DELNERY
U.S.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, PLLC
I
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite! A
Post FaJls, Idaho 83815 !
1

Theresa Henry
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Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, PLLC
N. Linco]n
Suite
Post FaJls, Idaho 83854
Ph: 208-262-38931 Fax: 208-262-3894
jonathon@cdaJegal.com
ISB No. 9129
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,
Case No.: CV 15-1406
Plaintiff,
vs.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO
MOTION FOR PRO HAC VICE
ADMISSION

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Martin Frantz, by and through his attorney of record, Jonathon
Frantz of Frantz Law, PLLC, and hereby responds to the Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice
Admission as follows:
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") raises two issues in its
objection. Each will be addressed in turn.
1. Mr. Katz's Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission is Procedurally Proper

Hawley Troxell claims that Mr. Kat's motion for pro hac vice (the "l\fotion") is
procedurally defective because it was not served on Hawley Troxell's counsel. However,
Hawley Troxe11 had no counsel of record in this matter at the time the Motion was served.

/

.

r rantz Law rLJA,

case

227(c)(l)-(3) (emphasis added).
The Motion was served on April 7, 2015. Paine Hamblen did not appear in this matter
until (at the eariiest) April 22, 2015. 1 Therefore, Paine Hamblen was not "counsel ofrecord."
As a result, IBCR 227 did not require service of the Motion upon Paine Hamblen. Therefore, the
rule was properly followed.

2. Mr. Katz is Aware and will follow the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
Next, Hawley Troxell asserts that Mr. Katz contacted Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB")
directly in vioJation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. See IRPC 4.2. Hawley Troxell
here misunderstands the concept of representation. IIB is not a party to this litigation. No
attorney has filed, mailed, stated, or hinted at the fact that they represent IIB in this matter. As a
result, IIB, in this litigation, is unrepresented.

2

IRPC 4.2 prohibits attorneys from communica6ng with "a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter ... " (emphasis added). Further, when an attorney
represents a party in one matter, it is not an "omnipresent" representation in all matters.
JIB is not a party to this case. No attorney has ever communicated to either this court or
the attorney for Martin Frantz that s/he represents IIB in this matter. Therefore, Mr. Katz did not
contact a person he knew to be represented by another lawyer in this matter. As a result, there
was no violation of IRPC 4.2. Further, the communication with IIB was a request to see if llB
wanted to join Mr. Frantz as a plaintiff in this case. Hawley Troxell, who represents IIB in other
1

Paine Hamblen did not file a notice of appearance until May 5, 2015. But it filed documents as
if it were Hawley Troxell's attorney on April 22, 2015.
2
Further, it makes sense for IIB to not be represented in this litigation. IlB is not a party and has
no P,roverbial "doe: in the fight"

Martin Frantz vs Hawley 1"foxell. eta!

TO OBJECTION

p.u

matter as

Hamblen has not even purported to appear for IIB. Therefore, IIB is not represented in this
matter.
Also, both Idaho and Illinois have adopted the same model rules of professionai conduct.
Mr. Katz is licensed in Illinois and therefore is familiar with the identical rules of professional
conduct which are in place in Idaho.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Hawley Troxell 's objection should be dismissed and this Court
should enter an order granting Mr. Katz pro bac vice admission.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2015.

FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
By:

Isl _ _ __
Jonathon Frantz,
Attorney for Martin Frantz

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of May, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of
the instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:
John C. Riseborough
[ ]
U.S. Mail
[ ]
Overnight Mail
[X]
FAX
(509) 838-0007
[ ]
Hand Delivery

/s/ Jonathon Frantz

p.,

C!'<lllt.Z LdW rLL\,

jonathon@cdaJegal.com
ISB No. 9129
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,
Case No.: CV 15-1406
Plaintiff,
VS.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY

DECLARATION OF JONA THON
FRANTZ

LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.
Defendant.

STATEOFIDAHO)
) ss.
Kootenai County
)
I, Jonathon Frantz, hereby testify under the penalty of pe1jury as follows:
I am over the age of eighteen. I represent Martin Frantz in this matter. On February 20t\
2015 I filed this litigation on behalf of Martin Frantz. The complaint and summons were not
immediately served. Then, on March 2, 2015 I sent an email wherein I discussed a phone call

1

from a person who purported to be an employee at Paine Hamblin. In that emaiJ, I discuss that
the person who called me informed me that Paine Hamblin would file a notice of appearance in
the matter on March 3, 2015. At that time, I was never informed or provided any documentation
1

John C. Riseborough testifies that it the phone conversation took place on March 3, 2015. See

+12082623894

Frantz Law PLLC

p.8

appeared on behalf

Hamblen

that

them

end, I was asked if I had served the complaint yet I responded that I had not
The foJlowing day, Paine Hamblin did not file a notice of appearance. After more than a
month later, Paine Hamblen still had not filed any notice of appearance or made any further
communication with me. As a result, I believed that Paine Hamblin would not appear in this
matter.
Further, when Paine Hamb]en finally did file documents in this case, it did so without
filing a notice of appearance or paying the appropriate fee to the Kootenai County Court.

2

DATED this 30th day of May, 2015.

Isl Jonathon Frantz
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of May, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of
the instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:

John C. Riseborough
[ ]
U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
[ }
[X]
FAX
(509) 838-0007
[ ]
Hand Delivery

Isl Jonathon Frantz

on
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onattncm Frantz
Law,
N. Llnco]n
Falls, Idaho 83854
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DEPUTY

jonathon@cdaJegal.com
ISB No. 9129

Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

Case No.: CV 15-1406
Plaintiff,
vs.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.

OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN
F.KURTZ

Defendant.

Plaintiff, Martin Frantz, hereby objects to the following portions of the Affidavit of John F.
Kurtz, which was submitted on April 23, 2015 in support of Hawley Troxell's objection to Mr.
Katz Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission:
1. fl2-8 and all included exhibits: Irrelevant. The named paragraphs have absolutely
nothing to do with whether or not Mr. Katz should be granted pro hac vice admission.
2. <][9 and an included exhibits: Hearsay. Mr. Kurtz is testifying to communication between
two non-parties.
DATED this 30th day of May, 2015.

FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
By:
Isl_ _ __
Jonathon Frantz,
Attorney for Mattin Frantz

;
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John C. Riseborough
[X] FAX
(509) 838-0007
Isl Jonathon Frantz

Jonathon Frantz
PLLC
Lincoln St,
Idaho 83854
Ph: 208-262-38931 Fax: 208-262-3894
jonathon@cda1ega1.com
ISB No. 9129
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
fDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,
Case No.: CV 15-1406

Plaintiff,
vs.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.

OBJECTION TO AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN
C. RISEBOROUGH

Defendant.

Plaintiff, Martin Frantz, hereby objects to the last sentence of paragraph 2 as such is hearsay.
Mr. Riseborough testifies as to the contents of a conversation between two non-parties, his
paralegal and Jonathon Frantz.
DATED this 30th day of May, 2015.
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC

By:
Isl_ __
Jonathon Frantz,
Attomey for Mattin Frantz
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of May, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of
the instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:
John C. Riseborough
[XJ FAX
(509) 838-0007

Isl Jonathon Frantz

J. HJ\,
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17 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455~6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MAR TTN FRANTZ,

)
Plaintiff,

vs.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

___

Defendant.

)
)

Case No. CV15-1406

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH

)
)
)
)
)

)

ST/\ TE OF WASHINGTON)

) ss:
County c1f Spokane

)

JOHN C. R1SEBOROUGH, being first duly sworn upon oalh, deposes and says:
I am one of the attorneys representing defendant, Hawley TroxeU Ennis &

Hawley in this matter and have personaJ knowledge of the matters asserted herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Expert Witness

Disclosure filed in the Unit<:d StatC8 Bankruptcy Court. ;.)i~ttic1 of Idaho, in an adversary
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3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy

the Affidavit of Jolm F.

Kurtz, Jr., in support of Motion in Limine to prohibit the expert testimony of Jeffrey Katz.

JOl{N C. RISEBOROUGH
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me this
RISEBOROUGH.

a<o t" day

of June, 2015, by JOHN C.
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Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, PLLC

307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83815
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JONATHON FRANTZ
Frantz Law, PUC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
PostFalls, ID 83854
Telephone: (208) 262-3893
Facsimile: (208) 262~3894
jonathon@cdalegal.com
ISB# 9129

Attomey for MarinD. Frantz and Cyxrthia M. Frantz, Defendants

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTIUCT OF IDAHO
(Coeur d'Alene)
In.Re:

Case No. ll~21337-TLM

MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTiilA M.
FRANTZ,

Chapter7

Debtors.

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,

Adversary Proc. No. 13~07024

Plaintiff,
VS,

MARTIN D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants.
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EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE (Jeffrey Katz)
Martin & Cynthia Frantz, hereby discloses its intent to call Mr. Jeffi:ey Katz as

an expert witness at the bearing to Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP in the
above-entitled matter. Mr. Katz's hourly rate for preparation and trial testimony is $175 per
hour.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a true and correct copy of the disclosure
prepared by Mr. Katz's which sets forth his findings and conclusions to which he'll testify at the
aforementioned hearing. Mr. Katz's qualifications are set forth in Mr. Katz resume, attached
hereto and incorporated herein, as well as the aforementioned disclosure.

DATED this 25th day of November, 2014.

FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
!

Isl
Jonathon Frantz;,
Attomey
Frantz
. . .- for Martin and. Cynthia
.
.

EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE (Jeffrey Katz)- 2
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of November,
I sertt true
correct
copies of the foregoing to the following via email (with approval from the recipients as to the
form of communication):
John F Kurtz, Jr.· jkurtz@hawleytroxeU.com
Sheila Schwager~ sschwager@hawleytroxell.com
I FURTIIBR CERTIFY that on the 25th day of November, 2014, I sent true and correct
copies of the foregoing to the Court via personal delivery to the Coeur d'Alene Federal
Courthouse.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that on the 25th day ofNovernber, 2014 until today (not including
Thanksgiving Day) I was unable to file this document on the ECF due to what I believe was a
technical error by the ECF.

Isl Jonathon Frantz
Jonathon Frantz

EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE (Jeffrey Katz)- 3
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26(a)(2) Expert Witness

LaSalle Street Suite 2100, Chicago, Illinois 60602.
A Mr. Jefferey O. Katz is a leading expert on matters of lawyer
professional responsibility. In 2012, Mr. Katz fou..._11,ded the American
Association for Justice Professional Liability Litigation Group) which
he has chaired since. He is a member of the Association for
Professional Responsibility Lawyers, and he chaired the Chicago Bar
Association Young Lawyers Section Professional Responsibility
Committee from 2009 until 2012.

Mr. Katz attended the University of Wisconsin at Maa.ison, where he
earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations and
Political Science. Mr. Katz earned bis Juris Doctor degree a.t the Case
Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio. For the
entirety of his career, Mr. Katz has worked as a litigator and trial
attorney in Chicago, Illinois, with a primary focus on professional
liability matters involving attorneys. Mr. Katz is a partner at The
Patterson Law Firm, a distinguished boutique litigation firm located in
downtown Chicago.
Mr. Katz has filed and litigated over 400 legal complaints stemming
from the professional negligence of attorneys in a variety of
·
circumstances, roles, and jurisdictions throughout the United States.
Mr. Katz is admitted to practice law in the states of Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Kentucky. He is also admitted to practice in United
States District Comts in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana. He has been
admitted to the Sixth and Se'Venth Circuit United States Courts of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.
Mr. Katz has an extensive record of publications and lectures on best
practice methods I with a. particular focus on professional
responsibility. Mr. Katz recently published an article in the summer
2014 issue of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice in which he ·
proposed an amended Rule 8.4, a rule pertaining to lawyer
misconduct that is mirrored in both Dlinois and Idaho. Mr. Katz also
taught a seminar for attorneys on Rules 1.3 and 1.4, two professional
responsibility rules that are also mirrored in both Illinois and Idaho.

Mr. Katz lectured in a late 2014 National Business Institute seminar
on professional liability dispute resolution, in which his speaking
topics focused on trends in professional liability cases and the
elements of professional liability tort claims. Mr. Katz gave a lecture at
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Association for Justice .Annual Convention
Washington
in July of 2014 titled "Avoida:nce the Dreaded
Legal Malpractice Claim." His lecture, ''A Practical Due Diligence
Checklist on Preventing the Most Common Attorneys Errors in Civil
Litigationl' at the ACI/LPL Legal Malpractice Conference in May of
2012 in New York was a product of his expertise in the area of
professional responsibility, and he has served as a moderator for the ·
Chicago Bar Association Seminars on Rules of Professional Conduct
in December 2009, June 2010, December 2010, June 2011,
December 2011 1 and June 2012.
B. Mr. Katz will testify that he was retained by Martin and Cynthia
Frantz's attorneys as a Rule 26(a)(2) expert to testify with regard to a
matter of professional responsibility. Mr. Katz will testify as to the
professional standards of conduct applicable to Mr. Clark and Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 1 during the t:i.me in which they were
retained by Mr. Frantz and the duties and responsibilities that extend
from th.at relationship and continue to exist in the present matter
with Idaho Independent Bank. Mr. Katz will focus on the duties owed
to Mr. Frantz and the proper and professionally responsible actions
that should be taken in the present matter.
}

Amongst other testimony, Mr. Katz 'Will testify that an attorney-client
relationship did exist between Mr. Frantz and Mr. Clark end Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. Due to the language contained within
the retainer agreement, Mr. Clark's role :in the prior matter, and Mr.
Frantz's expectations of Mr. Clark's contributions, Mr. Clark and
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, served a dual-role as both expert
witnesses and expert consultants. Because the present matter is
substantially related to the prior matter and because Mr. Clark and
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, received or were given access to
confidential financial information that is at issue in the present
matter and adverse to the interests of Mr. and Mrs. Frantz, the motion
for disqualification is proper.
Further1 Mr. Katz will testify that the record does not establish that
Mr. Frantz made a valid waiver of any privilege or conflicted
representation. Finally, Mr. Katz will testify that know:ingly hiring a
previously retained expert consultant of an adverse party does in fact
create grounds for disqualification, as appears to be the case in the
present matter. It is Mr. Katz's opinion that the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct prohibit Mr. Clark and Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley, LLP, from continuing as counsel for Idaho Independent Bank
in the present matter.
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D. In addition to his educationi trruning, and experience 1 Mr. Katz's
opinions are or will be based upon hia review of the following material:
'1

l,I D,..f.,.-nd""'nts' Mr.u'on +o n1· "q11\A,.~J
"'T~-Ft, ro,,ns"'l'
""' i...l
J
......... .....,....

a.J.,

...

....-

,L

""

.,_,,

""

J.

"""

(2) The Declaration of Regina McCrea, along with all attached
exhibits;
(3) The Declaration of Martin Frantz, along with all attached e1thibits;
(4) The Declaration of Jonathon Frantz, along 'With all attached
exhibits;
(5) Idaho Independent Bank's Memo in Opposition to the Motion to
Disqualify, along with all attached affidavits and exhibits;
(6) Second Declaration of Martin Frantz, along with all attached

ex..hibitSi
(7) Defendants' Reply in Support of their Motion to Disqualify;
· (8) The Supplem.eI:1.tal Declaration of Regina McCrea;
(9) The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct; and
(10).Any additional material that may be appropriately considered or

later provided or disclosed.

Respectfully submitted;
Dated; November 24, 2014

/ s / Jefferey

O. Katz

Jefferey O. Katz
The Patterson Law Firm, LLC
One North LaSalle Street; Suite 2100
Chicago, IL 60602
Tel. 312-223-1699
Fax. 312-223-8549
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Jefferey Ogden Katz
Patterson Law Firm
North LaSalle Street, Suite
Chicago, UJinois 60602
(312) 750~1817 (Phone)
(312) 223-8549 (Fax)
(312) 545-5107 (Mobile)
· jkatz@pattersonlawfmn.com
WWW. pattersonlavrorm.com

LEGAL EXPERIENCE
The Patterson Law Finn LLC, Chicago, IL
Partner (September 2012-Present)
• Practice concentrated in litigation, including but not limited to general commercial litigation and
professional liability matters involving attorneys, accountants and other professionals.
• Originated and obtained judgment in the amount of $2,550,377 for Scottie Pippen against Cluistian
Laettner in action involving failed purchase of professional sports franchise.
• Second chaired five week jury trial resulting in a judgment of $2,000,000 on behalf of Scottie Pippen
against fo:rmer attorneys and advisors.
• First chaired action on behalf of Ben Gordon against former accountant and advisor which resulted in
summary judgment in the amount of $1,386,666 for Mr. Gordon. Subsequently first chaired and
obtained summary judgment for Mr. Gordon in defense of action brought by form.er agent seeking in
excess of$1,200,000 for alleged breach of professional services contract.
• First chaired and obtained voluntary dismissal of major bank vice president charged with contribution
and indemnification in the middle of a jury trial involving legal malpractice.
• First chaired and obtained settlement in the amount of $1,100,000 on behalf of a major Chicago law
furn in connection with a departing.partner's alleged theft of a contingent fee matter.
The Spellmire Law Firm LLC, Chicago, IL

Attorney (September 2005-September 2012)
EDUCATION
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cle-veland, OH
Juris Doctor, May 2004
·
Universjty of Wisconsin at Madison, Madison, WI
Bachelor of Arts: International Relations and Political Science, May 2000

BARAD1\1ISS10NS
State of Illinois, November 2004
State of Wisconsin, September2009
State ofKentucky. June 2014
United States District Court, Northem District of Illinois, January 2005
United States District Court, Western District of Wisconsin, October 2008
United States District Court, Northern District of Indiana, February 2010
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh C1rcuit, September 2011
United States District Court, Central District oflllinois 1 June 2014
United States Supreme Court, October 2013
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Admitted Pro Hae Vice in Wisconsin, Ohio, Texas, Indiana, Kentucky and DC state courts

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS
Member$ American Bar Association, Illinois State Bar Association. Chicago
Associationi =::i,svuJlid.Li\Jl.l
Professional Responsibility Lawyers and American Association
Justice (formerly
Chair, Chicago Bar Association Young Lawyers Section ProfessionaJ Responsibility Committee (20092010. 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 years)
.Founding Chair, American Association for Justice Professional Liability Litigation Group (2012-present).

l-

PUBLICATIONS MYJl SEMJNARS
No Good Mental Note: Keys to Progressi11g, A.4.J Tr;ial Lawyer Magazine (SUI""...mer Edition)
Attomeys, The Internet, & Hate Speech: An Argument For An Amended Model Rule 8.4, Seattle Journal
for Social Justice (Summer 2014 issue).
Avoidance of the Dreaded Lega] Malpractice Claim, American Association for Justice Annual
Convention (Washington, D.C., July 2014)
Streamlining Client Representation: Leveraging new business structures, Law Bul1etin Seminars
(Chicago, June 2014)
Contributing Editor, InsideCounsel Magazine (January 2014.:Present)
So You Want to File a Legal Malpractice Case? American Association for Justice Annual Convention
(Chicago, June 2012)
View from the Plaintiff's Bar: Adapting Your Claims and Litigation Strategies to New and Innovative
Theories Being Brought by Your Adversaries, ACJ/LPL Legal Malpractice Conference (New York, May
2012).
A Practical Due Diligence Check.list on Preventing the Most Common Attorneys Errors in Civil
Litigation, A CI/LPL Legal Malpractice Conference (New York, May 2012)
Ethical Considerations Related to Modem Technology, Chicago Bar Association YLS Professional
Responsibility Committee (Chicago, September 2010).
"Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct," Half Moon Seminar (Chicago, October,
2006).
Moderator: Chicago Bar Association Seminars on RuJes of Professional. Conduct (December, 2009, June,
2010. December 2010, June 2011,December 2011, and June2012).
Moderator: Chicago Bar Association Seminar-State of the Profession (December 2012).
VOLUNTEER/PRO BONO EXPERIENCE
Volunteer attorney with Chicago Volunteer Legal Services (2005-Present)
Chicago Bar Association e-mentoring program mentor (2006-2007, 2012)
Brief grader; for Chicago Bar Association moot court competition (2006)
American Association for Justice (fonnerly ATLA) mock trial judge (2006)
Chicago Bar Associatfon Judicial Evaluation Com:rnittee (2009-Present)
Young Professionals Committee for Justice Mary Jane Theis (2011-2012)
Case WestemReserve University School of Law AJunuli Recruiting Coordinator (2011-:Present)
American Association for Justice Law Schools Committee (2012-Present)
Regional Coordinator American Association for Justice STAC Program (2013, 2014)
American Association for Justice NLD Education Committee (Present)

CRAR.ITABLEEXPERIENCE
Founding Member of The Up Foundation (benefits Autism Speaks)
Advisory Board Member of LifeLine Response and Clandestine Development

AWARDS AND HONORS
Dlinois Rising Stars List 2013 and 2014 (Professional Responsibility)
American Association for Justice Trial Lawyers Care Award 2014 (Finalist)
vs Hawley
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Schwager,
John R Kurtz, Jr., ISB No, 2396
Timothy R. Kurtz, ISB No. 8774
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Maio Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box.16i7
Baise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5261
Email: sschwager@haw]eycroxell.com
jkurtz@bawleytroxeJl.com
tkurtz@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank
IN" THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF IDAHO
(COEUR D'ALENE)
In Re:

)

)

MARTIN D. FRANTZ AND CYNTHIA M. · )
FRANTZ,

)

Chapter7

)

Debtors,

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Adversary Proc. No. 13-07024-TLM
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ, JR.
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE
TO PROHIBIT THE EXPERT
TESTTh10NY OP JEFFEREY KATZ

)

MAR.Tm D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
cYNTHIA M. FRANTZ1 an individual,

______________
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ JR. JN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF JEFFEREY KATZ
Martin Frantz
Hawley Troxell, etal
43576,~5
EX~B·IT
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states

I am a partner of the law fim1 of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, attorneys

of record for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank: ("IIB") in the above captioned action. I make this
affidavit and the statements contained herein based upon my personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a letter that Hawley

Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP received from Mr. Jefferey Ogden Katz of The Patterson Law
Firm LLC, dated October 16, 2014,

,.,,,

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

County of Ada

)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 28th day of November, 2014.

~~~-~
Name: Tammy N. Deerman
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My commission expires 05/30/2020

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ JR. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT EXPERT
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HEREBY
that on this 28th day of No-vember,
to served a
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R KURTZ JR. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO PROHIBIT THE EXPERT TESTitv.fONY OF JEFFEREY KATZ, by tbe method indicated
below, and addressed to each of the following:

Jonathon Frantz

0 U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid

Frantz Law, PLLC

D Hand Delivered

307 N. Llncoln St .. Ste. A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Jonathon.@cdalegaLcom

0 E-mail

Stephen B. McCrea
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 101
P.O. Box 1501
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1501

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
0 E-mail

D Overnight Mail

D Telecopy

D Telecopy

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. KURTZ JR. lN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT EXPERT
TESTThiiONY OF JEFFEREY KATZ - 3
Hawley
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October t 6. 2014

VIA REGULAR MAIL & EMAIL
Mr. Steven W. Berenter

Hawley Troxell
&77 W. :Main St.. Suite 1000
Boise. ID 838702
iberen;ter@hawleyrmx:ell.c,om

Re:

In re Marty Frantz

Dear Mr. Berenter:
By way of introduction, I am a Partner with The Patterson Law Firm LLC and have been
retained by Mr. Marty Frantz to investigate and pursue an action against your firm in
connection with youx provision of legal services to Mr. Frantz.
In order to avoid :filing a Complaint at tbis ~ime, I would like to discuss this matter with
you in order to explore the possibility of prewsuit resolution. Should you not respond to
me by Octqber 29, 2014. we will have no choice but to file a Con1plaint sollnding in legal
malpractice. I hope we can. resolve these issues without resort to that action.

[ look forward to hearing from you sooll.

cc: Marty Frantz (via email only)
Jonathon Frantz (via email only)
. :·:··

Exhibit A
Nor!h la Salle Street, Suite 2100

I Chicago, Illinois 60602 I Phone 312 Z.23

1699

I

Fax 31 l 223 8549

l www.pattersonlawfirm.C:Ql'fl
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JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH, ISB
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane~ Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455~6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxel} Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAH01 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ.

)

)
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV15-1406

)

VS.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

A.FFIDAVIT OF JACK GUSTAVEL

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss:

County of KOOTENAI

)

JACK GUSTAVEL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am the Chief Executive Officer of Idaho Independent Bank, have personal

knowledge of the matters asserted hereunder, and am competent to be a witness in this action.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an email I received

from Jeffrey Katz on March 9, 2015.

AFFIDAVIT OF JACK GUSTAVEL •
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SIGNED AND SWORN to before met
JACK GUSTAVEL.

~CITE

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State

of!daho, residing a t ~ ~
My Comm1ss1on Expires:
(
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
on the~1iay June,
to
following:

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVER.NIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

5,

Jonathon Frantz

Frantz Law, PLLC
301 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83815

~~a,..,_
Debbie Miller
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From: JeffereyKatzfmailto:Jt<atz@pattersQolawfi(Ul,com]
Sent; Monday, March 09, 2015 8:59 AM
To: Jack W. Gustavel
Subject: Marty Frantz
Mr. Gustave!I represent Marty Frantz In a newly fifed action again.st his former attorneys at the Howley Troxell firm. I would like to
discuss this matter with you and discuss how it may be flnanclally beneficial to you.
Please give me a call at your convenience.
Jefferey Ogden Katz
Partner

I

'111~

Patte,·s.on
L:1w Fi rm

One North LaSalle Street, Suite 2100
Chicago, llllnols 60602

Direct (312) 7S0.1817
Main (312) 223.1699 El<t. 104 • Fax {312) 223.8549
email I web~jte I r.na.e
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From: Jane Bodle-Hill [rnaflto:Jane.Bodle-Hlll@ll6K.NE1J
Sent: Frfday, June OS, 2015 7:58 AM
To: Shella Schwager; John Kurtz
Cc: Kurt Gustave!; Dawn L. Smfth
SUbject: FW: Malpractice Opportunity
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From: Marty Frantz [maflto;mar:tYfcaotz,d~@g.mgil.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 04, 201S 12.:49 PM
To: Jack W. Gustave!
Subject: Malpractice Opportunity

Hi Jack

From Marty

It's our 51h anniversary this week since the litigation began and I have become aware of an opporcunity that may
be of foteresc.

Hawley-TroxeJ's continued representation oflIB has created a unique situation. The Chicago malpractice law
attorney asserts it's an opportunity for not only myself but for IIB and Hawley-Troxell as well. Mr. Kacz has
never lost a case in about 500 malpractice cases he's done nationwide. He personally represented Scottie
Pippen of the Chicago B~1J1s in a malpractice case winning a high dollar settlement. Malpractice work js all he
does. At the onset, he asked me if 1would object if he were to invite IIB to join the malpractice case because
there wouJd be an advantage to Hawley-Troxell if Im joined and also the case wouJd lead to a gujcker and more
lucrative settlement for IIB and myself than H the parries relied soieiy on 3-.5 more years of litigating other
complex coumercJajms and affirmative defenses. While the request seemed somewhat unconventional on the
outset, after listening to Mr. Katz, I could not deny that the merits are compeJHng and beneficial to aJI
parties, including Hawley-Troxell.

As background, with regard to the malpractice case, Hawley-Troxel hid the truth about their koowJedge with
regard to my prior engagement of their law firm. I fortuirously rao across the payment receipt from Hawley~
TroxeJ when moving out of my home. I personally paid them ovec $ Wk on my credit card with my name on
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co assure there is no
they

Mr Katz's proposal js to draw up an agreement which pays the first $4m of insurance award funds to IIB in
exchange for transferring the l 04 acre note/mortgage ro Eagle llidge. The remaining insurance proceeds would
be spilt 50/50 between IIB and Eagle Ridge. Mr Katz's !aw firm is pursuing the case on a contingency fee
basis including taking the case through higher court appeals if so required. So there is no risk to lIB other than
3d party costs that would be pajd on a 50/50 basjs. Thfa agreement would pul IlJ3 in a position to substantially
help Hawley-Troxell which is ex.plained below.

But first, in regard to the merits of the case, the disqualification case was different than a malpractice case. We
pursued the disquaJification case as a probe so that Mr Katz could wrap his head around the issues and really
understand what happened and to see how HT would defend themselves. Mr Katz used part of that informacjon
to evaluate the merits of a high stakes future malpractice case wllich success rests upon other facts and case !aw
principles that were not of issue nor debated in the disqoalification bearing. Mr Katz 1s firm needed to decide if
the case was strong enough to compel them to pursue the future high stakes civil litigation on a contingent fee
basis. He looked at the fact that around 2008 & 2009, Mr. Clark at Hawley~Troxell was my key
.
attorney. Ironically. that case was also a malpractice matter against my previous CDA attorney regarding GAB.
the centerfold of one of the subjects of IIB·s claim against me jn lhe current litigation. As a resuJt of Mr.
Clark's work for me. I woo the malpractice case. The Chicago firm analyzed the djsquaJification case with
overwJapping JegaJ issues. AfteJWard their review was completed, they were compelled to pursue the hjgh
stakes maJpractice case in clvjJ court and to do so on a contingent fee basis. To that end, the malpractice case
against HT was recently filed in civB court.

By way of ex:.ampJe1 if the insurance award is $!Om, IlB would receive the first $4m pJus approx $2m:;;; ~6m
totaJ co JIB ($!Om~ $2m approx legaJ costs :o $8m - $4m priority to JIB ::s: $4m remaining x 50% = $2m more to
IIB = $6m totaJ to IIB). The joint litigalion agreement requires unanirnotis consear by both you and I co settle
the malpracLice case with an attencion-grabbjng exception. As long as IIB is satisfied thar the maJpractice
senlement amount is enough to extinguish/transfer the note/mortgage to Eagle Ridge, IIB can over-ride m)!
voce and I would be regufred to accept whatever settJement offer JIB so chooses for whatever amount anywhere
from $4m to $J Om or more. IIB could dedde to settle for a net of only $4m receiving 100% of net fr1surance
proceeds while EagJe Ridge would receive $ -0- and would only benefit from the note/mortgage transfer. IlB
gets to sit ln the driver's seat regarding the settJement amount and mitigate Hawley~Troxell' s liability.

an

Since we have alreadyfiJed against H~T and are pursjng the litigation with or without IIB, it would be
advantage to Hawley-TroxeJJ if Im were to join in the case to have sole control over the amoum of chat
settlement to mirigme Hawley-Troxell's risk. If I1B were not pa.rt of the case, with no obligatjon to buy out the
note/mortgage, the award funds would be used to fue! our other litigation and the amount of settlement would
not be controJJed by IIB. Otherwise, IIB can and Jikety wrn exercise their exclusive right to accept a lesser
amount due to thefr good relationship with Hawley-TroxeH, saving them $4m or more depending upon the
2
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settlement amount and how much IIB is willing to accept in ·
transferring the
note/mo1tgage lO Eagle Ridge, Therefore there is little down side
a significant benefit
1ncemive for
Hawleyr Troxell to encourage IIB to join the malpractice case.
part of the joint
once IlB uses
exclusive right to seule the case for an amount at chejr sole
and the I04 acre
is
extinguished/transferred, sjmu!taneously. IIB's sole action wHJ require all other litigation and/or claims to be
ex:dngujshed between us. Until the malpractice case is settled, which could be as early as within half a year, it
would not affect the orher numerous claims and coumerclaims which we expect will take 3-5 more years to play
out. So ic wouJd not hold up IIB's other litigation increasing the odds that a settlement wiH be forthcoming
sooner than later.

Even though this proposal is beneficial to Hawley-Troxell, Mr. Jeff I(atz @ l-312-223-1699 cannot discuss

this with H~T but is authorized to accept your other counsel· s communication to discuss and determine for
yourself rhe merits of the case and its benefit to IIB and Hawley-TroxeJI,
Tnt IHl,.'\.'iil£C"I :mJ ;tlhlt:hm.:ws hcrcut fl1Jy C'{)niJht L.t'l11fiiJcJf1t~tl mf1,ml,UH)1& ;l1\lh'l..lCtl I\) 11i.~ ~lll't'h\'' ·chttm !'Jt\ticgc !1( :mntli~, pri\ttt.:u: Titi''<n.· 1 !<l!U)IJHllt',1111-Jlf\ ;u,: u)t.:,uU-,:,J lti
bt J''1 "tl-11.! <t.JUJ 11:'U) or.u he h!(.'tHd\,wd Ht' t:Ut'}h.·d w11hucu 1111.! t:110St•U Oj 1l1c mHht?L I( JCYU heh~\ 1./ ,H\y m~•.t,:I~ h;t1, f«:'cn ~cHl lit )f.tH U1 \!J'f1n·, nti:.l!)t: mtt1I) fh1-~ \t~H,h!I' ,!n<.J ifiti1!l\~ lh~
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RJSEBOROUGH,
HAMBLEN
Sprague A venue
Washington
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007

J.~ V,

#7898

Anorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)

MARTIN FRANTZ,

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.

)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY

Case No. CV15~1406
REPLY RE OBJECTION TO MOTION
FOR PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION

)
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,
)
)
Defendant.
__ )

___

,

COMES NOW defendant Hawley TroxeJl Ennis & Hawley LLP and for its Reply to the
Response of Plaintiff regarding Defendant's Objection to Pro Hae Vice Admission submits the
following:
Plaintiff's technical response fails to provide assurance to the Court that Mr. Katz
understands the rules and witl comply wjth them. Rather it tacitly admits and attempts to excuse
Mr. Katz's inappropriate conduct. Plaintiff contends that the rules in Illinois and Idaho are the

same. Whether they are or they aren't, Mr. Katz has demonstrated either an wifamiliarity with or
a determination not to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct in Idaho.

REPLY RE OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION ·
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ARGUMENT

M:r. Katz violated
Represented by Counsel.

Rule

with Person

Plaintiff's attempt to excuse Mr. Katz's unauthorized conduct with a represented party
fails. Mr. Katz, while representing plaintiff, and while presenting to the Idaho Bankruptcy Court

that he was acting as an expen witness, contacted a represented party in that matter. No amount
of spin can change that fact. That neither Mr. Katz nor Mr. Frantz recognize this as a violation of

tbc RPC's speaks volumes. Mr. Frantz's efforts to excuse Mr. Katz's conduct fail and Pro Hae
Vice admission should be denied.

I.R.P.C. 4.2 provides that in ''representing a cl lent, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another

lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is autho1ized b~
law to do so." (Emphasis added). Plaintiff does not deny that IIB was represented by counsel at

the time it was contacted, nor that HTEH did not consent to the contact. Both the current matter
and the matter for which Mr. Katz advised Plaintiff as an ''expert" revolve around a single issue

- whether HT.EH should be disqualified. Plaintiff's excuse that Mr. Katz had his "counsel-inanother-matter" hat on - not his "expert-in-this-matter" hat on when he contacted BB should be
rejected as an effort to circumvent the spirit, if not the letter of the RPC's. This District Court
will not be well served by admitting counsel with such predilections.

B.

Mr. Katz has also violated I.R.P.C 3,3 - Candor Toward the Tribunal

There is now further evidence of Mr. Katz's misunderstanding of the Rules of

Professional Conduct. As demonstrated by the Affidavit of Jack Gustave!, as well as the
Affidavit of John Kurtz (Exhibit B to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough), certain actions of
REPLY RE OBJECTION TO MOTTON FOR
PRO HAC VtCE ADMISSION - 2
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while failing to disclose his representation of the debtor (Affidavit of John F. Kurtz, Jr.);
and

b)

The entire Motion to Disqualify HTEH was a subterfuge, authored and

directed by Mr. Katz to assess the reaction of IIB and HTEH to that motion and th.us
determine how he would hand.le Mr. Frantz's case for attorney malpractice against HTEH
(Exhibit B to Affidavit of Gustave!).
As to a), the attachment to the Affidavit of John C. Riseborough demonstrates that Mr.
Katz filed an extensive expert opinion in support of the disqualification motion. He presented
himself to the Court, not as counsel for Frantz, but as an expert witness. He did not disclose to

the Bankrnptcy Court that he was simultaneously representing Mr. Frantz in a civil action with
the same issue at its center. Mr. Katz thus failed to reveal significant infonnation impacting his

credibility and bias to the Court.
As to b), the recent emaiJ from Mr. Frantz to Mr. Gustave!, CEO of IIB, reveals that the

motion to disqualify HTEH which took up so much of the bankruptcy court's time. was a
"probe." As stated by Mr. Frantz:
We pursued the disqualification case as a probe so that Mr. Katz could
wrap his head around the issues and really understand what happened
and see how HTEH (Hawley Troxell) would defend themselves.

Thus, Mr. Frantz represents that his motion was not pursued for a legitimate, (albeit
misgujded) purpose of obtaining disqualification, but rather as a tactical device by Plaintiff's

counsel.
REPLY RE OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
PRO HAC VJCE ADMJSSlON - 3
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should be

didn't happen

that

candor
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See

this violates I.R.C.P l l(a)(l) requiring each attorney signing a pleading in Idaho

·'ihat

to

the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry ir. is

well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law . . . and that it is not interposed for any

improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
oflitigation.... " (Emphasis added). Plaintiff's "probe'' violates the tenents of that rule.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Katz knew that IIB was represented by HTEH when he made contact with its CEO
without that counsel's consent to discuss the same subject of that representation. He did not

advise the bankruptcy court of his representation of Frantz as attorney when he filed his opinions
as an expert witness. He participated in a motion that was not brought for a proper purpose, and
failed ro disclose that purpose to the com1. These actions demonstrate that the privilege of acting
as attorney in Idaho's courts should be withheld from this attorney on this occasion.

DATED this~

d~y of June, 2015.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

R.Ef>LY l{e OBJECTION TO MOTlON FOR
PR.O HAC VICE ADMISSION. 4
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Jonathon Frantz

Law,
N. Lincoln St.,
A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854

Pb: 208-262-38931 Fax: 208-262-3894
jonathon@cdalegal.com

ISB No. 9129
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,
Case No.: CV 15-1406
Plaintiff,
VS.

FRANTZ'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PRO HAC VICE
ADMISSION

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Martin Frantz, by and through his attorney of record, Jonathon Frantz
of Frantz Law, PLLC, and pursuant to the oral order issued by the Court at the hearing on this
matter on June 30, 2015 at 2:30 pm, and hereby provides the Court with bjs brief in support of
the motion to admit, pro hac vice, Mr. Katz as an attorney for Mr. Frantz.

MR. KATZ HAS NOT, IS NOT, AND WILL NOT BE A WITNESS
In Idaho Bankruptcy Adversary Case No. 13-07024-TLM, Idaho Independent Bank got
into a dispute with Mr. Frantz, wherein Mr. Frantz moved to disqualify Idaho Independent
Bank's attorneys: Hawley Troxell. However, the evidentiary hearing on the matter was set so
that Mr. Frantz only had a couple of weeks in which to prepare for the evidentiary hearing. As a
result, Mr. Frantz sought to have Mr. Katz be an expert witness in the matter. Regardless, the
No.

of
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to

matter.
as moot

therefore not adjudicated. Therefore, Mr. Katz has never been a witness for Mr. Frantz.
Furthermore, Mr. Katz has no independent knowledge about the facts that form the basis of this
matter. As a result, Mr. Katz is not and will not be a witness for Mr. Frantz in this case.

MR. KATZ SHOULD BE ADMITTED PRO HAC VICE
Idaho has no case law interpreting when pro hac vice admission shou]d not be granted.
However, other jurisdictions have met this question head on. The 5th and 11th Circuits have he)d,
The District Court may [only] refuse to admit a lawyer, otherwise qualified, on a
showing that in any legal matter ... he has been guilty of unethical conduct of
such a nature as to justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted genera1ly to the bar of
the court.
Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241,247 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Schlumberger Techs. V. Wiley,
113 F.3d 1553,1561 (11th Cir. 1997) (the 11th circuit continued to apply the same standard after
it split from the 5th circuit). Because Mr. Katz has not violated any rules of professional
conduct, let alone have cause to be disbarred, he must be granted admission.

l.

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK IS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

Mr. Katz at no point has violated any Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct by contacting
IIB because IIB is not represented in this matter. Specifically, neither Mr. Katz nor Jonathon
Frantz have ever received a letter from any attorney claiming to represent IIB in this matter.
Further, neither Mr. Katz nor Jonathon Frantz have received a cease and desist letter from any
attorney claiming to represent 11B in this matter. No such event has ever occurred because llB
indeed bas no representation in this matter.
Further, if Hawley Troxell represents IIB in this case (as alleged) there is no explanation
for Hawley Troxell's failure to every so identify itself. Clearly, Hawley Troxell is aware of the

p.
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IIB
IIB is

matter.

it cannot point to any proof showing

IIB is represented

this matter (further, Hawley Troxe11 cannot point to any proof showing that Mr. Katz or Jonathon
Frantz would have been aware of such representation).
Therefore, it is wholly appropriate for Mr. Katz to discuss this case personally with JIB
personnel because IIB is not represented. As such, no rule has been violated.

2. MR. KATZ ABIDES BY THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making false
statements of fact or law, failing to disclose controlling legal authority, or offering evidence
known to be false. Mr. Katz has never done any of those items. Mr. Katz disclosure in Case No.
13-07024-TLM was formulated to comply with the Fed. R.Civ.Pro. Rule 26(a)(2)(B), which is
very specific in its requirements. Regardless, it is completely immaterial considering the judge
there disallowed expert witnesses and ultimately dismjssed Case No. 13-07024-TLM as moot.
So, Mr. Katz never was an expert witness.
Furthermore, the laughable allegations of subterfuge are outlandish and unfounded. The

email referenced in Mr. GustaveJ's affidavit from Mr. Frantz was never reviewed by his attorney.
Plus, it should be obvious that Mr. Frantz could have been subject to scruple if he had filed a
malpractice claim without bringing a disqualification motion first (plaintiffs always have a duty
to mitigate their damages).
Additionally, Mr. Katz agreed to represent Mr. Frantz in thls case on October 7, 2014. At

the same time, Mr. Frantz and Mr. Katz set Mr. Katz's fees, which were not dependent or
contingent or affected in any why by the disqualffication hearing. So, Mr. Katz really did not
care how the disqualification motion turned out. Instead, Mr. Katz only encouraged the Frantzes
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As such, For Hawley Troxell to pretend that the sole purpose of Mr. Frantz's motion to
disqualify was to "probe" the issue is simply ridiculous and without merit. Lastly, Mr. Frantz
was represented at the disqualification hearing by Jonathon Frantz, not by Mr. Katz.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Mr. Katz has conducted himself appropriately and within the bounds of
Idaho law. Therefore, there is no cause to withhold pro hac vice admission from Mr. Katz and
he should be admitted to practice in this case.

DATED this 13th day of July, 2015.

FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
By: Isl Jonathon Frantz

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of Ju]y, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the
instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:

John C. Riseborough
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail

[X]

FAX

[ ]

Hand Delivery

Isl Jonathon Frantz

Hawley

(509) 838-0007
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Lincoln St,
Post Falls,· Idaho 838 54

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

Ph: 208-262-38931 F'ax: 208-<262-3894
jonathon@cdalegal.<::om
ISBNo. 9129

f)fPUT

~1,M';{Jd~

Attorney for Plaintiff: Martin F:ra:ntz

IN THE DISTRICT COURT ()F THE FIRST JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

Case No~: CV 15-1406

pf.•
runtiff•

vs.
DECLARATION OF JEFFERY KATZ IN

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.

SUPPORT OF MOTION FORPRO HAC

VICE ADMISSION

Defendant.

I, the. undersigned, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the followingis.ttue and correct
to the bestC>f my knowledge~

1. I am over the age of eighteen a.rid competent to testy to the matters contained herein.
2. I am an ~tt9n1ey m~ensed to practice law in Ulinois~ Wisconsiti., K~ntucky pll,lS variou.s

federal district courts (including the Seventh Circuit and US Supreme Court).
3. In 2012, I founded the American Association for Justice Professional Liability Litigation

Group.
4. In 2009- 2012 Ichaired the Chicago Bar Association Young Lawyers Section

Profession~l Responsibility Committee.
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attorney negligertce.
6. In mid to late 2014, Mr, Frantzcontacted.meregardingapotential attorney malpractice
claim against an attorney finn in Idaho.

7. Aftetrevi¢W1ngtheease, on October 7,2014 I ~greed to represent Mr. Frantz in a
malpractice action against Hawley Troxell. On that same day I forwarded to Mr. Frantz a

representation agreement which Mr~ Hantz signed.
8. I never agreed to represent. Mr. Fiantz in Idaho .Bankruptcy Ca$eN-0. 13~07024. I never
clid represent Mr.. Frantz in Case No. 13-07024.

9. that represent~on agreei;nent spelled outthe tenns and conditions by which I would
receive remuneration.

10 .. Neither the amounts! receive nor the service! provide under our representation
agreement are affected~in any way by the di~qualification hearing in ldalio Banknlptc:y
Court Case No. 13-07024.
11. Further, base9. on the fi)ings in, Case No. 13-07024, I am aware that Mr. Jonathon Frantz
and Mr. Steven McCrea, both Idaho licensed attorneys, represent Mr. Martin Frantz in
Case No. 13-07024. I havenever repre~nte4 Mr. F.rantz in Ca$e No. 13-07024.
12. Shortly after agreeing to ,represent Mr. Martin Frantz in a malpractice action ag~nst

HawleyTroxell, Mr. Jonathon F:tarttz, attomey fotMai:tio Frantz in Case No. 13-07024,
and I ha,d a con.ver~ation wht:lreby Jonathon Frantz askt::d iflvfartil). Fran,tz.ne~ed move to

disqualify Hawley TroxelLin Case No. 13~07024 to preserve the malpractice action
against Hawley Troxell,. 41 which action I had agreed to undertake representation of

Martin Frantz.
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Martin
14. illtima:fe}y, Jonathon Frantz-and 1 felt it bett~r forMartin Fra.ntzto roove to disqualify

Hawley Troxell in Case No. B-07024 to ensure that Hawley Troxell would not raise an
affirntative defense offailure to mitigate.
15 . While I was interested to see the outcome-0f the disqualification hearmg, I did not, and

do not, believe that the. outcome of the dtsqualillcation hearing has any bearingortthis
malpractice litigation as th,e two are mutually exclusive legal proceedings.
16. Ultimately, the outcome ofthe dlsqualiflcatfoii heai:ing was without effect as Case No.

13:.07024 was dismissed onmootness.
17. I have reviewed the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and I will follow them.

t8. I have never received any n<>tification from any att9mey stating thatldahOiridepertdent
Bank is represented in this above-entitled matter.

19. No employee or agent for Idaho Independent Bank has ever advised me that they are

represented by an attorney in this matter.
20. I have only ever contacted Idaho Independent Bank for the purpose of discussing the

above..entitled case.
21 . I have never been sanctioned by any barjurisdktion for any conduct.

22. I do not.have any fu.dep~ndent knowledge regarding ~ facts of the above-entitled case;
23. I will not be a witness in the above-~ntitled Ca$e.

24. I have never testified for Mr. Martin Frantz before.
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.
By:

/sf Jonathon Frantz

CERTIFICATE OF $ERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day ofJµly, 2015~ I caused ~ mi~ a.rid corr~ct~opy ofthe
lrtstrt!Inent above to he served o:nthe folkrwing in the tnamier indicated below:

John c. Riseborougp.
[ J U:S. Mail
[ ]
OterilightMaif
[X]
FAX
(50~) 838--0007
[ ]
Hand Delivery

Is/ Jonathon Frantz
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STATE OF IOAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
FILED:

CLERK DISTRICT COURT

N. Lincoln

~~1uc1:~

Post Falls, Idaho 83854

Ph:208-262-38931Fax: 208-262-3894

J

jonathon@cdalegal.com

ISB No. 9129
Attorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

Case No.: CV 15-1406
Plaintiff,
VS.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.

DECLARATION OF JONATHON
FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION

Defendant.

I, the undersigned, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct
to the best of my knowledge:

1. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to testy to the matters contained herein.
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho.
3. I represent Martin Frantz in the above-entitled case and in Idaho Bankruptcy Case No.

13-07024.
4. 1n mid to late 2014, Martin Frantz discussed with me his discovery that he had hired
Hawley Troxell before. After reviewing the material, I recommended that he contact a
legal malpractice attorney.
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be local counsel for Mr. Katz.
6. I informed both Martin Frantz and Mr. Katz that I would be local counsel on the case so
long as Mr. Katz was granted pro hac vice admission (or some other legal malpractice
attorney took on representation for Martin Frantz).
7. At about that same time, I discussed with Mr. Katz whether or not it would be beneficial
to Martin Frantz's malpractice case against Hawley Troxell ifwe moved to disqualify
Hawley Troxell.
8. I further asked if the outcome of the dismissal motion could possibly affect the
malpractice litigation.
9. To that end, Mr. Katz and I discussed the va]ue of the disqualification motion in
foreclosing Hawley Troxell's potential affirmative defense of failure to mitigate.
10. Outside of that consideration, however, Mr. Katz informed me that the disqualification
hearing outcome would have no bearing on Mr. Frantz's litigation against Hawley
Troxe11.
11. In the hearing to disqualify Hawley Troxell, I attempted to call Mr. Katz as an expert
witness; however, the judge there disallowed expert testimony.
12. As a result, Mr. Katz never acted as an expert witness for Martin Frantz.
13. Furthermore, Case No. 13-07024, in which the disqualification hearing took place, was
subsequently dismissed as moot. Therefore, there was no resolution in that case.
14. Additionally, I have reviewed the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and have passed
Idaho's required competency test thereto.
15. Mr. Katz has not violated any of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.
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17. No employee or agent for Idaho Independent Bank bas ever advised me that they are
represented by an attorney in this matter.
18. Mr. Katz will not be called as a witness in the above-entitled case.
DATED this 13th day of July, 2015.
/s/ Jonathon Frantz

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the
instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:

John C. Riseborough
[ ]
U.S. Mail
[ ]
[X]

[ ]

Overnight Mail
FAX
(509) 838-0007
Hand De1ivery

/s/ Jonathon Frantz
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Post Falls, Idaho 83815
Ph: 208-262-3893
Fax: 208-262-3894
Email: jonathon@cda1ega1.com
ISB No. 9129
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,
Case No.:CVlS-1406
Plaintiff,
V.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

RESPONSE TO HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR ABATE (I.R.C.P.
12(B)(8))

Defendant.

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Martin Frantz ("Frantz") filed a legal malpractice action against Defendant Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") on February 20, 2015 for Hawley Troxell 's
conflicted representation and revelation of confidential information submitted by Frantz to
Hawley Troxel] within the scope of the representation. Hawley Troxell claims that the instant
case should be dismissed pursuant to IRCP 12(B)(8) as the issue raised in this maner is being
litigated in a separate proceeding, the adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy
Court, District of Idaho, captioned as No. 13-07024-TLM ("Adversary Proceeding"). However,
as the Adversary Proceeding was rendered moot on May 20, 2015 and the moot proceeding has
no preclusive effect, Hawley Troxell's motion must be denied.
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II. Argument

a. Abatement pursuant to IRCP 12(B)(8) is improper, as there are no longer
two pending actions.
As Hawley Troxell recognizes, "[a]batement is the power of the trial court to dismiss or stay an
action where is similar action is a]ready proceeding in another forum. The policy behind such a
defense is to prevent concurrent litigation of the same issue in different Courts." Memorandum
of Points and Authorities, p. 5 (emphasis added). As is evident from Hawley Troxell' s
statement, for abatement to be proper, there must be two pending cases. Cases discussing
abatement similarly require two pending actions for abatement. See, e.g., Diet Center, Inc. v.
Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 237 (1999) ("since
there is no pending litigation involving the same parties and issues, this Court vacates the order
dismissing the action"). In Diet Center, a case repeatedly relied-upon by Hawley Troxell, the
Idaho District Court declined to hear the matter pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(8) due to another action
then pending in California, a decision upheld on appeal. Diet Center, Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho
20, 22-23 (Ct. App. 1994). The factual scenario presented by Diet Center, where two actions
concerning the same issue were concurrently litigated, is the axiomatic time for the use of the
doctrine of abatement. Indeed, the presence of another cun-ently pending case has been a
requirement for the invocation of the defense of abatement for nearly a century. Sanderson v.

Salmon River Canal Co., 34 Idaho 145, 162 (1921) ("As a fourth affirmative defense defendant
contends that there is another action pending in the federal court involving the same parties and
the same issues as the present action. This tenders a proper issue in abatement.").
Abatement is improper in the instant action. As detailed above, abatement requires two
pending cases. Hawley Troxell has identified the Adversary Proceeding as the second pending
action. However, on May 20, 2015, the Adversary Proceeding was rendered moot and the
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one proceeding, the case sub judice. The fact that there are not two pending cases leaves the
request for abatement moot since, as admitted by Hawley TroxeH and confirmed by the relevant
caselaw, two pending cases are required.

b. Res judicata does not apply.
Although not explicitly argued by Hawley Troxell, Hawley Troxell 's brief mixes elements of
abatement with that of preclusion. The doctrines are related, with one of the tests that determine
whether abatement is proper being "whether the other case has gone to judgment," in which case
claim and issue preclusion may bar further litigation. Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437 (1999).
Claim and issue preclusion are both inapplicable, as both doctrines require a final
judgment. Hawley Troxell appears to admit as much, noting that the Adversary Proceeding has
not proceeded to judgment at the time it filed its Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
Subsequent to the filing of its Memorandum, the Adversary Proceeding was rendered moot and
terminated. Therefore, not only was there never a final judgment, but there will never be such a
final judgment. A final judgment is required for both issue preclusion and claim preclusion.
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124 (2007) (issue preclusion requires "a final
judgment in the merits in the prior litigation"); Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68
(1994) ( claim preclusion requires a "final judgment" in order to be applied). In determining
whether an order is final in a bankruptcy proceeding for purposes of preclusion, the Idaho
Supreme Court has cited the Ninth Circuit's definition of finality in a banbuptcy proceeding.

Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68 (1994). This incorporated definition is '"one that
'ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but [execute the] judgment.'"
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and emphasis added).

Here, it is evident from the order itself that there was no end to the litigation on the merits.
Rather, as the court stated, the Adversary proceeding was rendered moot, with the trial date
vacated. As there is no final judgment on the merits, and never will be one, claim and issue
preclusion do not apply.
Moreover, ever if there was a final judgment, the difference between a motion for
disqualification and an action for 1egal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty would preclude
the issue of preclusion from being raised. Hawley Troxell avoids this issue by solely claiming
that the issue in both cases is whether there is an attorney-client relationship. However, this
disregards the differences between the issues raised in the proceedings. Rule 1.9 of the Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct, discussing conflicts of interest, applies to former clients.

In

deciding whether disqualification is proper, the moving party bears the burden of establishing the
reasons for disqualification and the court conducts a multifaceted analysis that encompasses a
variety of issues, including the timing of the motion and prejudice to the non-moving party. See
Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 697-98 (1991). A legal malpractice claim requires that an
attorney owe a duty to the Plaintiff, a different requirement than the "former client" of Rule 1. 9
that encompasses a broader category of individuals. See, e.g., Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 90 P.3d
884 (2004) (duty to testamentary beneficiaries); Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323 (2014) (duty to
recipient of opinion letter). Therefore, the issue raised in the Adversary Proceeding, although
similar, is legally distinct and would not have any preclusive effect However, as there was not
final judgment, this analysis is unnecessary as preclusion is facially improper.
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Ill. Conclusion
this case

to IRCP

threshold matter, abatement requires two concurrently pending cases. While there were two
different cases at the time the Memorandum of Points and Authorities was filed, the Adversary
Proceeding was terminated as moot. There are no longer two proceedings, and abatement is
improper. Next, issue and claim precJusion are also inapplicable, as there was never a final
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation. As a fina1 judgment on the merits is a necessary
element of both claim and issue preclusion, and the Adversary Proceeding was tenninated as
moot, there can be no preclusion. Hawley Troxell' s Motion must therefore be denied.

DATED THIS 14th day of July, 2015.
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
By: _ _ Isl_ _ __
Jonathon Frantz
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 141h day of July, 2015, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of this document upon:
John C. Riseborough
via fax at: 509-838-0007

Isl Jonathon Frantz
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Post Falls, Idaho 83815
Ph: 208-262-3893
Fax: 208-262-3894
Email: jonathon@cdalegal.com
ISB No. 9129

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,
Case No.:CVlS-1406
Plaintiff,
V.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

DECLARATION OF JONATHON
FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE
TO HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY, LLP' S MOTION TO
DISMISS OR ABATE (l.R.C.P. 12(B)(8))

Defendant.

I, the undersigned, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the following is true to the best of
my knowledge:
L I am over the age of eighteen and competent to testify to the matters herein.
2. I am an attorney licensed to practice in Idaho before the state courts, US federal court for
the district of Idaho, and the Idaho District BanlrJUptcy Court.

3. I represent Martin Frantz and Cynthia Frantz in Idaho Bankruptcy Case No. 13-07024TLM Adversary Proceeding.
4. Idaho Bankruptcy Case No. 13-07024-TLM Adversary Proceeding was dismissed by

Judge Meyers as moot on or about May 20, 2015 and the trial was vacated.
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the dockei entry (Dkt. 116) that
was posted in the case by Judge Meyers' clerk, Mel Battle.
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By: _ _
Jonathon Frantz

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 141.h day of July, 2015, I caused to be served a tme and correct
copy of this document upon:
John C. Riseborough
via fax at: 509-838-0007

/s/ Jonathon Frantz
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13-07024-TLM Hearing Held (Other)
3 messages
ecf@id.uscourts.gov <ecf@id.uscourts.gov>
To: CourtMail@idb.uscourts.gov

Wed, May 20, 2015 at 9:37 AM

***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits
attorneys of record and parties in a case (including prose litigants) to receive one free electronic
copy of all documents filed electronically, if receipt is required by law or directed by the filer.
PACER access fees apply to all other users. To avoid later charges, download a copy of each
document during this first viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the free
copy and 30-page limit do not apply.
U.S. Bankruptcy Court
District of Idaho [LIVE]
Notice of Electronic Filing
The following transaction was received from Battle, Mel entered on 5/20/2015 at 10:37 AM MDT and filed
on 5/20/2015

Case Name:
Idaho Independent Bank v. Frantz et al
Case Number:
13-07024-TLM
Document Number: 116
Docket Text:
Hearing Held
Appearances: Sheila Schwager and John Kurtz - Counsel for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank,
Steve McCrea and Jonathon Frantz~ Counsel for Defendants Martin and Cynthia Frantz, Corey
Quinn - Representing Chapter 7 Trustee
Report of Proceedings: Trial Status Conference. Argument presented regarding the effects of the
Approved Waiver of Discharge. The Court orally enters findings and conclusions. Due to the
Approved Waiver of Discharge this Adversary Proceeding is rendered MOOT. The trial scheduled to
commence on May 26, 2015 is hereby VACATED.

(RE: related document(s)[1] Complaint filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank, [115] Notice of Hearing)
(Battle, Mel)

The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:
13-07024-TLM Notice will be electronically mailed to:
Jonathon Frantz on behalf of Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz
Jonathon@cdalegal.com
Jonathon Frantz on behalf of Defendant Martin D. Frantz
Jonathon@cdalegal.com
John F Kurtz, Jr on behalf of Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank

p.4
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Stephen Brian McCrea on behalf of Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz
mccreaecf@cda.twcbc.com
Stephen Brian McCrea on behalf of Defendant Martin D. Frantz
mccreaecf@cda. twcbc. com
Sheila Rae Schwager on behalf of Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank
sschwager@hawteytroxell.com, cdavenport@hawleytroxell.com
13-07024sTLM Notice will net be electrcnically mailed to:
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JOHN RJSEBOROUOH,
PAINE HAMBLEN
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201~3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defenda11t Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, Thi AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

)

)
Plaintiff,

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,
Defendant.

Case No. CVIS-1406

)

)
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RE PRO
HACVICE OBJECTION

COMES NOW defendant, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") and
in compliance with the Court's ruiing of June 30, 2015, submits the following in response to

plaintiffs contention that the proposed admittee, Jeffrey Katz, should be admitted pro hac vice
for this action.

Defendant objected to the Motio11 for Pro Hae Vice Admission due to substantial
questions as to whether the proposed admittee (a) understood the rules as applied in Idaho courts,
and/or (b) could be expected to follow them. Plaintiffs recent filing suggests a position that
technical interpretations beyond the spirit,
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current lawsuit is a subterfuge and a sham, whose primary

is not to correct a conflict

of interest, but to obtain a source of funding to satisfy Mr. Katz's $6 million indebtedness to
Idaho Independent Bank. The Court should deny admittance pro hac vice to Mr. Katz.

PLAINTIFF'S CITATION OF AUTHORITY
Plaintiff attempts to persuade the Court it lacks any discretion to refuse admission to an
attorney seeking pro hac vice status unless it can be demonstrated that the counsel is subject to
disbannent. However the cases cited by counsel are either inapplicable, or ate contrary .to Idaho
practice. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are the two cases Mr. Frantz cites. The first, Sanders v.

Russell, does not state any hard and fast rule regarding when a federal district court should, let
alone must, allow counsel to be admitted pro hac vice. That case regards the interpretation of a
Mississippi rule which, as applied, operated to unduly restrict litigant's choice of counsel in civil
rights litigation. ''The issue is whether the petitioners had a federal right to retain counsel of their

choice in non-fee generating school segregation and civil rights cases in federal court." Sanders,
401 F.2d 241 at 244. The Court specifically notes, "This case does not involve the right ta
practice in state courts.') Indeed, in reading the Sanders case, one wonders why counsel cited it at
all.
The second case is Schlumberger Technologies v. Wylie. Plaintiff cites this case as
applying the same rule as Sanders. This case clearly applies only as a standard for a Federal

District Court in the Eleventh Circuit to apply in determining admission pro hac vice. The case
turns on the Eleventh Circuit's view that a trial court lacks discretion in arriving at a
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MR. KATZ AS A WITNESS
At the hearing in this matter, the judge requested briefing on how Mr. Katz could
represent Mr. Frantz and still be a witness in the case. Rather than addressing the circumstances
under which an attorney might act as a witness in a case where he represents a party, Frantz
baldly asserts that Katz will not be a witness, attempting to moot the issue. 1n that regard, IRPC
Rule 3. 7 provides:

Lawyer a.s Witness.
(a)
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:
(i)

The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(ii)
The testimony relates to the nature and value of
legal service rendered in the case; or
(iii)
Disqualification of the lawyer works substantial
hardship on the client.

Plaintiff does not contend that a:11y of the exceptions to that rule apply and recognizes that

Mr. Katz could not act as a witness. Rather, plaintiff asserts that there is no reason for Mr. Katz
to be a witness. Plaintiff is likely mistaken in that regard.
As the Court is aware, plaintiffs claim is that Merlyn Clark, in acting as an expert

witness, somehow became Mr. Frantz's attorney in a malpractice action he brought against the
Witherspoon Kelley firm in 2008. There is simply no evidence, other than Mr. Frantz's
testimony to his subjective belief, that any such relationship was formed. Additionally,
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Owens. In assessing the credibility of that subjective beliet: the finder of fact is entitled to
consider Mr. Frantz's motivation in bringing the suit, and hls efforts to gain Idaho Independent
Bank as an ally in that endeavor.
Although not a model of clarity, Plaintiffs Complaint appears to be seeking damages
from Hawley Troxell for his inability ''to discharge IIB's claim against him in the bankruptcy
action, including the adversary proceeding .... " (See 144, p.8, Plaintjffs Complaint and Jury

Demand.)
Mr. Frantz remains embroiled in that bankruptcy proceeding filed in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho. 1 The principal indebtedness in that bankruptcy is a
debt Frantz personally guaranteed to Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB") in the sum of
approximately $6 million. As the email from Mr. Katz. to Mr. Gustave!, IIB's CEO reveals, the
purpose of this suit against Hawley Troxell is to find a source of fonding which would relieve

, Mr. Frantz of his substantial financial obligation to IIB. Exhibit A to Affidavit of Jack Gustave!.
This purpose is confirmed by the proposal recently made by Mr. Frantz to Mr. Gustavel.

Exhibit B to Affidavit of Jack Gustave!. It is the defense's position that it is this motive, and not
a genuine subjective belief by Mr. Frantz that Mr. Clark acted as his attorney, that generated this
lawsuit.

1

Frantz's counsel is mistaken in advising the Court that the bankruptcy action, including the adversary proceeding
filed by Tdaho lndependent Bank., has been dismissed. No dismissal has been entered and, as seen by the Affidavit
of Sheiia Schwager and the Court's docket (Exhibit B), there are two substantial matters still pending
detennination by the Bankruptcy Court before the adversary proceoding is dismissed.
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basis and reasoning behind his contact, and what financial benefit he had

mind as

suggested in that message. As the Court observes, this forms a solid basis for refusing Mr. Katz's
admission pro hac vice for this action.

THE ''IT DIDN'T HAPPEN HERE" EXCUSE
Plaintiff again contends that because Mr. Katz was representing ML. Frantz in this state
court action, his contact with IIB ex parte while realizing that JIB was represented by Hawley
Troxwell in the bankruptcy action is excusable. This even though he knew the purpose of that
call was to ask IIB to agree to accept payment of Frantz's indebtedness being litigated in the
bankruptcy action in lieu of that bankruptc~ proceeding. His excuse is "Well, that was in another
action."
Mr. Katz's actions clearly violate the spirit of the mle. The Court should ask itself, "Why
do we have such a rule'?" Besides the unseemliness of such conduct, the law recognizes that Jay
persons are at a substantial disadvantage in dealing with attorneys. Mr. Katz was clearly seeking
to influence the action being pursued by IIB in the bankruptcy through its counsel Hawley
Troxell, or to undermine IIB's confidence in its counsel. Contending that this Court should

ignore that conduct because it happened in another action in another jurisdiction should be
rejected. Pointedly, plaintiffs current counsel has not cited any Bar Opinion, or legal authority

support such conduct as permissible.
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his position as counsel for Mr. Frantz while submitting an evidentiary declaration for the
Court (who would be the finder of fact) to consider, is a "no harm, no foul" argument. According
to counsel and Mr. Katz, it is perfectly all right for him, as an officer of the Court, to hide his

bias and the factors which could affect his credibility from a court that he knows will be acting as
finder of fact in considering the evidentiary materials he is submitting. Plaintiff's response is:
"Well, the judge didn't allow expert testimony." That response, as with plaintiffs prior
responses, underscores counsel's lackadaisical attitude towards this Court's rules.
Finally, on the related issue of the purpose of the Disqualification Motion, plaintiff
submits no evidence.
Plaintiffs response to the e-mail of Mr. Frantz is to denigrate the allegation, rather than

rebut it. Counsel calls the allegation that the Motion to Disqualify was a subterfuge as
"laughable," as well as "outlandish" and "unfounded." Plaintiff fails to submit any evidence,
however, that the Motion to Disqualify was a proper motion brought for a proper purpose. 2
Plaintiff's new contention is that the Motion was brought, "so they couldn't say we failed to
mitigate." Whether that's creative after-the-fact thinking by counse) or the actual purpose behind
the motion is really irrelevant to the Court's determination.
There is the matter of the Declaration of Jeffrey Katz. At the time of the hearing in this
matter, Frantz' s current counsel insisted that Mr. Katz wanted very badly to respond to the
allegations. However, rather than recognizing the questionable nature of his conduct or
2

Indeed plaintiff's counsel has not submitted anything which could be properly considered as evidence by this
Court. Plaintiff submitted two "Declarations," neither of which are sworn.
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provided under oath) contains the same erroneous assettions

that by Jonathon Frantz, i.e., that

the adversary proceeding has been dismissed for mootness.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff fails to excuse the complained of conduct. Further, the defense intends to assert
as part of its defense that this suit is a device created solely for the purposes of seeking to relieve
Mr. Frantz of his indebtedness to Idaho Independent Bank. The defense intends to challenge

Mr. Frantz's credibility as to his subjective beJief that an attorney-client relationship existed by
demonstrating his delay in expressing that beJief, the timing of his complaint, and he and his

counsel's effort to engage IIB in a judgment sharing agreement to extinguish Frantz' s substanti.al
indebtedness to that bank. This evidence will likewise :rebut Mr. Frantz's excuse for waiting to
make the claim that Mr. Clark was his attorney until the eve of his bankruptcy t1ial for fraud.
(Mr. Frantz's testimony is that he either forgot, or didn't think of it until then.) Mr. Katz clearly
has relevant testimony in that regard and will likely become a witness in this action.
For the reasons stated, the Court should decline to adroit Mr. Katz for the purposes of this
action.
RESPECTFULLY SUB:MITTED this

ACJ day of July, 2015.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
C. Riseborough, ISB #7898
ttomeys for Defendant
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RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RE PRO HAC VlCE
OBJECTlON - 8

Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 838S4
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good .standing and are associated with locallyadmitted counsel in nonfee generating school
desegregation and civil rights cases in federal
courts were not precluded, by limitation to
nonfee generating cases, from seeking attorney's
fees in appropriate cases. Civil Rights Act of
1964, §§ 204(b), 706(k), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a3(b), 2000e-5(k),

Honorable Dan M. RUSSELL, Judge, United
States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, Respondent.
Joan ANDERSON et al., Petitioners,

v.
Honorable William Harold COX, Judge,
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, Respondent.
Nos. 25797, 25815.

5 Cases that cite this headnote

Sept 18, 1968.

Petitions for mits of mandamus from the United States
DiStrict Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Dan
M. Russell, Jr., J., and William Harold Cox, Chief Judge,
to determine validity of District Court ru1e. The Court of
Appeals, Dyer, Circuit Judge, held that District Court rule
permitting pro hac vice appearance by out-of-state anorneys
in nonfee generating civil rights cases only if attorney is
nonresident, in only one case in any 12~Month period, and
only if attorney has been admitted to state bar for at least 5
years unless federal district cow1 of his home state admits
Mississippi attorneys under more lenient rule contravened
Congressional intent as embodied in civil rights acts, imposed
unreasonable limits and was invalid.

(3)

Federal district courts ha'Ve broad discretion
in prescribing requirements for admission to
practice before them in most cases, but their rules
must be consistent with acts of Congress. 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1654, 2071.
l Cases that cite this headnote

(4]

Fede:ral Courcs
.., Particular cases, contexts, and questions

6 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorney and Client
.,_ Rules of court
Federal district courts have valid interest in
regulating qualifications and conduct of counsel,
their availability for service of court papers, and
their amenability to disciplinary proceedings. 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A.

West Headnotes (15)

Court of Appeals had supervisory power to grant
writ of mandamus to prohibit district court from
enforcing rule which had effect of precluding
nonresident attorneys from appearing in civil
rights cases under specified circumstances. 28
U.S.CA §§ 2071, 2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A.

Attorney !\nd Client
e= Rules of coUrt
Attorney and Client
€1=> Jurisdiction to admit

Writs granted.

[l]

!:heir choice who are attorneys in

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[5J

Attorney and Client
..., Rules of court
Federal district court rules regulating
qualifications and conduct of counsel ,nust be
designed to preserve and protect decorum and
dignity of profession. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071,
2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 U.S,C,A
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Di.strict court rule pennitting pro hac vice
appearance by out-of-state attorneys in nonfee
rights cases
if ,,,.,.,,,r,.,~,.,
vw•~·~"··

in

one case in

month

and
has been
ad.mined to state bar for at least 5 years unless

attorney

federal district coui-t of his home state admits
Mississippi attorneys under more lenient rule
contravened Congressional mtent as embodied
in civil rights acts, imposed unreasonable limits
and was invalid. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 2072;
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A

Trial court cannot substitute its judgment for that
of litigant u1 choice or number of counsel that
litigant may feel is required to properly represent
:his interests.
2 Cases that cite this headnote

3 Cases that cite this headnote
[71

Attorney and Client
$:;, Jurisdiction of Courts
Federal district court is free to Md should take
measures against unethical conduct by attorneys
if and when it occurs in connection with any
proceeding pending before it.

[111

Federal district court rnay refuse to admit lawyer,
otherwise qualified, on showing that in any legal
matter, whether before the particular district
court or in another jurisdiction. he has been
guilty of unethical conduct of such nature as to
justify disbarment of lawyer admitted generally
to bar of the court. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071, 2072;
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A.

9 Cases that cite this headnote
(81

Attorney and Clieut
$;> Admission of practitioners .in different
jurisdiction

Federal courts cannot be used to serve local
interest in assuring dues paying support of
local bar association by limiting pro hac vice
appearance of out-of-state aLtomeys in 11011fee
generating civil rights cases. 28 U.S.C.A. §§
2071, 2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28
U.S.C.A

5 Cases that cite this headnote
(12]

Civil Rights
.,. Appointment of Counsel
ln nonfee generating civil rights cases, only
reasonable limits can be placed on federal
litjgant's choice of counsel. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071,
2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28 U.S.C.A.

15 Cases that cite this headnote

l Cases that cite this headnote
(131
[10}

Attorney and Client
~ Admission of practitioners in different
jurisdiction

Atl"orney ind Client
ea Admission of practitioners in different
jurisdiction
Privilege of pro hac vice appearance is available
to out-of-state attorney whether he comes into
tlle district on the day of appearance or whether
he resides in the state on a 11onpermanej1t basis,
so long as local counsel, generally admitted to
district court's bar, is associated. 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2071, 2072; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 83, 28
U.S.C.A.

11 Cases that cite this headnote
(9]

Attorney and Client
i= Admission of practitioners· in different
jurisdiction

Attorney and Client
.., Admission of practitioners in different
jurisdiction
Association of out-of-state attomey with local
counsel admitted to district court's bar satisfies

JVL/LU/LUl'.J/!VlVI~ UL:ur

rm

r. ul j

reasonable interest
district court in having
of its bar professionally responsible for
§§ 2071,

that

headnote

Opinion
l14]

CivilRights
""" Criminal law e11forcement; prisons
Bvidence established that plaintiff who had
brought series of suits under Civil ru ghts Act was
engaged in patently vindictive scheme to harass
law enforcement officials and was not entitled
to court appojntment of counsel. 28 U.S.CA §
1915(d); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Cases that cite this headnote

DYER, Circuit Judge:
We are called upon in these mandamus proceedings to
determine the validity of the rule of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi limiting the
pro hac vice appearance of out of state attorneys as applied
in non-fee generating ci\>il rights cases. T.t\at rule, which
was promulgated on September 26, 1967, 1 imposes three
limitations upon such appearances:
( 1) A pro hac vice appearance by an attorney is permitted only

[l5J

Civil Rights

if he is a nonresident of the State of Mississippi;

.., Appoit1tment of Counsel
Court may decline to appoint counsel for
indigent plaintiffs in order to protect defendants
from malicious suits under Civil Rights Act. 28
U.S.C.A § 1915(d); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Cases that cite th.is headnote

(2) A pro hac vice appearance by an attomey is permitted i.11
only one case in any twelve month period and;

*243 (3) A pro bac vice appearance by an attorney can be
made only if he has been admitted to a state bar for at least
five years, unless the federal district court of his home state
admits Mississippi attorneys under a more lenient rule, in
which event the more lenient rule applies. 2

Attorneys and Law Firms
*242 Jonathan Shapiro, Jackson, Miss., John H. Schafer,
Washington, D.C., for James E. Sanders.

R L. Goza, Canton. Miss., William A. Allain. Jackson, Miss.,
John C. Satterfield, Yazoo City, Miss .• for Judge Dan M.
Russell,
Melvyn Zarr, Jack Greenberg, New York City, Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Philadelphia. Pa., Paul Brest and Marian
E. Wright, Jac.kso11, Miss., William T. Coleman. Jr.,
Philadelphia, Pa., for Joan Anderson and others,
Jol111 C. Sattel"field, Yazoo City, Miss., for Judge William
Harold Cox.

Erskine W. Wells, Jackson Miss., for intervenor Miss. State
Bar.

The Rule as to Nonresident Attorneys was applied to
refuse admission pro hac vice in the District Court to
Lawtet1ce Aschenbrenner, a.11 attorney employed full time
by the Lawyers' Committee for Ci.Vil Rights Under Law,
in a damage sttlt under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, because he
had already appeared in one other case in the District
Court within the preceding twelve months. Jonathan Shapiro,
another Lawyers' Committee Attorney, was also prevented,
by application of the Rule, from appearing pro hac vice in
a similar suit,. and Paul am:J Iris Brest, attorneys employed
by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund were
prevented from appearing pro hac vice in seven school
desegregation suits. The applications of the latter three
attorneys were denied bacause they were not 'nonresident
attorneys.' The Rule, as interpreted by the respondent Judges
and by the Jackson Division Attorneys' Comity Committee, 3
makes the pro hac vice privilege unavailable to attorneys
tempor8rily residing in Mississippi, and those three attorneys
had been resid:u1g in Mississippi for limited periods while
working for their respective civil rights organizations.
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At the outset the respondents assert that this Court
run.sCllcticm to entertai11 the petitions
no supervisory power to question rules
not
with,

States Supreme Court, 4 *244 and in any event mandamus is
not the proper remedy. These argunients are patently without
merjt. It and as we later make clear there is no if, the Rule
is not 'consistent vvith Acts of Congress' because it has the
effect of precluding nonresident attorneys from appearing
in civil rights cases under the circumstances here shown,
there is no doubt of our supervisory power by the grant
of a writ of mandamus to prohiM the District Court from
enforcing i.ts rtile, As the S'Upreme Court said in La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co., 1957, 352 U.S. 249, 2:59-260, 77
S.Ct. 309, 315, l L.Ed.2d 290: 'We believe that supervisory
control of the District Cotuts by the Courts of Appeals is
necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal
system. The AJl Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals
the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the
exceptional circumstances existing here.' 'While sounding the
usual caveat that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to
be used under exceptional circumstances lest it become a
substitute for an appeal or interlocutory appeal, we echoed in
In re Watkins, 5 Cir. 1959, 271 F.2d 771, 76 A.L.R.2d 1113,
what had been said in La Buy and granted the writ, finding
that the 'procedure (of referring the case to a special master)
nullifies the right to an effective trial before a constitutional
court.' Id. at 775. Finally, in considering the requirement of a
local rule providing inter ali.a for the signature by a member
of the bar of the Southern District ofMississippi on a removal
petition under the Civil Rights Act, we said in a mandamus
proceeding that 'such rules may not be allowed i:o operate in
such a way as to a.bridge the right of any class of litigants to
use the federal courts or to deny the Sixth Amendme11t right
of criminal defendants to counsel of their own choice.' Lefton
v. City of Hattiesburg, 5 Cir, 1964, 333 F.2d 280,285; see
also Alexander v. Cox, 5 Cir. 1965, 348 F.2d 894.

Substantial allegations were made in the petitions that the
Rule affected fundamental rights and that its adoption was
beyond the authority of the District Court We do not doubt
our power to grant the writ,. nor that sound discretion dictates
that the writ be granted.
(2] 'I\un.ing to the Rule itself, the issue is a narrow one.
A summary of what is and what is not involved in this case
will put the question before us in better focus. The petitioners'
position. is simply that they have a federal right to retain
Frantz vs Hawley
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counsel of their choice who are anomeys in good standing at
bars and are
locally-admitted
COUJ.1Sel ii1110,1-fee generating school desegregation and

their

rights cases in federal court. 5
the right of non
to
case does not
involve the right to practice in state courts. This case does
not involve the right to general admission to a federal district
cou1t. This case does not involve the right of attorneys to
be adtnined pro hac vice without association with locally
admitted counsel This case does not involve fee-generating
cases. This case does involve the need for :free legal services in
civil rii;hts cases. Out of twenty- "'245 two hundred lawyers
in Mississippi, only twelve are negroes. Of course, all twelve
are not always available. This is obviously an inadequate
reservoir. Moreover, there is ample evidence in the record
to demonstrate the burdens of counsel handling such cases,
see Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80
Harv.L.Rev. 1711, 1722 (1967), as well as the petitioners'
inability to obtain representation, which, parenthetically, is
borne out by literally hundreds of civil rights cases that hav-e
come to us in which out of state lawyers have had the laboring
oar. lt is no overstatement that in Mississippi and the South
generally 11egroes with civil rights claims or defenses have
often found securing representation difficult. Lefton v. City
of Hattiesburg, supra. As the Supreme Court pointed out in
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,443, 83 S.Ct. 328,343,
9 L.Ed.2d 405,

Lawsuits attacking racial discrimination, at least in Virginia,
are neith.er very profitable nor very popular. They are not an
object of general competition among Virginia lawyers; the
problem is rather one of an apparent dearth of lawyers who
are willi11g to lin.dertake such litigation. (Footnote omitted.)
On the showing made in this case the ci-vil rights climate
in Mississippi is not unlike that of Virginia. Furthermore,
in damage cases brought by negro plaintiffs against white
defendants, the slight chance of contingent fee recovery does
not suggest that economic benefits are or will be such as to
outweigh, for appreciable numbers of Mississippi lawyers,
their reluctance to become identified wtth the negro civil
rights effort. Under these circumstances it is imperative that a
local rule not be applied in such a way as to abridge the right
of civil rights litigants to use the federal court.
(3) As we said in limine, the district courts have broad
discretion in. prescribing requirements for admission to
practice before them in most cases, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654, but
their rules must 'be consistent with Acts of Congress; 28
§ 2071.
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omecttid the
1,,;u1.am,ui:11.1uu of federal law, common
and state law as will
best 'adapted to the
the civil rights laws. Rev.Stat. § 722 (1875), applying
to Title XIII, Rev.Stat.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see 28 U.S.C. §
1443, formerly Rev.Stat.§ 641 (187.S); 42 US.C.A. § 1988
note. Therefore, a federal court is required to use common
law powers to facilitate, and not to hinder, 'proceedings in
vindication of civil rights.' 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

whatever its source, that
choice

m

rights litigation cannot be sustained.
(6) Apart from the Rule (the rule does not attempt to
prohibit pro hac vjce admission simply because the court may
determine that certain lawyer's participation in a given case
is unnecessary), lack of necessity- in the judge's viewsimply is not and cannot be a proper basis for exclusion in
these cases. The trial court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the litigant in the choice or number of counsel that the
litigant may feel is required to properly represent his interests.

Lefton v. City of Haniesbu.rg, supra, 333 F.2d at 284~
accord, Brown v. City of Meridian, S Cir. 1966, 356 F.2d
602, 605. The Rule as here applied clearly contravenes the
Congressional intent as embodied in the civil rights acts.
[4]
[SJ We recognize that the District Court has a Amicus Curiae, the Mississippi State Bar, arguing in support
valid interest i11 regulating the qualifications and conduct
of the Rnle, points our that It has a vital interest in the ethical
of counsel, their availability for service of court papers,
conduct of lawyers and the disciplinary action to be taken
and their amenability to discipli.nary proceedings. See Note,
in the event of misconduct. 7 The State has basically three
Constitutional Right to Ei,gage An Out-of-State Attorney, 19
interests that need to be given cotisideration. The interest in
Stan.L.Rev. 8.56, 866 (1967). But the assertion of the District
maintaining high levels of professio11al ethics, the financial
Court's regulatory interest cannot justify a rule that limits the
or economic interests of the members of the Mississippi bar,
number of pro nae vice appearances, whether it be to one
and the interest in assuring a high quality of representation.
case a year or three cases a year. The respondents coITectly
[7] We can envisage no difficulty in maintaining standards
state that the rules of the trial court must be 'designed to
of professional ethics, The pro hac vice admissio11 is to
preserve and protect decorum and the dignity of an honored
the fedetal not state cot1It. The federal court is free to and
profession.' 6 It is difficult *246 to see how the concern
should take measures against ui1er:hical conduct if and when
of the District Court in decorum, digi:ity, compete1,cy, good
it occurs jn com1ection with any proceeding pet,du1g before
character or amenability to service and discipline is served by
it. Necessary sanctions may be imposed not only directly,
a numerical limitation.
but through the bar of which the pro hac vice lav.,yer is a
member, as well as through the local lawyer with whom be is
associated. Non-resident lawyers who stay for any significant
Nor can we find any valid basis for denying the p;ivilege of
period of time, as bas been the pattern with those employed by
pro hac vice appearances in civil rights litigation to out-of.
the various civil rights organizations, and who do not confine
state anomeys who reside in the state on a temporary basis.
their practice within the limits prescribed by their pro hac Vice
This is particularly true here where the residence requirement
admission are subject to appropriate action by the State of
of the state bar is such as to prevent them from qualifying for
Mississippi for unauthorized practice oflaw. Miss.Code Ann.
admission to t1,e bar of the District Court for a long period
§ 86&2 (1942).
of time.

No reason has been suggested and we know of none why
admission for five years should be a pre-requisite for a pro had
vice appearance in civil rights cases. This provision has no
para! lei in the rules of other courts, it does not require practice
but orily admission for five years, and .it is not requjred
for general admission to the bar of the Southern District of
Mississippi. Rule l, Rule Regulating Admission ofAttomyes,
July 10, 1962. It thus cannot be said to serve the purpose of
insuring a certain level of competence in representation.
Frantz

[8] The financial or econo:mic interest of the members of
the Mississippi bar are not snbstantially affected. True, the
local bar association will not receive dues paying support,
but the federal courts cannot be used to serve such a local
interest. Al1d si11ce we are here concerned with free legal
services in the represe11tation of civil rights litigants, this is
not ·a commercializatio11 of the legal profession which might
threaten the moral and ethical fabric of the admiili.stration of
justice.' *247 Brotherhood ofRailroad Trainmen v. Virginia
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Virginaia State Bar,
L£d.2d

377

l, 6, 84 S.Ct 11

a
civil rights cases is to be expected. His admission to a state
bar is a basic determinant both of the attorney's professional
qualification and good moral character because the state bar
is the standard-setting body that .initially investigates and
actively takes steps to insure that the canons of professional
ethics are obser11ed, This is borne out by the fact that in
most federal district courts in the United States, including the
Southern. District of Mississippi, membership in the state bar
is sufficient qualification for general admissfo11 to the district
court bar. Association with a local lawyer gives the nonresident lawyer a source of knowledge about local rules and
procedures and their proper application to the case at hand.
Moreover, in the context of civil rights litigation, an out-ofstate la-wyer :frequently develops an expertise because of his
specialization in this field.
In sum, bearing in mind what we have said about what this
case does a11d does not involve, we are unable to perceive
how the regulatory powers of either the District Court or the
MississippS State Bar over professiooaJ conduct can be or are

r. UlO

This cal1l.'lot be accomplished when, as so often happens in
this district, different

at various stages of

the proceedings, with little or no knowledge of what has
theretofore trru1spired io the case, Delays resulting from such
unpreparedness necessarily encroach upon valuable judicial
time. 9 Reasonable conditions may be imposed to insure
that the same counsel will continue in the case until it is
concluded to insure against delays and other administrative
inefflci encies that are inherent in the rotation of counsel and
to avoid the necessity of ccmtinuances because of substitution
of counsel. The District Court may refuse to admit a lawyer,
otherwise qualified, on a showing that in any legal matter,
whether before the particular district court o:r in another
jurisdiction, he has been guilty of unethical conduct of sucn a
nature as to j1.1stify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally
"248 to the bar of the court. See In re Ruffalo, 1968, 390
U.S. 544. 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117. The privilege
of pro hac vice appearance in such cases is available to a
lawyer wbether he comes in to the district on the day of
appearance or whether he resides in the state:. on a nonpermaoent basis, so tong as local counsel, generally admitted
to the District Coutt's Bar, is associated. Such association
satisfiesthereasonableinterestoftheDistrictCourtinhaving
a member of its Bar, who is subject to the court's general
control. be professionally responsible for the litigation and

8

affected.
who can be served with papers, can be notified of hearings and
(9] [10] [llJ
[12) [l3} In these non-fee generatirt&.n be held accountable if anything reflecting on the Court
civil rights cases it is clear that only reasonably limits can be
or an abuse of its process occurs during the course of the
placed on a federal litigant's choice of counsel, ai1d we find
litigation. fa this rule there is no need for active participation
that the limits here established by the 'Rule as to Nonresident
in the conduct of the litigation by associated counsel. lO
Attorneys' are not reasonable. In our view the District Court
must grant pro hac vice admissions in such cases upon a
showing that an individual lawyer is a member in good
The District Court's Rule as to Nonresident Attorneys is
standing of the bar of some state, without limitation in terms
invalid.
of years of practice or admission. The District Court may not
Writs Granted,
limit the number of appearances that the lawyer ca.11 make in
such cases. This is not to say or even intimate that the District
Court's control over its docket, pretrial procedures and triais
All Citations
js to be in anywise diminished. Jt is the responsibility of the
District Court to keep its dockets current by the expeditious
401 F.2d 241, 12 Fed.R,Serv,2d 1395
disposition of pretrial motions, hearil1gs and the trial of cases.
Footnotes

1
2

Prior to September 26, 1967, pro hac vice admission to the District Court merely required that a member of the bar of
that court move the admission of a non-resident attorney. 'Rule Regulating Admission of Attorneys,' July 10. 1962.
RULE AS TO NONRESIDENT ATTORNEYS
1. Any attorney admitted to practice in a state other than Mississippi and not qualified to practice in the courts of Mississippi
may be permitted by this Court be comity to appear and participate in the particular case, when introduced to the Court
with such recommendation by an attorney in good standing at the bar of lhls Court; but, no nonresident attorney shall be
vs
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thus admitted by comity to appear In more than one case in any calendar year, or within the space of twelve months; and
no such attorney shall be thus permitted to appear ln any case under this rule unless such
has been admitted
to practice for at least five years before !he Court of the state from which he
she comes. unless be shown to this
Court that the federal court of such state from which the attorney comes admits attorneys from Mississippi to practice by
comity under a more favorable or relaxed
in which even! such more relaxed rule will be applled by this Court
No person not admitted to the bar of this Court, or expressly authorized by order of the Court to appear before the Court
in any case shall participate in any manner or to any extent in any discovery proceeding for or as an attorney (or present
any matter to the Court for an order}; or affix his name or permlt his name to be affixed to any motion or pleading in any
case in this Court as attorney for any litigant; and any Infraction or violation of this rule or any part thereof will be treated
and considered by the Court as a direct contempt in the presence of the Court and summarlly puntshed accordingly.
On October 2. 1967. the District Court entered an order appointing an Attorneys' Committee for the Jackson Division to
process applications of nonresident attorneys and to make findings and recommendations thereon.
Respondents cite no case law in support of their argument and seemingly rely on the text of the rules themsleves: 28
U.S.C .A.§ 2071, The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules
for the conduct of their business, Such rules shall be consistent with Act of Congress and rules of practice and procedure
prescribed by the Supreme Court: 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072. 'The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules, the forms of process, writs. pleadings. and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts and courts
of appeals of the United States in civil actions. including admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the
practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United
States and for the judlclal review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers/
Rule 83, Fed.R.Civ.P .. 'Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to time make
and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by
any district court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In all cases not
provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.'
The limitation to non-fee generating cases does not preclude petitioners from seeking attorney fees In appropriate cases.
The award of attorney's fees pursuant to Titles II and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-3(b).
2000e-5{k); Newman v. Piggie Park. Enterprises. Inc .. 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (U.S. March 18, 1968)
rs not In conflict with a policy of refusing to accept fees from clients.
Respondent's Response. p. 17, in Anderson v. Cox. We have been unalbe to find a scintilla of evidence in the entire
record which would lead to an inference that there had been or will be any dimlnishment of decorum or dignity because
of the pro hac vice admission of petitioners.
There is no suggestion in the record or briefs.- Indeed none could have been made- that the integrity of any of the
lawyers irwolVed In this Jitigatioh is in Question.
Since we are not here concerned with the right of non-lawyers to practice law. the State Bar's reliance upon Hacldn v.
Arizona et al .. 1967, 389 U.S. 143, 88 S.Ct. 325, 19 L.Ed.2d 347; Darby v. Mississippi State Board of Bar Admissions,
Miss.1966, 165 So2d 6B4 is misplaced. likewise the right to practice in the state courts is not involved. See Theard
v, United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 278, 77 $.Ct. 1274, 1 L.Ed.2d 1342. General admission to the District Court is not in
issue, thus the State Bar's insistence upon Application of Wasserman, 9 Cir., 1956, 240 F.2d 213 is unavailing. Our
Interpretation of Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp .• 2 Cir., 1966, 364 F.2d 161 is more Favorable to the petitioners than
to respondent and we find Martin v. Walton. 1961, 368 U.S. 25, 82 S.Ct. 1, 7 L.Ed.2d 5, readily disinguishable on the facts.
This problem Is acute and recurring. As many as four or more law;ers have initially signed pleadings and then in a rotating
fashion have appeared at successive hearings. Not infrequently new counsel have been substituted for one or more of
those lnltlally appearing.
After this case was orally argued the District Court. on June 12. 1968, promulgated another rule requiring, inter alia,
that 'every lavvyer who signs or permits his name to be listed as counsel. for either party in any case shall appear In
person in that case, unless such counsel (and each counsel who appears) is released by an order of this Court entered
on notice to the client. or approved by the client.' We think this rule Is overly broad and thus invalid as applled to nonfee generating civil rights cases. We presume that it was promulgated by the District Court to eliminate the problem of
successive counsel appearing at different stages in the proceedings. If so, it can no doubt be re-cast in the light of what
we have heretofore said.

End or Documant
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hac vice

admission of attorney a:nd its interpretation of
that standard is subject to de novo review, and
in reviewi11g district court's interpretation and
appljcation ofthe Rules of Professional Conduct,
which involves mixed question of law a:nd fact,
Court of Appeals does not defer to district court's
dete1minations.

SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., a Delaware corporation, PlaintiffCounterclaim-Defendant-Appellant,
V.

G. Dan WILEY; Robe.i.'1:A. Fergusson;
Donald Bahouth, DefendantsCounterclaim-Plaintiffs-Appellees.

6 Cases that cite this headnote

Junes, 1997.
The United States District Court for the Southein District
of Alabama, No. 94-0118-AH-M, Alex 'T. Howard, Jr., J.,
denied attorney's pretrial application for admission pro hac
vice, though not :fo1ding that attorney violated any specific
ethical rules, and certified interlocutory appeal. The Court of
Appeals, Birch, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) denial of pretrial
pro hac vice admission required showing ofunethical co11duct
of such nature as to justify disbarment of lawyer admitted
generally to the bar of the district court, and (2) Court of
Appeals reviews district court's factual findings for clear enor
and application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to the
facts de novo, and does not apply abuse of discretion standard
where conduct does not occur in front of the district court and
is not of type to disrupt proceedings before the court.

[3]

6 Cases that cite this headnote

Vacated and remanded.
(4]

jurisdiction

Denial of pro hac vice admission to applicant

Federal Courts
~ Particular Actions and Rulings
When district court certified for interlocutory
appeal po1tion of its order denying admission pro
hac vice of attorney, refusal to certify portio11
of its order striking certain declarations did
not place that portion of the order beyond the
jurisdiction of the CoUrt of Appeals. 28 U,S,C.A.
§ 1292(b).
6 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorney and Client

+- Admission of practitioners in different

West Headnotes (8)

{l]

Federal Courts
~ Counsel
On appeal of denial of pro hac vice admission
to no1weside11tattorney, Court of Appeals would
review district cowt's factual findings for clear
error and its application of Rules of Professional
Conduct to the facts de novo, rather than
applying abuse of discretion standard, even
though attorney's conduct was related to the case
at bar, where the conduct occmred before action
was filed and not in front of the district court a11d
was not of a type to disrupt proceedings before
the comt, and where decision to deny admission
turned on application of the relevant Rules.

who is member in good standing of a state
bar may not be denied except on showing of
unethical conduct of such narore as to justify
disbannent of lawyer generally admitted to the
bar of the district court.
11 Cases that cite this headnote
[S}

Attorney and Client
~ Disqualification proceedings; standing
Where district court's order disqualifying
attorney is based on allegation· of ethical
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Schlumberger Technologies,

.. ,,ey, 113 F.3d 1553 {1997)

65 USLW 2618. 10 Fia_ L_ Weekiy t-ed. C 979

violation, court may not simply rely on
general :inherent power to admit and suspend
attorneys, without any limit on such power,
but instead must dearly identify specific Rule
of Professional Conduct
is applicable to
the relevant jurisdiction and must conclude that
the attorney violated that rule, which is a legal
conclusion subject to foll appellate review
23 Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Attorney and Client
'i= Disqualification proceedings; standing
Standards governing disqualification of attorney
already admitted to appear before the district
court differ, depending on the circumstances; if
condtlct at issue threatens disruption of court
proceedings or there is deliberate challenge
to authority of district court, Cou1t of
Appeals gives great deference to trial court's
decision to disqualify, but otherwise Court
of Appeals insists that diStrict colli1S rest
disqualification decisions on violation of specific
Rules of Professional Conduct, not on some
transcendental code of conduct that exists only in
the subjective opinion of the court
10 Cases that cite this headnote

[7)

Attorney and Client
fe Disbarment: Revocation of License
Power of d1strict court to disbar attorney from
practice before the court is one that ought
always to be exercised with great caution and
ought never be exercised except in dear cases
of misconduct, which affect the standing and
character of party as anorney.

6

that

this ne.ionoite

Attorneys and Law Firms
"1554 Champ Lyons, Jr., Helmsing, Lyons, Sims & Leach,
Mobile, AL, Jobn H. Pickering, Alex E Rogers and A.
Stephen Hnt, Jr., Washington, DC, for Appellants.
H. William Wadsden, Rachel Sanders-Cochran, Donald F.
Piefce, Forrest S. Latta, Pierce, Ledyard, Latta & Wasden,
P.C.; Orrin K. Ames, m, P. Russel Myles, Jerry A.
McDowell, Ha11.d, Arendall, L-1.C.; James E. Atchison, G.
Da11 Wiley, Hess & Atchison; William B. Jackson, II and
Donald Bahouth, Mobile, AL, for Appellees_

Appeal :from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama.
Before BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and
:MICHAEL*, Senior District Judge.

Opinion
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
The issue in this appeal is the standard that govems a district
court's decision to deny a party's motion on behalf of a nonresjdent attorney for admission pro hac vice. The district
court denied admission pro hac ,,tee to plaintiffs counsel,
even though it did not find that the attorney had violated any
specific ethical rules. We hoJd that binding circt1it precedent
requires a showing of unethical conduct of such a nature as to
justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar of
the district court in order to justify the denial of au applicant's
pro hac vice admission. Accordingly, we vacate the district
court's order denying counsel's admission pro hoc vice and
remand for further proceedings.

1 Cases that cite this headnote
[8J

Attorucy and Client
*"' Disqualification in general
District court should not deprive attorney of
opporrunity to practice profession before the
court on basis of determination after the fact
that conduct is unethical, if responsible attorneys
would djffer in appraising the propriety of that
conduct.
Frantz

Hawley

I. BACKGROUND
This interlocutory appeal of the district court order denying
admission pro hac vice to Roger M. Witten, counsel for
Schlumberger Technologies, Inc. ("Schlumberger"), arises
from a lawsuit filed by Schlumberger "15SS against former
officers and directors of its wholly owned subsidiary, Global
Tel*Link Corporatioll (''Global"). The defendants, G. Dat1
Wiley, Robert A. Fergusson, and Donald Bahouth, were
378 of 513
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the most senior officers of Global, and the first n¥o were
,...w,iu"J'"-"1 terminated their
as a result of a
audit of

l, 1993, Schlumberger acquired Global, which
is headquartered in Mobile, AJabama, and whose principal
line of business involved the manufacture and sale of
co1nmunicatio11 services, predominantly automated pay
telephones for prison systems. In the fall of 1993, Louisiana
newspapers reported allegations that Global had overcharged
customers in its contract with the Louisiana Department of
Corrections, and the Louisiana Public Service Commission
started an infonnaJ investigation into Global's operations
in that state. In October 1993, Schlumberger retained the
Washington, D.C. law finn of Wilmer, Cutler & Picke1ing
("WC & P'') to provide advice on comml:mications law issues.
In December 1993, Schlumberger further retained WC & P
to assist in a legal audit of Global and selected Witten, a
WC & P partner, to lead the audit terun. The audit team
included other WC & P lawyers, lawyers from the Mobile,
Alabatna law furn of Helmsing, Lyons, Sims & Leach, and
accountants from Price Waterhouse ("PW"). The legal audit
began on January 10, 1994 and continued for approximately
one month. At an initial informatio~1al meeting on the first
day of the audit, Witten explained to Global middle and upper
management personnel the process of the legal audit and
told them that they would be interviewed by the audit team.
Witten stated that the WC & P lawyers involved in the audit
represented Schlumberger and were 1101 lawyers for any of
Global's employees or management Dale Gaudier, in-house
counsel for Schlumberger, distributed to Global employees a
memorandum ("the Gaudier memo") dated January 10, 1994,
stating in relevant part:
Schlumberger considers this review,
and the information it and PW and
WC & P gather during the review,
to be confidential You should not
discuss or disclose to those outside
Global the fact that a review is taking
place or the nature of the review. You
should also not discuss the substance
of any conversations you may have
with PW, WC & P or Schlumberger
legal personnel with aoyoi1e inside or
outside Global.
R:3-Def. Exh. l.
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The audit team theti secured Global's premises as well as
nn,,.,n,~nt<
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Global employees.
those with
he represented
not represent
the interviewee personally, and that he could not guarantee
that Schlumberger would not disclose any statements made
by the :interviewee. 1 Witten and other members of the audit

team interviewed Bahouth and Fergusso11 last, on January
17 to l & a11d on Jai.1uary 18, respecbvely, As a result of the
audit, Schlumberger concluded that Global had engaged in
extensive consumer fraud and other unlawfttl practices while
under defendants' management Schlumberger voluntarily
disclosed its findings to the appropriate state law enforcement
and regulatory authorities and undertook to make restitutiOL1
to the defrauded consumers, Schlumberger also fired the
defendants for cause and commenced this suit in federal
district court, alleging fraud under federal secwities laws and
Alabama law. Witten and local counsel signed the complaint.
Fergusson filed a motion, later joined by Wiley and Bahouth,
to deny admission pro hac vice to Witten, alleging that Witten
acted unethically during the interview with Fergusson. 2 In
an affidavit attached to hls motion, *1S56 Fergusson stated
that, based on his observation of the audit team during
the period preceding his interview and conversations with
Global employees who had been interviewed, he had reaso11
to suspect that he and others might be the targets of the
investigation. Fergusson also claimed that he asked at the
outset of the interview whether he should have a lawyer
present and that Witten assured him that he need not. Bahouth
later filed an affidavit making similar allegations.

In Schlumberger's oppositio11 to Fergusson's motion to bar
Witten's admission, Schlumberger de.11.ied that Fergusson
asked whether he should have a lawyer at any time during
his interview and asserted that none of the three members
of the audit team who participated in the inteT\liew advised
Fergusson in any way 011 whether he should have a personal
lawyer. SchlUlTlberger stated that, during the interview,
Fergusson said that he might want to consult a lawyer in
the future in his capacity as a shareholders' representative.
According to Schlumberger, Witten did not give Fergusson
any advice as to that matter and his only response was that
Fergusson was being interviewed solely in his capacity as an
officer and employee of GlobaL 3
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on June 2, 1994.
test:mea, essentially repeating
379 of 513
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claims i11 their respective affidavits During Fergusson's
direct examination,
the
court
Fergusson whether the Gaudier
the course of the audit. When
the court opined that
the statement, "You should also not discuss the substance
of any conversations you may have with PW, WC & P or
Schlumberger legal personnel with anyone inside or outside
Global " contained in the Gaudier memo meant that Global
'
employees were precluded from talking to a personal lawyer
regarding the audit. 4 R3-56.
The district court de11ied Witten's admission pro hac vice at
the end of the hearing. The court did not make any fonnal
findings of facts and conclusions of law at that time, but
gave the following reasons, which we construe as the court's
findings of fact; (1) the purpose of the legal audit team
ilivestfgation was to "get some dirt.on [the defendants) before
they got la\.\fYers''; (2) Fergusson claims that he asked for a
lawyer and even Witten does not deny that the subject of a
lawyer was brought up~ and (3) the language of the Gaudier
nietno, coupled with the fact that the subject of a lawyer was
brought up in fergusson's interview, would be ta.ken by any
layman as precluding him from consulting with a personal
lawyer. R3-114 & 115. The court concluded: "So I feel that
*1557 (Mr.] Witten ... [was] acting in a fashion which this
Court terms to be unethical. And therefore, since this Court
terms it to be unetltical, the Court will not admit [him) to
practice pro hac vice in this case." R3-115.
Schlumberger filed a motion for reconsideration, supported
by declarations of former Fifth Circuit Judge and Attorney
General Griffin R Bell, former Eighth Circuit Judge and
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William H.
Webster, and Yale Law Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard.
The tl1ree declarants supported Schlumberger's contention
that Witten did not violate any rules of ethical conduct
in not affirmatively advising the defendants to retain
personal counsel and that the Gaudier memo was a. standard
memorandum routinely used in similar circumstances to
preserve the corporate attomey-client privilege i11 accordance
with Upjohn. Toe declarants asse:rted that, in their experience,
the Gaudier memo comported with prevalent practice and that
they have never had any experience with anyone interpreting
such a memorandum to preclude consultation with a personal
attorney.
district court issued a written order in which it denied
Schlumberger's motion to reconsider the court's denial of
Frantz
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admission pro hac vice to Witten. The court did not make any
i,ew findings
order.It held,
that denying
ad.mission
on
as it found them at
the Jut1e 2 .hearing was within its
stmck the
because
it interpreted them as disputing the district court's factual
finding that the effect of the Gaudier memo on the defendants
was to preclude them from consulting legal counsel. Thus,
the court concluded that these affidavits did not aid the court
because it was "completely capable of handling on its own''
this factual issue. Id. at 16-17.
[1] The district court certified au appeal to this court
pursuant to 28 US.C. § 1292(b) on the portion of its

order denying admission pro hac vice of Witten. 5 The
court declined to certify the portion of its order striking the
declarations of Bell, Webster, and Hazard. 6

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard ofReview

[2] The district court's determination ofthe appropriate legal
standard that govems th.is case and its interpretation of that
sta11dard is subject to de novo review. See United S1a1es
1•, Me.ndo:::a-Ceoelta. 963.F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir.1992).
Within the framework of the legal standard governing
the court's decision to deny pro hac vice adn1ission, the
parties disagree as to the standard of review applicable
to the court's determinations. 1n cases involving attorney
disqualifications, we have used two apparently inconsistent
standards of review. See generally Norton v. Tallahassee
Mem'l Hosp., 700 F.2d 617, 618-20 (11th Cir.1983) (''Norton
11 ") (''(C]ourts have not always been careful to ent111ciate
their reasons for exercising one type ofreview ...-traditional
review of factual findings and legal conclusions or review of
abuse of discretion .... "). In Norton II, we held that the district
*1558 court's factual detem1inations are reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard, but that the courts "appJ(ication
of] the standards of the Code of Professional Responsibility
to questions of attorney disqualification warrant full appellate
review to ensure that there is consistency of treatment." Id.
at 619-20. On other occasions, we have reviewed a district
court's decision to revoke ru1 attomey's adn1fasion pro hao
vice for an abuse of discretion. See United Suites v, Dinitz,
538 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir.1976) (en bane); Nationalist
Movement v. City of Cumming, 913 F.2d 885, 895 (11th
Cir.1990), ajf d sub Mm. on other grounds, Forsyth CoUhly
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we
cm:un1sumc,es ,md
ofthe court's
disqualification of an attorney in these cases. Indeed. we
explained in Norton II that these circumstances dictate the
extent of the district court's discretion and, therefore, the
scope of our review. We explained that, in a case like Dtnitz,
the abuse of discretion standard is applicable because "that
particular disqualification decision (was] so closely linked to
the trial judge's responsibility to supervise the conduct of the
case before him." No11on II, 700 F.2d at 619. We stressed
that, in Di'nitz, "the nial court's ... judgment was based on
conduct he had observed" Id. (emphasis added) Similarly, in
Nationalisl Movement, the district court revoked an attorney's
pro hac vice admission after that attorney persisted, during
the trial, in a course of conduct that can only be descnbed
as "an effort to commit a fra1.ld on the court." Nanonalist
Mo1 1ement, 913 F.2d at 895. The deference that we accorded
the trial judges in both Dini.tz and Nationalist Movement was
necessary so that the trial judge could maintain effective
control over his or her court room and process. Id. at 895
("(T]his case presents unique facts involvjng the integrity
of the court system and respect for its particjpants within
a courtroom proceeding."). In contrast, the district court's
disqualification decision Jn Norton II turned on the proper
application of the Rules of Professional Conduct, not on the
court's response to an attorney's in-court disruptive behavior.
See Norton 11. Tallahassee Mem'l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 94142 (11th Cir.1982) (''Norton!") (reversing the district court's
disqualification order based on a violatio,; of Canon 9 of
the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct), reh'g denied,
Norton II. 700 F.2d at 620. In reviewing a district court's
interpretation and application of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, which involve a mixed question oflaw and fact, we
do not defer to the district court's determinations. See Norton
11, 700 F.2d at 620; In te Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 156364 (J Ith Cit.1990),
[3] Even though Witten's conduct is related to the case at
bar, that conduct occurred before the action was ever filed
'
did not occur in fro11t of the district court, and was not of a
type to disrupt the proceedings before the court Moreover, as
we shall explain below, the court's decision to deny Witten's
admission turns or. its application of the relevant Rules of
Professional Conduct Therefore, in accordance with No11011
IL we review the district court's factual fmdings for clear error
and its application of the Rules to the facts de novo,
Docket No.

our
to govem 01l1y the procedural requirements for denying
admissjon pro hac vtce to an attomey, The court held that,
once a complaint alleging misconduct rising to the level of
disbannent is made, the district court has broad discretion
to deny admission pro hac vice after notice and a hearing,
without necessarily finding that the misconduct actually rose
to a level justifying disbarment. For this proposition, the
d"istrict court cited Din.i12:, 538 F.2d at 1219, Kleiner v.
First National Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir.1985),
ru.1d Nationalist .Movement, 913 F.2d at 895. Thus, although
"[t)he [c]ourt did not find that Witten violated any specific
ethical rules, as would be required for disbannent," it denied
Witten's admission because the "(d]efendants here submitted
'evidence of behavior that [the court] believe[d) justifie(d)
denying an attorney admission pr'o hac vice.' " R2-l77"'1S59 14 (alterations in original) (quoting Evans, 524 F.2d
at 1008).
[4) In Evans, we enm1ciated both a procedural standard
and a substantive standard for a district coun's decision
to deny admission pro hac vice to a11 anomey, First, "(i]f
a District Court has evidence of behavior that it believes
justifies denying an attorney admission pro hac vice," it must
give the anomey adequate notice ofthe ethical charges and set
a hearing on the issue. Evans. 524 F.2d at 1008. The district
court believed in this case that the evidence against Witten
rose to the threshold set in Evan.s for a hearing. The court
n1istakenly believed, however, that it had the authority to deny
an attorney admission pro hao vice because it believed the
evidence justified such action, without any further findings.
This was error, because the district court disregarded the
substantive standard set out in Evans:

Admission to a state bar creates a presumption of good
moral character that ca1U1ot be overcome merely by the
whims of the District Court. An applicant for admission
pro hac vice who (s a member in good standing of a state
bar may not be denied the privilege to appear except ''on
a showing that in any legal matter, whether before the
particular district court or in another jurisdiction, he has
been guilty of unethical conduct of such a nature as to
justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar
of the court!'
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113 F.3d 1S53 (1991)

524 F.2d at 1001 (quotingSande"f'sv. Russell, 401 F.2d
247-48 (5th CirJ968)).
district court specifically
of

The district court's reliance on post-Evans cases giving
district couits wider latitude to revoke an attorney's admission
pro hac vice is misplaced. In a footnote, the district court
cited Ktrkla.nd v. l.fational Mortgage Network, Inc., 884 F.2d
1367 (11th Cir. 1989), for the proposition that "the Supreme
Court's decision in Lets v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443-45,
[99 S.Ct. 698, 701-02, 58 L.Ed.2d 717) (1979), may have
partly undermined Evans .insofar as the Supreme Co1.1rt made
clear that 'no Fourteenth Amendment property interest is
implicated by a state court's refosal to adrnit an attorney pro
hac vice.'" R2-177-12 n. 16 (quoting Kirkland, 884 F.2d
at 1371). In Kirkland. the district court revoked an attorney's
admission pro hac vice without giving him notice of the
charges against him or affording him a hearing, We reversed
the district court's decision because it failed to comply with
the procedural requirement of Evans. Kirkland, 884 F.2d at
1372. Therefore, the Kirkland court's statement casti11g doubt
on the continued vitality ofE,,ans' substantive standard is pure
dictum, which is not binding on us. Indeed, it is not clear
why a decision holding that a federal court cannot review a
state court's dec:iaJ of admission pro hac vice because that
denial does not implicate a Fourteenth Ame11dment property
interest would have any bearing on our decision in Evans.
In Evans, we did not rest our decision on any purported
constitutional right for an attorney to be admitted pro hac
vice in a federal court. We, instead, exercised our supervisory
authority over the district courts in this circuit to circumscribe
the discretion of trial judges in deciding whether to admit an
attorney pro hac ,,tee. For this reason, we rejected the Fourth
Circuit's standard which gives district courts the discretion
..to deny admissfon pro hac vice to an attorney guilty of
'unlawyerlike conduct' " because we found "the discretion
permitted by the Fourth Circuit too broad and, consequently,
susceptible to abuse." Evan.s, 524 F.2d at 1007 n. l (citing
Thomasv. Cassidy, 249F.2d 91 (4thCir.1957)). We conclude
that, contrary to the dictum in KMdand. the Supreme Court's
decision in Leis did not cast doubt on Evan.s' holding. Evans.
therefore, remains binding precedent in this circuit.
Nonetheless, the defendants suggest that Eleventh Circuit
precedent on the isslle of attorney disquaHfication has evolved
into two different lines of decision, one exemplified by Evans
and the other by Dtnitz and Nationalist Movemem, and that
Frantz
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the district court correctly relied on 1he latter to deny Witten's
We
we
Evans

aneimpt1~ to
establish
applicable to a
pretrial motiot1 to appear pro hac
vice .... Once an attorney has beei.1
admitted pro hac vice and a case
has proceeded to trial, however, the
considerations are guite different. Tne
interests ofjustice demand that a judge
have a measure of discretion to take
steps necessary to ensure that order is
maintained.

Dinitz, 538 F.2d at 1223-24. Therefore, as Dini'!:: itself
teaches, Evans controls here because this case involves a pretrial motion for admission pro hac vice.

Second, a more complete review of Eleventh Circuit
precedent on the issue of attorney disqualificatiOJ'l shows that
the district court's reading of that case law is erroneous. As
we explained in our discussion of the standard of review
applicable to this case, there are two distinct lines of Eleventh
Circuit decisions on attorney disqualification, but these
two lines can be reconciled if we consider the particular
circtimstances of each case. In Dinirz and Nationalist
Movement, we were faced with "unique facts involving the
integrity of the court system and respect for its participants
within a. courtroom proceedit1g." Nationalist ,Movement, 913
F.2d at 895. In both Dtnilt: and Nationalist Movement, the
district court revoked an attorney's admission pro hac vice
after repeated warnings due to the attorney's persistence in
ethically questionable conduct that occurred in the courtroom,
fo the view of the district court, and that resulted in a
disruption of the proceedings. See Nattanalisr Mol'ement,
913 F.2d at 893 (Attorney actions included: "presenting .. , a
witness to authenticate corporate documents ... [in] an anempt
to create fraud on the court; making frivolous objections ...
to prevent the troth from emerging about [the witness's] lack
of qualifications to testify; concealing from the court his
personal interest in. the litigation ... ; and asking an adverse
witness whether he was a veteran, in an effort to embarrass
and disparage him.'); Dfnirt, 538 F.2d at 1220-21 & nn.
8-10 ("The disruptive effect of [the a.ttomey'Js co11duct is
evident when we consider that the court was forced to delay
the beginning of the trial to hear testimony on a suppression
motion that was utterly frivolous, to wam the attorney
repeatedly about specific instances of misconduct, and to send
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the jury out of the courtroom no less than three times during
course
The
of
this case clearly do not
contrast, cases
the
to disqualify an attomey was based on ·a11 alleged ethical
violation, we carefully reviewed the court's interpretatioo
and application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See
Norton J, 689 F.2d at 941-42 (reversi11g the district coUlt's
disqualification order based on a violation of Ca.11011 9 of
the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct). In a more recent
case, we reversed a district court's decision disqualifying
an attorney for conduct which, according to the district
court, was so reprehensible as to ''transgress[] a 'code' by
which an attorney practices which transcends any written
code of professional conduct" Finlrelstein, 901 F.2d at:
1563. Ftnkelstein involved the following circumstances:
In the interim period between the liability phase and the
damages phase of a lengthy civil rights trial, and after
the district court had encouraged the parties to negotiate
a settlement, the attorney "leapfrogged" defendant's trial
attorney and sent a settlement letter directly to defendant's
*1561 corporate counsel. The tone of the letter was
inappropriately threatening. See id at 1562-63. The district
court understandably found such conduct reprehensible and
disqualified the responsible attorney on that basis. Upon
review, "[w]e share[dJ the disapproval of the district court
caused by Finketstein's letter to [corporate counsel]. It not
only 'exhibited an unlawyerlikerudeness' but it also displayed
a gross n:usu11derstru.1dii.1g of true professionalism." Id. at
1564 11. 4. Nonetheless, we reversed because the district
court may not disqualify an attorney on the basis of some
"transcendental code of conduct ... that ... e::idsted only in
the subjective opinion of the court, of which (the attorney]
had no notice, and (that) was the sole basis of the sanction
administered after the conduct had occurred." Id. at 1565.
Thus, where the district court's disquaJification order is
based on an allegation of ethical violation, the court may
not simply rely on a general inherent power to admit and
suspend attorneys, without any limit on such power. The
court must clearly identify a specific Rule of Professional
Conduct which is applicable to the relevant jurisdiction and
must conclude that the atto:mey violated that rule-a legal
conclusion subject to full appellate review-for its order to be
upheld. See Norton L 689 F.2d at 941. Moreover, as we stated
in Finkelstein, "[t]his Court will 't1ot deprive an attorney
of the opportunity to practice bis profession on the basis
of a dete1111ination after the fact that conduct is unethical if
responsible attorneys would differ in appraising the propriety
vs
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of that conduct'" Finkelstein, 901 F.2d at 1565 (quoting In re
Ruffalo,
U.S.
88
17

sum, our
district
decisions to deny a motion for admission pro hac 11ice
or to disqualify an attorney already admitted to appear
before the court is not inconsistent. It is sensibly tailored to
circumscribe the discretion of trial judges to suit the particular
circumstances of a given case. The standards governing a
district court's denial of a pre-trial motion for admission pro
hac vice are set out in Evcrns: Absent a showing of unethical
conduct rising to a level that would justify disbarment, the
court mil.SI admit the attorney. Evans, 524 F.2d at 1007. The
standards governing disqualification of at, attorney already
admitted to appear before the district court differ, depending
on the circumstances. If the conduct at issue threatens
disruption ofthe court proceedings, see, e.g., Dinirs, 538 F.2d
a:t 1221 (in-court misconduct) and Nationalist Movemen.1,
913 F.2d at 893 (same), or is a deliberate challenge to the
authority of the distrjct couit, see, e.g., Kleiner, 751 F.2d
at 1207 (attorney deliberately advising client to disobey the
district court's protective order), we give great deference to
a trial court's decision to disqualify the responsible attorney.
If, however, the conduct at issue does not threaten the orderly
administration of justice but is allegedly unethical, we insist
that district courts rest their disqualification decisions on the
violation of specific Rules of Professional Conduct, not on
some "transcendental code of conduct ... that ... exist(s] only
ill the subjective opinion of the coun." Fi:nkelstein, 901 F.2d
at 1565. 8
Based on our review of the governing case law, we conclude
that the district court incorrectly co11strued the scope of its
discretion. Because this case involves a pre-trial motion for
admission pro hac vice, it is controlled by the standard
enunciated jnEvans. The district court's order denying Witten
admission *1562 pro hac vice is vacated because ''It)hc
court did not find that Witten violated any specific ethical
rules, as would be required for disbarment." R2-177-14. 9

[7] [8] The district court in this case was roindful that
"[a]ccusations of unethical conduct are among the most
serious of allegations that (a c]ourt must consider ... [and]
aware that an attorney's honor as an officer of the [c]ourt is at
issue here." R2-177-15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We share the district court's sense of gravity over this
issue, because "the 'brand of disqualification' on grounds of
dishonesty and bad faith could well hang over [an attorney's}
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name and career for years to come."' Kirkland, 884 F.2d at
1370 (holding that a district court's order disqualifying an
attorney is reviewable this court even after the underlying
settled because of the gravity of the acct\sations of
"""''""'""""' conduct); Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1200 n. 14. These
considerations should weigh even more heavily when (and if)
the district court rules upo11 remand on Witten's admission pro
hac vice. Because Evans requires a showing of disbarrable
conduct in order to justify the denial of Witten's admission,
the district coun must be fu..'1:her mind:fol that "the power [to
disbar) is one that ought always to be exercised with great
cautio~ and ought never be exercised except in clear cases
of misconduct, which affect the standing and character of
the party as an attorney." Ex pa.rte Wall, 107 U.S. 265,288,
2 S.Ct. 569, 588, 27 L.Ed. 552 (1883) (emphasis added);
cf ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
Rule 18(C) (1993) {providing that charges of misconduct
"shall be established by clear and convincing evidence'');
Alabama Rules of Disciplinary Procedure Rule 19 (1995)
("Clear and convincing evidence shall be the standard of
proofrequired in all disciplinary proceedings ... .''). Moreover,
the court should " 'not deprive an attorney of the opportu11ity
to practice his profession on the basis of a determination
after the fact that conduct is unethical if responsible attorneys
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would differ in appraising the propriety of that conduct.' "
901
atl565
relwffalo,
at

88

at

(White,

10

IlI. CONCLUSION
The issue in this appeal is the standard that governs a
district court's decision to deny a party's motion on behalf
of a no11-resident attorney for admission pro hac vice. The
district court denied adm.ission pt'O hac vice to plaintiff's
counsel. even though it did not find that he violated any
specific ethical rules. We hold that binding circuit precedent
requires a showing of unethical conduct of such a nature as
to justify disbam)ent of a lawyer admitted generally to the
bar of the "'1563 district court in order to justify the denial
of an applicant's pro hac vice admission. Accordingly, we
VACATE the district court's order denying Winen admfosion
pro hac vice and REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

All Citations
113 FJd 1553, 65 USLW2&18, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 979

Footnotes

1
2

3

4

Honorable James H. Michael, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Virginia. sitting by designation.
This assertion, Which Witten ahd ·other interviewers made in their affidavits, is not disputed by the defendants. What
happened later in the interview is disputed. as will become apparent subsequently in this opinion.
Fergusson alleged that Witten violated rules 4.2 ("Communication with Person Represented by Counselj, 4.3 (''Dealing
with Unrepresented Person"), 4.4 ("Respect for Rights ofThird Persons'') of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct
("ARPC") made app!tcab!e to attorneys admitted pro hac vice in the Southern District of Alabama by Local Rule 1(A)(4).
The defendants later added ARPC Rule 3.7 ("Lawyer as a Witness'1 to that list.
With respect to Bahouth, Schlumberger later submitted affidavits from several audit team members, including Witten,
stating that Bahouth never asked whether he shOuld have a lawyer at his interview and that no member of the audit team
ever advised Bahouth about this issue. Moreover, the affiants asserted-and Bahouth never denied-that Witten and
two colleagues informed Bahouth on January 14, 1994 that the audit to that date had revealed questionable practices
by Global and that Schlumberger was considering suspending Bahouth with pay. Bahouth reportedly responded that
he knew what the questionable practices were and requested that Schlumberger postpone its decision until it heard his
"side of the story. n •
Before the district court made these comments, none of the defendants had ever claimed that they had interpreted the
Gaudier memo as precluding them from consulting a personal lawyer about the audit. Schlumberger maintains that the
purpose of the Gaudier memo was to preserve the corporate attorney-client privilege, in conformance with Upjohn Co. v,
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677. 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). Indeed. the language of the Gaudier memo is quite
similar to the language of the letter before the Supreme Court in Upjohn. Moreover. it later became clear that Fergusson,
at least, did not interpret the Gaudier memo to preclude any contact with a lawyer. Although Fergusson testified at the
hearing that he never told any lawyer about the audit, he eventually admitted that he did contact a lawyer during the
period of the audit and that he told the lawyer about the audit. Fergusson made this admission after being confronted
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with telephone logs showing that he called a law firm in Palo Alto, California during the period of the audit. and stated
that he contacted the lawyer in his capacity as a shareholders·
See
144. & 159.
Schlumberger attached to its motion for certification
to § 1292(b) a letter from the District of Columbia bar to
Witten Which contained the results of an investigation by the D.C. bar of Witlen's conduct. The letter from the
bar
does not purport to resolve the factual dispute about whether Witten personally assured
and Bahoutll that
they did not need a lawyer present while Witten intervlewed them. In any event, it is the province of the district court to
resolve that and any other factual disputes.
However, based on information provided by Wrtten and a review of the transcript of testimony at the June 2, 1994
hearing, the D.C. bar concluded that Witten did not violate any D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct (which are virtually
identical to Alabama's rules as well as the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct). The district court denied the
defendants' motion to strike that letter.
The court correctly recognized. however. that its refusal to certify the portion of its order striking the declarations does
not place that portion of the order beyond our jurisdiction under § 1292(b). 'When a district court certifies an order for
appeal, all questions material to that particular order are property before the court of appeals." United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n. 2 (11th Clr.1990): accord Yamaha Motor Corp .. U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199.
1 116 S.Ct. 619,623, 133 l.Ed.2d 578 (1996).
The district court's and defendants' reliance on Kleiner, 751. F.2d 1193, is also misplaced. Kleiner. llke Olnitz and
Nationalist Movement, involved the disqualification of an attorney from the case before the court for conduct related to
the proceedings. In fact, the attorney dlsqualifled In Kleiner was a local attorney, regularlY admitted to practice before the
district court. It is true that the conduct at issue in Kleiner did not occur in front of the district court We affirmed the district
court's disqualificatlon In that case, however, because it was a sanction for the attorney deliberately advising his client to
disobey the court's protective order not to contact any members of the plaintiff class. See id. at 1207. We stressed that
disqualification was Justified by the "strong ... interest in securing obedience to mandates of the court which is necessary
to secure the orderly administration of the laws." Id. at 1210. The conduct of which Witten ls accused in no way threatens
the orderly administration of the laws. Indeed, this conduct occurred before the Instant action was ever filed and, thos,
could not be viewed as a challenge to the district court's authortty in any way.
The defendants contend that if we were to reverse the trial court's decision, we would be condoning "hard ball" discovery
and investigation techniques. This contention, it appears to us. invites us to sanction Witten for conduct that does not
necessarily violate the Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to the Southern District of Alabama bar, but on the basis
of a "transcendental code of ethical conduct." Whatever we may personally think. of "hard ball" litigation tactics-and we
do not mean to intimate in any way that we consider Wltten's conduct to fall within this category of tactics-It Is not up to
us or the district court to Impose our own views of what tactics are or are not acceptable through the use of after-the-fact
disqualification. We therefore decline the defendants' invitation for such a finding, It should be noted that district courts
remain vested with the discretion to control the litigation before them and to curb the use of abusive litigation techniques
during the pendency of the litigation through protective orders and other appropriate means at their disposal.
Despite this language in the district court's order, the defendants assert that the court did find that Witten violated Rules
4.2, 4.3. and 4.4 of the ARPC. Rather, according to the defendants, the district court did not find it necessary to expend
further resources to decide whether Wltten's vlolatlon was so egregious as to justify disbarment. We do not share the
defendants· interpretatlon of the district court's order. First. the court's order is quite carefully constructed and expressly
relies on Dlnltz and Nationalist Movement. which do not require the court to flnd a specific ethlcal violation before taking
disciplinary action against an attorney. Second, although the court characterized its decision at the June 2, 1994 hearing
as having found "that Witten acted in an unethical fashion," R2-177-15, It never specified any Rule of Professional
Conduct that Wrtten had violated. Indeed. a review of the transcript of the hearing suggests that the court relied on
a personal ''transcendental code of conduct" rather than the Alabama or Model Rules made applicable to the instant
proceedings through Local Rule 1(A)(4). See R3-115 {"So I feel that ... Witten ... (was) acting in a fashion which this
Court terms to be unethical. And therefore, since this court terms it to be unethical, the Court will not admit ... [.Witten] to
practice pro hac vice in this case.") (emphasis added). Under Finkelstein, the district court may not discipline an attorney
-let alone find that his conduct rose to the level of disbarment-on the basis that he violated a "transcendental code of
conduct." of which he had no notice. Finke/stein, 901 F.2d at 1565.
Schlumberger urges us to reverse the district court's order striking the declarations of Bell, Webster, and Hazard as an
abuse of discretion in light of Finke/stein 's teaching. We need not and do not reach this issue because we vacate the
court's order on the basis that it misapprehended the legal standard governing the denial of admission pro hac vice. On
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remand, however, the court should reconsider its decision to strike these declarations, or decide whether to admit similar
declarations
any new factual
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JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH, ISB #7898
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Haw ]ey LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

)

)
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 15-1406

)

) AFFIDAVIT OF SHEILA R.
) SCHWAGER

vs.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited LiabHity Partnel'ship,

_______________
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Ada

)

)
)
)
)

)
)

) ss.

I, SHEILA R. SCHWAGER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and state:
1.

I have personal know ledge of the matters asserted herein and am competent to be

a witne$s in this matter.
2.

1 am a partne1· of the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley

Troxell''), attorneys of record for Idaho ]ndependent Bank ("BB"), as to the collection efforts of
outstanding obligations due and owing by Martin Frantz and others to

AFFIDA VlT OF SHEILA R. SCHWAGER •
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that regard, I along
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Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, Case No. 1.1 -21337-TLM ("Bankruptcy Case").

3.

In addition, I along with my partne1· John F. Kurtz, Jr., through Hawley Troxell

have been representjng IIB in an Adversary Proceeding filed against Martin D. Frantz and
Cynthia M. Ftantz, which was commenced on June 23, 2013, as Case No. 13~07024-TLM
(''Adversary Proceeding"). In the Adversary Proceeding, IIB sought 11on~djschargability of the

guaranty and loan obligations owed by Mr. and Mrs. Frantz to IIB in amounts exceeding $6.4

MHlion Dolla!'s, plus accruing interest, fees. and costs. Non-dischargability was sought based
upon multiple acts of fraud and conversion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (a)(6).
4.

I have reviewed the Declaration of Jonathon Frantz and in paiticular the assenions

that the Adversary Proceeding has been dismissed as moot. That is inaccurate. as indicated by

the entire Docket of the Adversary Proceeding, attached hereto as Exhibit A. and incorporated
herein by reference.
5.

On the eve of the two week trial of the Adversary Proceeding, Mr. and Mrs.

Frantz filed a Section 727 Waiver of Discharge in their Bankruptcy Case, conceding the nondischargability relief requested in the Adversary Proceeding, thus rendering a determination of
dischargabi1ity moot.

SpecificalJy, the 727 Waiver of Discharge meant that none of the

obligations owed to IIB would be discharged and therefore a trial on the section 523 11.onb
dishcarge issues were not necessary. Acco1·dingly, the trial date was vacated. However, despite
counsel's suggestion to the contrary, no Ordel' of Dismissal has been entered, and in fact the
Adversary Proceeding remains pending.
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submitted and under advisement, with a decision to be forthcoming. See Ex. A. Docket No. 127.

Further, on June 3, 2015, HB filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs as the prevailing party
in the Adversary Proceeding. That Motion ls set for hearing for July 28, 2015. See Ex. A,
Docket Nos. 121, 122, 123, 128. h1 shol't, no final ordeJ has been entered at this point in the

Adversary Proceeding. If either or both of the motions aie granted, a judgment will be entered

accordingly.

s
SIGNED AND SWORN to before me .this ~day of July, 2015, by SHEILA R.
SCHWAGER.
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U.S. Bankruptcy Court
District of Idaho [LIVE] (Coeur dAlene)
Adversary Proceeding#: 13-07024-TLM
Assigned r.o: Chief Judge Ten-y L Myers

Date Filed: 08/23/13

Lead BK Case: 11-21337
Lead BK Title: Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz
Lead BK Chaple1': 7
Demand: $6419000

Nature[s] ofSuit: 62 Dischargeability - 523(a)(2), false pretenses, false representation, actual fraud
68 Dischargeability - 523(a)(6), willful and malicious injury

Plai1ttiff

Idaho Independent Bank
c/o Sheila R Schwager
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
POB 1617
Boise, ID 83701

20&3446000

represented John F Kurtz, Jr
by Hawley Trnxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
POB 1617
Boise. ID 83701~1617
(208) 344-6000
Email: j~ur1z@hawleytroxeJl.com

Sheila Rae Schwager
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS aod HAWLEY LLP
POB 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
(208) 344-6000
Email: sschwager@J.1awleytroxell.com

V.

Defendant
Martin D. Frantz
PO Box 830
Rathdrum, ID 83858
SSN I ITIN:

represented Jonathon Frantz
by Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St.
Suite A

Post Falls. ID 83 854
208-297-6647
Fax: 208-297-6648
Email: Jonathon@cdalegal.com

Stephen Brian McCrea
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Defendant
Cyntbln M. Frantz
PO Box 830

represented Jonathon Frantz
by (See above for address)

Rathdrum,
SSN I ITIN

Stephen Brian McCrea
(See above for address)

Filing Date

#

l

Adversary case 13-07024. 62 (Dischargeability 523(a)(2), false pretenses, false representation.
actual fraud): Complaint by ldaho Independent
Bank against Martin D. Frantz, Cynthia M. Frantz.
Fee Arnount $293 (Attachments:# l Exhibit
Exhibit A# 1 Exhibit Exhibit B # J Adversary
Pl'oceeding Cover Sheet# .1 Summons # ~
Summons) (Schwager, Sheila)

2

Receipt ofComplaint(l3-07024-TLM) [cmp,cmp]
( 293 .00) Filing Fee. Receipt number 4608419. Fee
amount 293.00. (re; Doc# D (U.S. Treasury)

1

Sunu11ons Issued on Cynthia M. Frantz Date Issued
8/26/2013, Answer Due 9/25/2013; Martin D.
Frantz Date lssued 8/26/2013, Answer Due
9/25/2013 (Attachments:# l Summons Issued) (ar)

.4

Acceptance of Service. Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)J.
Summons Issued). (Attachments:# l M. Frantz
Summons) (Schwager, Sheila)

(69 pgs; 6 docs)

08/23/2013

08/23/20]3

(4 pgs; 2 docs)

08/26/2013

(4 pgs; 2 docs)

08/27/2013
5
(4 pgs; 2 docs)

Acceptance of Service. Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)d
Summons lsi;ued). (Attachments: # l Summons C.
Frantz) (Schwager, Sheila)

§
(23 pgs; 2 docs)

Motion to Strike Complaint Filed by Defendants
Cynthia M. Francz, Mrutin D. Frantz (Attachments:

08/27/2013
10/09/2013

Docket Text
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to

Strike) (Frantz, Jonathon)

1
pgs)

10/09/2013

£

Notice of Service Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s).9.
Motion to Strike Comp1aint Filed by Defendants
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attaclm1ents:
# l Supplement Brief In Support of Motion to
Strike) filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 1 Notice of Hearing
Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D.
Frantz (RE: Ielated document(s)§ Motion to Strike
Complaint Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz,
Martin D. Frantz (Attachments:# 1 Supplement
Briefln Supp011 of Motion to Strike) filed by
Defendant Maiiin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M.
Frantz}. Motion to Strike hearing to be held on
10/29/2013 at 10:30 AM Video- Boise to Coeur d'
Alene (Mou11.tain Time) for§, filed by Defendant
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz).
(Frantz, Jonathon)

2

Response to (related document(s): §. Motion to
Strike Complaint filed by Defendant Mrutin D.
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) Filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Indepe11dent Bank (Attachments: # l
Exhibit A) (Schwager, Sheila)

lQ
(9 pgs)

Reply to (related document(s): .2. Response filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz
(Frantz, Jonathon)

ll

Exhibits filed Rthibit A Filed by Defendants
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related
document(s)lQ Reply). (Frantz, Jonathon)

(2 pgs)

l 0/09/2013

(48 pgs; 2 docs)
10/25/2013

10/28/2013

(45 pgs)

10/28/20] 3

Notice of Hearing
by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s).§
Motion to Strike Complaint Filed by Defendants
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attaclm1ents:
# 1 Supplement Brief In Support of Motion to
St1·ike) filed by Defendant Manin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to Strike
hearing to be held on 10/29/2013 at 10:30 AM
Video - Boise to Coeur d'Alene (Mountain Time)
for §, (Frantz, Jonathon)
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Bankruptcy
Certificate

13

Hearing Held
Appean111ees: Sheila Schwager - Counsel fo1· the
Plaintiff, Jonathon :Frantz - Counsel for the
Defendant.
Report of Pa·ocetdings: Defendants Motion to
Strike Complaint, Doc. No, 6. Argument
presented. Afte1· review, the Court orally enters
findings ;:ind conclusions. The Court DENIES
the Motion to Strike or Dismiss Claim. An order
by the Plaintiff is fort.hcomin.g. A telephone
pretrial co11ference is forthcoming.

(RE: related document(s)§. Motion to Strike filed by
Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M.
Frantz) (Battle, Mel)

10/29/2013

l 0/3112013

11/03/2013

14
(3 pgs; 2 docs)

Order Denying Motion to Strike (Related Doc#.§)
Signed on 10/31/2013. (ar)

Ji

BNC Certificate of Mailing~ Order on Motion to
Strike Notice Date 11/03/2013. (Admin.)

(3 pgs)

li

Answer to Complaint Filed by Defendants Cynthia
M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments:# l
Exhibit A# 2 Exhibit B # J Exhibit C) (Frantz,
Jonathon)

l1

Notice of Appearance as Co-Counsel for
Defendcints Filed by Detendants Cynthia M. Frantz,
Ma11in D. Frantz. (McCrea, Stephen)

(33 pgs; 4 docs)

11/13/2013

(2 pgs)

11/13/2013

ll

(6 pgs; 2 docs)

11/20/2013

Notice of Hearing (RE: related document(s).!.§.
Answer to Complaint Filed by Defendants Cynthia
M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz). Pre Trial Conference
hearing to be held on 12/J 8/2013 at 9:00 AM
(Pacific Time)/ 10:00 AM (Mountain Time)
Telephonic Hearing - Boise Chambers for 1.§, (ar)
On the date and time specified, the parties shall call
the Courts personal conferencing phone number at
l-877~336-1829, enter access code 3956660,
security code 2222 and follow the operators
instructions. Modified on 12/3/2013 (Battle, Mel).
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Baiikrnptcy

Appearances: John Kurtt: - Counsel for the
Defendant, Jonathon Frantz and Stephen
McCrea - Counsel for the Defense
Report of Proceedings: Telephone Pretrial
Conference. The pleitdings are settled. Any and
aU discovery shall be completed no lnte1· than
August 31, 2014. The Defense shall disclose all
Expert Witnesses by Mnrch 31, 2014 and
]~la.in.tiff shall <lisclose all Expert Witnesses by
April 3(l, 2014. Any ~md a.ll pretrial motions,
including any motions for continuances, must be
filed and a hearing held befol'e the Coutt in
acco1·dance with the BankJ'uptcy Rules and
.Local Bankruptcy Rules (including but not
limited to LBR 7056.1) no later than September
15, 2014. Pretrial briefs shall be filed no late1·
thnn November 17, 2014 'fl'i.aJ of this tuatte,· is
set for December l and 2, 2014 at l.:30 J>.m.,
December 3, 4 and 5, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. nt the
United States Com·tl1ou~e, 6450 Mine1·11I Drive,
Coeur dAlenc, lduho. A 1>retrial ordet is
forthcoming.

(RE: related document(s)l6 Answer to Complaint
filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant
Cynthia M. Frantz) (Battle, Mel)

12/18/2013

21
(4 pgs)

12/23/2013
22
(4 pgs)

Order re Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for Trial
Sjgned on 12/23/2013. Trial of this matter is set for
December 1 and 2, 2014at 1:30 p.m., December 3,
4 and 5, 2014 at 9:00 a.1n. at the United States
Courthouse, 6450 Mineral Drive, Coeur dAlene,
Idaho.(Battle, Mel)
Stipulation Between Idaho Independent Bank and
Ma11jn D. fra1':itz and Cynthia M Frantz lo Amend

P,-e1rial Otder as to Experl Witness Disclosures
Filed by PlaiJ1tiffldaho Independent Bank (RE:
telated document(s)21 Order re Pretrial
Proceedjngs Setting Date for Trial). (Schwager,

02/18/2014

Sheila)

02/19/2014
of
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BNC Certificate
02/22/2014

-

1nnl<1~Pl1

'

(3 pgs)

Notice Dace 02/22/2014. (Admin.)

25

Stipulation Between Both Parties ta Amend Pretrial
Order As ro Expert Witness Disclosures Filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank. (Schwager,
Sheila)

(4 pgs)

06/25/2014

26
(4 pgs; 2 docs)
06/26/2014
27

06/28/2014

#

Order Granting ,rn,l::iti
T
Signed on 9/2014. (ar)

(4 pgs)

Order Granting Second Stipulation to Amend
Pretrial Order as to Expe1t Witness Disclosures
Signed on 6/26/2014 (RE: related document(s)25
Stipulation filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent
Bank). (ar)
BNC Certificate of Mailing - PDF Document
Notice Date 06/28/2014. (Admin.)

28
(4 pgs)

Stipulation Between Planintiff and Defendants to
Amend PreMal 01·der Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (RE: re1ated document(s)2
Order re Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for
Trial). (Schwager, Sheila)

08/05/20]4

29
(4 pgs; 2 docs)

Order Granting Stipulation (Related Doc # 28)
Signed on 8/5/2014. (ar)

08/07/2014

30
(4 pgs)

BNC Certificate of Mailing - Stjpulated Order
Notice Date 08/07/2014. (Admin.)

.ll

Notice of Additional Method ofRecord;ng
Deposition Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz,
Martin D. Frantz. (McCrea, Stephen)

08/04/2014

(2 pgs)
08/29/2014

32
(2 pgs)

Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendants
flled by Defendants Cynthia M. f1·antz. Martjn D.
Frantz (McCrea, Stephen)

33

Stipulation Between Idaho Independent Bank,
Tyson Frantz,Matthew Frantz, Tailored
Management Services, LLC, Martin D. Frantz and
Cynthia M. Ftantz Sripulalion Agreemenf of
Confidential Materials and ro Enhy ofProtection
Orde1· Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank.
(Schwager, Sheila)

09/24/2014

(5 pgs)

09/29/2014
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B

Independent Bank
related document(s)33
Stipulation Between Idaho Independent Bank,
f ran tz,Matthew
Management Services,
Martin Frantz and
Cynthia M. Frantz St:ipulatioh Agreement of
Confidential Materials and to Entry of Protection
01·der). (Schwage1\ Sheila)

35

Suppiemeut to Stipulation Agreement of
Confidential .Ma1.erials and to Entry ofProtection
Order Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank
(RE: related document(s)33 Stipulation Between
Idaho Independent Bank, Tyson Frantz,Matthew
Frantz, Tailored Management Services, LLC,
Martin D. Frantz ru1d Cynthia M. Frantz Stipulation
Agreement of Confidential Ma,erials and to Enrry
ofProrection Order). (Schwager, Sheila)

(3 pgs)

09/30/2014
36
09/30/2014

(3 pgs; 2 docs)

BNC Certificate of Mailing - Stipulated Order
Notice Date 10/02/2014. (Admin.)

37

10/02/2014

(3 pgs)

38
(17 pgs;

6 docs)

Motion to Amend Morion 10 Continue Trial &
Pretrial Order (related document(s)ll Order re
Pretiial Proceedings Setting Date for Trial, 29
Order on Stipulation) Motion to Continue Trial &
Pretrial Order Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # l
Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2. Exhibit A to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# J. Exhibit B to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz#:!: Exhibit C to
Declaration of Jonathon f rantz # ~ Affidavit of
Martin Frantz) (Frantz, Jonathon)

10/03/2014
10/03/2014

Order Granting Stipulation (Related Doc # TI)
Signed on 9/30/2014. (alw)

39
(2 pgs)

Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Mm.tin D. Frantz (RE: re]ated document(s)
38 Motion to Amend Morion to Continue Trial &
Pretrial Order (related document(s)Il Order 1·e
Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for Trial, 29
Order on Stipulation) Motion 10 Continue Tr;a/ &
Pl'elrial Order Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # 1
Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2 Exhibit A to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 3 Exhibit B to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 4 Exhibit C to
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# 5 Affidavit
Declaration of Jonathon
Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to Extend
Time heaifag to be
on 10/20/2014 at 10:00
AM Video Boise to Coeur d' Alene (Mountain
Time) for~ (Frantz, Jonathon)

40
(2 pgs)

10/03/2014
10/03/2014

41
(2 pgs)

Notice of Service Certtficate of Service Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz
(RE: related document(s)38 Motion to Amend
Motion to Continue Trial & Prell'ial Order (related
document(s)2 l Order re Pretrial Proceedings
Setting Date for Trial, 29 Order on Stipulation)
Motion to Confinue Trial & Pre1rial Ordei' Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz
(Attachments: # 1 Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2
Exhjbit A to Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 3
Exhibit B to Declal.'ation of Jonatho11 Frantz# 4
Exhibit C to Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 5
Affidavit of Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M, Frantz, 39
Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: relaled documem(s)
38 Motion to A1nend Motion lo Continue Trial &
Pretrial Order (related document(s)ll Order re
Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for Tria1, 29
Order on Stipulation) Motion lo Continue Trial &
Pretrial Order Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # l
Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2 Exhibit A to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz # 3 Exhibit B to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 4 Exhibit C to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# S Affidavit of
Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to Extend
Time hearing to be held on 10/20/2014 at 10:00
AM Video - Bojse to Coeur d' Alene (Mountain
Time) for~ filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). (Frantz, Jonarhon)
Amended Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related
document(s)J,2 Notice of Hearing Filed by
Defendat1ts Cynthia M. Frantz~ Martin D. Frantz
(RE: related document(s)38 Motion to Amend
Motion to Continue Trial & Pretrial Order (related
docume11t(s)21 Order re Pretrial ProceedJn,gs
Setting Date for Trial, 29 Order on Stipulation)
Motion to Continue Trial & Pretrial Order Filed by

'
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Defe11dants Cynthia M.
Martin
(Attaclunents: # 1 Affidavit Jonathon Frantz# 2
Frantz# 3
Exhibit A to Declaration
Exhibit B to Declaration Jonathon
#4
Exhibit C to Declaration of Jonathon Frantz # 5
Affidavit of Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Fl'antz).
Motion to Extend Time hearing to be held on
10/20/2014 at 10:00 AM Video • Boise to Coeur d1
Alene (Mountain Time) for 38, filed by Defendant
Ma1tin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz).
(Frantz, Jonathon)
Corrective Action; Please refile notice of hearing to·
show the correct year, 2014. (RE: related document

(s)il Notice of Hearing filed by Defendant Martin
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) Con-ective
Action due by 10/14/2014. (alw)

10/06/2014

42
(3 pgs)

10/06/2014

10/10/2014

10/10/2014

Ame11ded Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related
document(s)38 Motion to Amend Motion to
Continue Trial & Pretrial Order (related document
(s)ll Order re Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for
Trial, 29 Order on Stipulation) Motion to Continue
Trial & Pretrial Order Filed by Defendants
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Al1achments:
# 1 Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz# 2 Exhibit A to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 3 Exhibit B to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 4 Exhjbit C to
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz# 5 Affidavit of
MarHn Frantz) filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to Continue
hearing to be held on l 0/20/2014 at 10:00 AM
Vjdeo - Boise to Coeur d1 Alene (Mountain Time)
for J,!. (Frantz, Jonathon)

43

Motion to Compel Production of Documents Filed

(146 pgs; 5 docs)

by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank (Attachments:
# 1 Memorandum in St1ppo1t # l Affidavit

Affidavit of SheiJa R. Schwager in Suppol't of
Motion to Compel Production of Documents # 1
Affidavit Affidavit of John F. Kurtz Jr. in Support
of Motion to Compel Production of Documents# 1
Certificate of Compliance with Local Rule 7037.1)
(Ku1tz, John)
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of Hearing
Independent Bank
related documen.t(s):13
Motion to Compel Production
by PJa:intiff ldaho Independent Bank
# 1 Memorandum

Support# 2 Affidavit
Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwager in Support of
Motion to Compel Production of Documents# 3
Affidavit Affidavit of John F. Kurtz Jr. in Support
of Motio11 to Compel Production of Documents # 4
Certificate of Compliance with Locai Ruje 703 7. i)
filed by Plaintiffidaho Independent Bank). Motion
to Compe] hearing to be be]d on 10/20/2014 at
l 0:00 AM Video - Boise to Coeur d' Alene
(Mountain Time) for :1:1., (Kurtz, John)
45
(8 pgs)

Objection to (related document(s): W Plaintftfs
Limited Objection to Motion ro Withdraw as
Attorney fer Defendants FHed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (Kurtz, Jolm)

46

Notice of Hearing Filed by Plaintiffidaho
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)45
Objection to (related document(s): 16) Plaintiff's
Limited Objection to Motion r.o Withdraw as
AuorneY,for Defendants Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank). Miscellaneous herufog to be
held on l 0/20/2014 at 10:00 AM Video - Boise to
Coeur d'Alene (Mountain Time) for 45, (Kurtz,
John)

10/10/2014

(3 pgs)

10/10/2014

47
(3 l pgs; 2 docs)

10/13/2014
10/15/2014

48
(106 pgs; 2 docs)

Objection to (related document(s): ll) to Morion lo
Continue Trial and Pretrial Order Filed by Plaintiff
Idaho Independent Bank (RE: !'elated document(s)
38 Motion to Amend Motion ro Continue Trial &
Pretrial Order (related document(s)6.l Order re
Pretrial Proceedings Setting Date for Trial, 29
Order on Stipulation) Molton to Continue Trial &
Pretrial Order). (Attachments: # l Affidavit of
Sheila R. Schwager in Support of Objection to
Motion to Continue Trial a11d Pret11aJ Order)
(Schwager, Sheila)
Amended AJ]idavil of John F. Kurtz .Jr. in Support
ofMotion lo Compel Production of Documents
(amends patagraph #7) (related docm11ent(s)43
Motion to Compel Production of Documents)
Affidavit ofJohn F. Kurlz Jr. in Support of Morion

J VJ.,/
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to Compel Production of Document:1
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank (Anachrnents: #
Modified
Exhibit A* 1) (Kurtz,
5/2014 (alw).

49
(4 pgs)

10/16/2014
50

(4 pgs)

10/17/2014
51

Reply to (related document(s): 45 Objection filed
by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz
(Frantz, Jonathon)
Objection to (related document(s): 43, 44) to
Mor.ion to Compel, or in the alternative, Motion to
Continue FiJed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz,
Mart.in D. Frantz (Frantz, Jonathon)

Hearing Held
Appeuanccs: Sheila Schw11gc1· ~ Counsel for the
l>Juintiff, Jon~ltbon Frantz ~UlCI Stephen McCrea
~ Counsel fot· the Defemhmts

Repo1·t of P1·oc.eedi.ngs: Defondaot.s Motion to
Continue the Trial, Doc. No. 38, J>laintiff s
Motion to Compel Production of Documents,
Doc. No. 43 and Defendants Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel for the Defendants, Doc.
No. 32. Argument pa·esented. After review and
consideration, the Court DENIES the Motion t:o
Continue the Trial. The trial will remain as
scheduled for December 201.4, all ternas of the
1>retrial oi-der sbaH remain iu effect. The Cout·t
DENIES Counsels request to Withdraw as
Counsel. The Motion to Compel is GRANTED.
Order by the .Plaintiff .is forthcoming.
(RE: l'elated document(s)38 Motion to Amend filed
by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia
M. Frantz, 43 Motion to Compel filed by PJaintiff
Idaho Independent Bru1k, 45 Objection filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) (Battle, Mel)

10/20/2014

52
10/24/2014

10/27/2014
10/30/2014

(2 pgs)

Order Granting Motion To Compel (Related Doc #
Signed on 10/24/2014. (zs)

ru

ll

Order Denying Motion To Amend (RE: Related
Doc# W Signed on 10/27/2014. (alw)

54

Order Denying Motion To Withdraw As Attorney
(Related Doc# J1) Signed on 10/30/2014. (alw)

(2 pgs)

(2 pgs)
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Motion to Witl1draw as Attorney for Motion to
Disqualffy Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley,
Martin
Filed by Defenda11ts Cynthia M.
Frantz (Attachments:# l Affidavit of Regina
McCrea # 6. Exhibit A to Declaration of Regina
McCrea# 2, Exhibit B to Declaration of Regina
McCrea# 1. Exhibit C to Declaration of Regina
McCrea#~ Affidavit of Martin Fr011tz # Q. Exhibit
A to Declaration of Martin Frantz# 1 Exhibit B to
Declaration of Martin Frantz#~ Affidavit of
Jonathon Fi·antz # 2 Exhibit A to Declamtion of
Jonathon Frantz # 10 Exhibit B to Declaratjon of
Jonatho11 Frantz) (Frantz, Jonathon)

56

Notice of Trial Schedule Filed by the Court Please
take notice, the Court hereby schedules the trial in
this matter to commence on December 1, 2014 at
9:30 a.m., continuing to December 2, 2014 at 9:30
a.m., December 3-5, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. By
November 17, 2014 the parties shall submit briefs,
disclose witnesses and exhibits. A Witness original
and two(2) Bench copies of all exhibits ru·e
required. Exhibits need to be marked, tabbed and
placed in a three-ring binder. All exhibits shall be
delivered to the Coeur d'Alene Courthouse,
attention to Mel Battle. (Battle, Mel)

57
(2 pgs)

Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Mrutin D. Frantz (RE: related docume11t(s)
55 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Moffon to
Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Ha:wley, LLP
Filed by Defenda.11ts Cynthia M. Frantz. Martin D.
Frantz (Attachments:# 1 Affidavit of Regina
McCrea # 2 Exhibit A to Declaration of Regina
McCrea# 3 Exhibit B to Declaration of Regjna
McCrea# 4 Exhibit C to Declaration ofRegjna
McCrea# 5 Affidavit of Martin Frantz# 6 Exhibit
A to Declaration of Martin Frantz# 7 Exhibit B to
Declaration of Martin Frantz# 8 Affidavit of
Jonathon Frantz # 9 Exhibit A to Declaration of
Jonathon Frantz# 10 Exhibit B to Dec)a1·ation of
Jonathon Fra11tz) filed by Defendant Martin D.
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz). Motion to
Disqualify Counsel hearing to be held on
l l/17/2014 at 10:00 AM Video - Boise to Coeur d'
Alene (Mountain Time) for J2. (Frantz, Jonathon)

11/03/2014

l l/05/2014

ll V,
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Defendants
Cynthia M.
Martin
(RE: related
docui11ent(s)55 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney
Morion lo Disqual(fy
&
Hawley, LLP Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Mrutin D. Frantz (Attachrnents: # l
Affidavit of Regina McCrea# 2 ExJ'.1ibit A to
Declaration of Regina McCrea # 3 Exhibit B to
Declaration of Regina McCrea# 4 Exhibit C to
Declaration of Regina McCrea# 5 Affidavit of
Martin Frantz# 6 Exhibit A to Declaration of
Martin Frantz# 7 Exhibit B to Declaration of
Martin Fra11tz # 8 Affidavit of Jonathon Frantz # 9
Exhibit A to Declaration of .Jonathon Frantz # 10
Exhibit B to Declaration of Jonathon Frantz) filed
by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia
M. Frantz). Motion to Disqualify Counsel hearing
to be held on 11/17/2014 at 10:00 AM Video~
Boise to Coeur d'Alene (Mountain Time) for 55,
(Frantz, .Jonathon)
Amended

59
(29 pgs; 3 docs)

11/06/2014
60
(2 pgs)

Notice ofHeaiing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s)
59 Motion for Preliminary Injunctjon Motion to
Dfsqualify Expert Witness Rand Wichman Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz
(Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Second Affidavit of
Martin Frantz# 2 Exhibit A & B to Second
Declaration of Martin Frantz) filed by Defendant
Ma1ti11 D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz).
Disclosure Statement hearing to be held on
11/17/2014 at l 0:00 AM at Video - Boise to Coeur
d'Alene (Mountain Time). (Frantz, Jonathon)

61
(3 pgs)

Motion to Determine Hardship Filed by Defendants
Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Frantz,
Jonathon)

62

Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s)
fil. Motion to Detem1ine Hardship Filed by

11/06/2014

11/06/2014

1l/06/2014

Motion for Preliminary Injunction Motfon to
Disqualify Expert Witness Rand Wichman Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Mar.tin D. Frantz
(Attachments: # l Affidavit Second Affidavit of
Marcin Frantz # I Exhibit A & B to Second
Declaration of Martin Frantz) (Frantz, Jonathon)

(2 pgs)
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Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin Frantz
by Defendant Martin
Frantz, Defendant
M.
(Frantz, Jonathon)

Conective Action: Please refile Notice of Hearing
and be sure to choose date/time/location so it will
set to the calendar. {RE: related document(s)62
Notice of Hearing filed by Defendant Martin D.
Fnmtz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) Conectlve
Action due by 11/12/2014. (a]w)

11i07/2014
63

Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz. Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document(s)
62 Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia
M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document
(s)6I Motion to Determine Hardship Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz. Martin D. Frantz
filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz, Defendant
Cynthia M. Frantz). filed by Defendant Martin D.
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz).
Miscellaneous hearing to be held on 11/17/2014 at
10:00 AM Video • Boise to Coeur d'Alene
(Mountain Time) for 62, (Frantz, Jonathon)

(2 pgs)

11/07/2014

64
(97 pgs; 4 docs)

Motion for Preliminary Injunction Motion to
Disqualify Experts- Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan
and Tes M Strunk Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # l Exhibit
A# J Exhibit B # J Exhlbit C) (Frantz, Jonathon)

65
(2 pgs)

Notice of Hearing Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Fra11tz, Martin D. Frantz (RE; related docurnent(s)
64 Motion fol' Preliminaty Injunction Motion to
Disqualify Experts- Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan
and Tes M Srrunk Filed by Defendants Cynchia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit
A # 2 Exhibit B # 3 Exhibit C) filed by Defendant
Martin D. Frantz. Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz).
Miscellaneous hearing to be held on l l/ l 7/2014 at
10:00 AM Video - Boise to Coeur d' Alene
(Mountain Time) for .§1, (Frantz, Jonathon)

66

Brief/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Withdraw as Attorney FiJed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)55
Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Modon to
Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP).

l l/07/2014

11/07i2014
11/13/2014

of 31

(77 pgs· 3 docs)

No.
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Page 15 of3 l
(Attachments: # l Affidavit of Merlyn W. Clark# l
Affidavit of John F. Ku~ .)
John)

(262 pgs; 8 docs)

11/13/2014

68
(5 pgs)

11/14/2014
69
(33 pgs)

Objectfon to (related document(s): 61) Mo1ionfer
Finding of Hardship Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (RE: related doCLm1ent(s)fil
Motion to Detennine Hardrhip). (Schwager,
SheHa)
Brief/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Preliminazy Injunction Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)64

Motion for PreJiminary Injunction Mor.ion to
Disqualify Experts- Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan
and Tes M. Slrunk). (Kurtz, John)

11/14/2014

70
(13 pgs; 2 docs)

11/14/2014
11/17/2014

Brief/Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
Prnliminary Injunction Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)59
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Motion to
Disqualtfy Rtpert Witness Rand Wichman).
(Attachrnents; # l Affidavit of Rand F. Wiclu11an #
l Exhibit Wichman Exhibit Part I of 4 # J
Wich111an Exhibits Part 2 of 4 # 1 Wichman
Exhibits Part 3 of 4 # i Wichman Exhibits Part 4 of
4 # .Q Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwager# 1 Affidavit
of John F. Kurtz, Jr.) (Kurtz, John)

71

Response to (related document(s): 66 Opposition
B1ief/Memorandum filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Ban]() Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Attachments:# l
Affidavit of Regina McCrea- Suppleme11tal)
(Frantz, Jonarl1on)
Heating Continued/Rescheduled

Appeunmces: Sheila Schwager antl .John Kurtz Counsel for the Plaintiff, Jonatholl Frontz and
Ste1>hen McCrea - Counsel for the Defenchrnts
Report o:t' Proceedings:

Pending Motions. Motion to Disquality Hawley
Troxell Eimis & Hawley, LLP, Doc. No. 55,
Motion to Dis<}tU'tlify Expe11 Witness R~nd
Wich,mrn, Doc. No. 59, Motion to Determine
Hardsl1ip, Doc. No. 61 nnd Motfou to Disqualify
No.

5

I'J'U\ 11 V,

UL/ LU/ U ::J/lVlVJ~ UL, lJ f!Yl

1. V'! I

16 of 31

Experts ~ Maggie Lyonsi
St1·unk, Doc.

Tes

The Court oraJly enters prelimi.nary decision.
Motioo to Determine Hardship, Doc. No. 61, is
DENIED.
The Cool't CONTINUES the Motion to
:Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley,
LLP, Doe. No. 55, Motion to .Disqualify EX\)ert
Witness Rand Wichm~10, Doc. No. 59, and che
Motion to Disqualify E:,q)erts- Maggie Lyons,
Laura Burgan nnd Tes M. St1'Unl<1 Doc. No. 64,
for an Evidentiary Hearing to be heard 011
December l, 2014 at 9:30 a.m. Pacific Time at
the United States Courthouse, 6450 Mineral
Drive, Coeur dAleo.e, Idaho. AH disclosures and
brlefs for tllis henring a1·e due no later than 5:00
p.m. Mountain Time on November 25, 2014.

The trial scheduled to be heard on Decembet'
1-5, 2014 is l1crcby VACATED. The cu.nent trial
deadlines it.re hereby ARA Tl~)) until further
notice.
(RE: related docmnent(s)2.l Order re Pretrial
Proceedings Setting Date for Trial, 55 Motion to
Withdraw as Attorney filed by Defendant Martin D.
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, ~ Motion
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant
Mrutin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, fil.
Motion to Detem1ine filed by Defendant Martin D.
Frantz, Defe11dant Cynthia M. Frantz, 64 Motion
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthla M. Frantz)
Motion to Disqualify Counsel hearing to be held on
12/1/2014 at 09:30 AM CDA- US Coui1house,
Bai'lkxuptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for i2., Hearing
to be heJd on 12/1/2014 at 09:30 AM CDA - US
Courthouse, Bankruptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for
22, Miscellaneous hearing to be held on 12/1/2014
at 09:30 AM CDA - US Courthouse,
Bankruptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for M., (Battle,
Mel) (Entered: 11/18/2014)

11/18/2014

72
(2 pgs)

Notice regarding rescheduling trial. (sjh)
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Witness Ust Filed
Bank. (Schwager, Sheila)

74
11/25/2014

(6 pgs)

.75

11125/2014

(3 pgs)

76
11/26/2014

(6 pgs)

Independent

Witness List Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz. Martin D. Frantz. (Frantz, Jonathon)
Exhibit List Filed by Defendants Cy1ithia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz. (Frantz, Jonathon)

71
(8 pgs)

Expert Witness Disclosul'e of Je/Ji·ey Katz Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz.
(Frantz. Jonathon)

78
(22 pgs; 3 docs)

MOTION in Limine to Prohibit E.."'C))ert Testimony
of Jefferey Katz Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (Attaclm1ents: # l Memorandum
in Support of Motion in Li mine# 2. Affidavit of
John F. Kurtz, Jr. in Suppo1t of Motion in Limine)
(Kurtz, John)

Jj_

Objection to (related document(s): ]j} Filed by

(5 pgs)

Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Martin D. Frn.ntz

11/28/2014

11/28/2014

(Frantz, Jonathon)

11/29/2014
12/01/2014

Exhibit List Filed by Piaintiff
Bank. (Schwager, SheiJa)

80

HearjJ1g Held
Appesll'ances: Sheila Schwager and John Ku.rt2.
fo1· Plaintiff, Jonath,m Frantz for Defendants

Report of Proceedings:
E'1idenfou-y Beariog regarding J>laiutiffs Motion
in Limillc. Doc. No. 78, Defendants Motion to
DisquaU(y Experts Maggie Lyons, Lau..-~
Bu1·g.1n and Tes M. Strunk. l)oc. No. 64 tnd
Defendants motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, and motion to
disqualify CXIHWt Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59.

Parties sti1>ulate to the admission of Defendants
e:xbibits 103, 106, 107, 112, 113, ll4, 115, 127
and Plaintiffs exhibits 201, 202, 204, 217.
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1.Plaintiffs Motion iu Liminc. Doc. No. 78.

J>arties present oral argument. The Court enters;
an onll ruling GRANTING Plaintiffs Motion.
2.Defendants Motion to Disqualify Experts

Maggie Lyons, Laura Burgan aud Tes M.
Strunk Doc. No. 64. P.,rtics present out
argmnent. The Court ente1·s un 01·1\I ruling
DENYING .Defendants motion.
3.Defeudsmts motion to disqu.tlify Hawley
Troxell Ennis & I-fowley, Doc. No. 55, and
motion to disqlu'llify expert Rm1d Wichmnn,

Doc. No. 59:
Michael Reagan sworn and examined.
Regina McCrM sworn and examined.
Defendants Exhibits 105, 110, 123 and Plaintiffs
Exhibits 200,232,233,234,235,238,239,240,
242, 243 admitted.

Me1·lyn Clark sworn nnd examined.
Marty Frantz sworn and examined. Defcn<hrnts
· Exhibits l.26, 136, 1371 138, 139, 140, 141, 142

admitted.
Parties stipulate to the admhision of Plaintiffs
exhibits 1.02-103, 105-107, 110-115, 117-124, 1261.27, 129, 1.32-164 and to J)efendnnts exhibits

200-21.2, 215-231 (some of which were previously
admitted).
Merlyn Clnrk, previously sworn, is recalled and

examined.

Sheila ScJ1wagcr sworn and examined.
John Kurtz sworn imd examined.

Defendants rest.

Court a·ecesses. :Hearing will l'esume oo Tuesday,
Dec. 2, 2014, nt 8:30 a.m.
(RE: related document(s)SS Moti011 to Withdraw as
AUomey filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz,

Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion for
Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Martin

D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 64 Motion

JU
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Bankruptcy

for Preliminary unction filed by Defendant
Martin Frantz, Defendant
(Battle, Mel)

fil.

: 12/03/2014)

Hearing Held

(4 pgs)

Appea .. ances: Sheila Schwager and John Kurtz
for Phlintiff, Jonathan :Frantz for Defendants
Report of f'roceedings:
Continued Evidentinry Hearing regarding

Plaintiffs Motion in .Limine. Doc. No. 78,
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Experts

Maggie Lyons, Lnura Burgan and Tes M.
Strunk. Doc. No. 64 ;rnd Defendants motion to
disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hnwley, Doc.
No. 55, and n1otion to disqi.iaJify· exJlert Rand
Wichman, Ooc. No. 59.

M)u·ty Frautz, previously sworn, is recalled and
examined.

Rimd Wichman - sworn i)nd exnminetl.
Defendants stipulate tlrnt Rand Wichnum was
an indepcndcn.t con.tractor and not an employee.
Plaintiff rests.

Marty Frantz, previously sworn, is recalled nnd
e:xamin<ld.
Defendants rest.

All parties rest. Evidence is closed.
P:lrtics present ornl closing argumeDts.

The Court takes the matter under advisement.

12/02/2014

(RE: related document(s)SS Motion to Withdraw as
Attomey fiJed by Defenda11t Martin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz) 59 Motion for
Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Ma1tin
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 64 Motion
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant
Ma11in D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Fra11tz)
(Suzanne Hickok, Mel Battle) (Entered:
12/03/2014)
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Order Denying Motion For Disqualification of
Plaintiffs Experts (Related Doc# M), G1·an11ng
Motion Limine
# 78).
on
12/4/2014. (sjh)

n(1 pg)

Notice of Hearing Filed by the Court. Please take
notice a Telephonic Oral Ruling regarding
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine. Doc. No. 78,
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Experts Maggie
Lyons, Laura Burgan and Tes M. Strwlk. Doc. No.
64 and Defendants motion to disqualify Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, and motion
to disqualify expert Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59
will be held on the December 10th, 2014 at l :00
p.m. Pacific Time/ 2:00 p.m. Mountain Time. On
the date and time specified, the parties shall call the
Courts personal conferencing phone number at
l-877-336-1829, enter access code 3956660,
security code 2222 and follow the operators
instrnctions. (Battle, Mel)

84

Heari11.g Held

12/05/2014
12/10/2014

L U'.) l

I' JtA 1~ 0,

!J f!Vl

At>i>earances: S1Jei1;1 Schwitger and Tim Kurtz Counsel for the Plaintiff, ,Jonnthon Krantz Counsel fo1· the Det'cndnnt

Report of Proceedings:
Oral Ruling regarding J)efendlrnts Motion to
Disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley,
Doc. No. 55, and Defentlan1·s Motion to
Disqualify expert Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59.
The Court orally enters findings and
conclusions, reseJ-ving the right to 11mend,
supplement, or issue written findings.

Defendants Motion to Disqualify Hawley Tro-xell
Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, DENIED.
Defendants Motion to Disqualify expert Rand
Wichman, Doc. No. 59, D.ENlED.
The Court will enter appropriate Order.
Counsel shall submit to the Court their
uoavaiJable trial dates for April, M1'1y and June
2015 by tile ct1<l of this wccl<..
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(Proceedings recorded in Boise1 lD.)
(RE:
Motion to
as
Attorney filed Defendant Martin
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz: Motion for
Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Martin
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frnntz, 78 Motion
in Limine filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent
Bank) (Battle, Mel)

85
(1 pg)

12/10/2014

(sjh)

86
(3 pgs)

12/12/2014

87
12/12/2014

Order DENYlNG motions to disqualify. Signed on
12/10/2014 (RE: related document(s)SS Motion to
Withdraw as Attomey filed by Defendant Martin D.
Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz).

(3 pgs)

88
(3 pgs)

12/29/2014

89

Notice ofllB's Unavailable Datesfo, Tri(.Jl Filed
by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank. (Schwager,
Sheila)
Notice of Unavailibilify (Frantz, Jonathon)
Modified on 12/12/2014 (alw).
Order Rescheduling Trial for May 26-29, 2015 and
June l ·S, 201 S (if necessary); setting video
conference hearing fol' March 16, 2015 at 11:00 an1
(MDT); 10:00 am (PDT) and establishing
deadlines. Sjgned on 12/29/2014 (RE: related
docume11t(s)2I Order re Pretrial Proceedings
Setting Date for Trial). (sjh)
Exhibit List Filed by PJaintiffJdaho Independent
Bank. (Schwager, Sheila)

Ol/30/2015

(26 pgs)

01/30/2015

(4 pgs)

Witness List Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent
Bank. (Schwager, Sheila)

02/04/2015

21
(3 pgs)

Witness List Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz. (Frantz, Jonathon)

92
02/04/2015

(7 pgs)

Exhibit List Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frnntz. (Frantz, Jonathon)

03/05/2015

93

90

(11 pgs)

Motion to Strike Undisclosed Witnesses Filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank (Schwaget,
Sheila)
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Notice
Filed by Plaintiffidaho
Independent Bank
related
Motion to
Undisclosed Witnesses
Plaintiff Idaho
Bank). (Schwager,
Sheila)

03/05/2015

Corrective Action: The date and time of the hearing
was not entered into ECF when filing the Notice of
Hearing. Please re-file. (RE: related document(s)94
Notice of Hearing filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank) Conective Action due by

03/05/2015

3/10/2015. (ar)

95
(3 pgs)

03/05/2015

96
(4 pgs)

03/05/2015
97

Objection to (related document(s): 21) Jvfotion ro
Strike Witnesses Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (Frantz, Jonathon)

(4 pgs)

Stipulation Between Plaintiff and Defe11dants
tegarding Trial Exhibits Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank. (Schwager, Sheila)

03/13/2015
98

Reply to (related docu.ment(s): 93 Motion to Sn·ike

(7 pgs)

Undisclosed Witnesses filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank) Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (Schwager, Sheila)

99

Hearing Held

03/13/2015
03/16/2015

Notice of Hearing Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)93
Motion to Strike Undisclosed Witnesses Filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank). Motion to Strike
hearing to be held on 3/16/2015 at 11:00 AM Video
- Boise to Coeur d' Alene (Mountain Time) for 21,
(Schwager, Sheila)

Appearnnces: Shella Schwager· Counsel for the
Pfajntiff, Jonathon Krantz. Counsel for the

Defendant
Reflort of Proeeedings:
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Undisclosed
Witnesses. Argument p1·cscutcd. After
eonsideration 1 the Court orally enters findings,

the Court GR.ANTS the ))laintiff s Motion to
Strike Undisclo5cd Witnesses. An order is
forthcoming by the Plain tiff.
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Trial Status Conference. The Court accepts the

parties stipulation regiin.ling t:hc admission of
e..xbibits. The Court orders Def,mse Counsel to
deUve1· nil exhibits to the Coeur d'Alene
Courthouse no l.ater than Ji'riday Ma1·ch 20,
2015. Tbe exhibits shall be marked and tabbed
in acconlmue to the pretrial orde•·.

(RE: related docurnent(s)l Complaint filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank, 93 Motion to
Snike filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank)
(Battle, Mel)
100
(2 pgs)

A.1t1ended Exhibit List Filed by Defendants Cynthia
M. Frantz, Martin D. Frantz (RE: related document
(s)92 Exhibit List). (Frantz, Jonathon)

lQ!

Order Requiring Clarification. Signed on 3/18/2015
(RE: related document(s) l 00 Exhibit List filed by
Defendant Maitin D. Frantz; Defendant Cyi1thia M.
Frantz). (sjh)

03/16/2015

(3 pgs)

03/18/2015
102
(3 pgs; 2 docs)

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
Undisclosed Witnesses (Related Doc# 93) Signed
on 3/18/2015. (ar)

w..

Notice of Transcript Requesl Filed by Plaintiff
Idaho In.dependent Ba11k. (Schwager, Sheila)

104

BNC Certificate of Mailing - Order on Motion to
Strike Notice Date 03/20/2015. (Admin.)

03/18/2015

03/18/2015

(3 pgs)

03/20/2015

(3 pgs)

03/23/2015

105
(2 pgs; 2 docs)

Transcript regarding Hearing Held 12il0/14 RE:

Judge's Ruling.
Remote electronic access to the transcr1pt is
resuicted until 06/22/2015. The transcript may be
viewed at the Bankruptcy Court Clerk's Office.
[Court Reporter/Transcriber Gayle Ma1ti11~Lutz@
NW Transcripts, LLC, Telephone number 208~9893455.] Purchasing Pal'ty: Sheila Schwagel'@

Hawley Troxell
(R£: related document(s) 84 Hearing Held

Appean1nces: Sheila Schwager and Tim Kurtz
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Jonathon Krantz Counsel for the Defcudant

w
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Bankruptcy Court
Report of Proceedings:

Oral Ruling regan.ling Defendants Motion to
Disquahfy Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley,
Doc. No. 55, and Defcuda.nts Motion to
Disqualify expert Rnnd Wicbman, Doc. No. 59.
The Court orally entc1·s findings and
conclusions, rese1"1-ing the right to amend,
supplement, or issue wl.'ittcn findings.
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, DENlED.

))efendants Motion to Disqualify expert Rlrncl
Wichmau, Doc. No. 59, DENIED.
The Court will cntc1· appropriate Ordet·.

Counsel sJull st1bmit to the Court tbeil'
unavailable ttial dotes for April, May ~,ncl ,June
2015 by the end of this week.

(Pi:oce.eding8 t·ecorded iJl Boise, ID.)
(RE: related document(s)55 Motion to Withdraw as
Attorney filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion for
Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Martin
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 78 Motion
in Li.mine filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent
Bank)). Notice oflntent to Request Redaction
DeadHne Due By 03/30/20 l S. Redaction Request
Due By 04/13/2015. Redacted Transcript
Submission Due By 04/23/2015. Transcript access
will be restricted through 06/22/2015. (Lutz, Gayle)
.lQ.6.
(4 pgs)

Response to (related document(s): 10 l Order
(Genedc)) Filed by Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz,
Matiin D. Frantz (Frantz, Jonathon)

107

03/24/2015

03/29/2015

(2 pgs)

BNC Certificate of Mai1i11g - Notice of Filing of a
Transcdpt Notice Date 03/29/2015. (Admin.)

04/13/2015

108
(3 pgs; 2 docs)

Transcript regarding Heal'ing Held 12/01/14 RE:
Trial Day 1.
Remote electronic access to the transcript is
J'estricted until 07/13/2015. The transcript may be
viewed at (he Bankruptcy Court Clerk's Office.
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[Court Reporter/Transcriber Bomiie Martinelli,
Telephone number
Sheila Schwager
(RE: related document(s) 80
Appearances: Sheila Schwager and ,John Kurtz
fol' Ph1iutiff, Jon~ltlrnn Fnmtz for Defendants
Report of F rocecdings:
Evidentiary Hearing regarding Plaintiffs Mo1·ion

in Umirie. Doc. No. 78, Defeudauts Motion to
Disqualify .E:xpert!I M,,ggie Lyons, Lau,·~
Burg,m and Tes M. Strunk. Doc:. No. 64 and
Defendant~ motion to disquaH1jr Hawley Ttoxcll
Ennl"> & I·fawley, J)oc. No. 55, and motion to
disqualify expert Rand Wichman, Doc. No. 59.

Parties stipulate to the admission ofOefcndants
exhibits 103, 106, 107, H2, 113,114,115, 127
and Plaintiffs exhibits 201,202,204,217. ·

I.Plaintiffs Motion in Lhnil)c. Doc. No. 78.
P~rties present on,l argument. The Coul't enters
an ond r11ling GRANTING Plaintiffs Motion.
2.DefeaHhmts Motion to Disqualify Experts

Maggie Lyons, Laura Bul'gan 1111d Tes M.
Strunk. Doc. No. 64. Pat·ties present ornl
argume11t. Tbe Coul't enters ~ln oral ruling
.DENYING Dcfenditnts motion.
3.Dcfendants motion to dis~1ualify H;lwlcy
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Doc. No. 55, and
motion to disqualify expet·t Rand Wichmlln,
Doc. No. 59:

Miclrne] Reagan sworn nnd examined.
Regina McCrea sworn imd examined.
Defendants Exhibits 105,110,123 and Plaintiffs
Exhibits 200. 232, 233, 234, 235, 238, 239, 240,
242, 243 admitted.

Merlyn Clarksworn and examined.
Marty Frantz sworn and examined. Defcndanf·s

Exhibits 126,136,137,138,139, 1401141,142
admitted.
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Parties stipulate to the admission of Plaintiffs
exhibits 102-103, JOS-107, 110-1
11
1261291 132-164 and to .Defendants exhibits

200·212, 215-231

which were previously

admitted).

Merlyn Cfarl<, previously sworn, is recalled and
exam,ned.
Sheila Schwager sworn and examined.
John I(U1·tz sworn and examined.

Defenda11 ts rest.

Court 1·eccsses. Hearing will resume on Tuesday,
Dec. 2, 2014, at 8:30 n.m.
(RE: related document(s)55 Molion to Withdraw as
Altomey filed by Defendant Mal'tin D. Ftantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion fol'
P1·eliminary Injunction filed by Defendant Martin
D. Ft·antz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz. 64 Motion
for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendant
Mrutin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz)).
Notice of Intent to Request Redaction Deadline
Due By 04/20/2015. Redaction Request Due By
05/4/2015. Redacted Transcript Submission Due
By 05/14/2015. Transcript access will be l'esuicted
through 07/13/2015. (Nunemacher, VaJerie)
Modified on 4/13/2015 (ar).

04/13/2015

109

Transcript regarding Heru·ing Held 12/02/ l 4 RE:

(2 pgs; 2 docs)

Day 2 Trial.

Remote electronic access to the transcript is
restl'icted until 07/13/2015. The transcript may be
viewed at the Bankruptcy Com1 Clerk's Office.
[Cou1t Reportel'/Transcriber Bormie Martinellli,
Telephone number 208~765-3666.] Purchasing
Party: Sheila Schwager
(RE: related docmnent(s) fil. Hearing Held
Appearances: Sheila Schwuger and John Kurtz
for Pl11intiff, Jonnthan Fnrntz fo1' Defendants

Report of Proceedings:
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Continued Evidentiary Hearing regnrdiug
Plaintiffs Motion in Limioe. Doc. No. 78,
Defendants Motion to Disqualify Experts

Maggie Lyons, Launt But·gan and Tes M.
Strunk Doc. No. 64 and Defendnnts motion to
disqualify Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Doc.
No. 55, and motion to disqualify expert Rand
Wichman, Doc. No. 59.
Marty Frantz, 1ueviously sworn, is recalled and
examined.

Rnnd Wichmim - sworn nnd examined.
Defendants stipulate that Rond Wichman was
an indcpendellt coutractor und not im. employee.
Plaintiff rests.

Marty Frantz, previously sworn, is recalled llnd
examined.

Defendants rest.
All parties rest. Evidence is closed.

Partfos prese:nt o.-al closing arguments.
The Court takes the matter under advisement.

(RE: related document(s)55 Motion to Withdraw as
Attorney filed by Defendant Martin D. Frantz,
Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 59 Motion for
Preliinin!lly Injunction filed by Defendant Mal'tin
D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz, 64 Motion
for Preliminary Tnjunction filed by Defendant
Martin D. Frantz, Defendant Cynthia M. Frantz)
(Suzanne Hickok, Mel Battle)). Notice oflntem to
Request Redaction Deadline Due By 04/20/2015.
Redaction Request Due By 05/4/2015. Redacted
Transcript Submission Due By 05/14/2015.
Transcript access will be restricted through
07/13/2015. (Nunemacher, Valerie) Modified on
4/13/2015 (ar).
BNC Ce1tificate of Maili11g - Notice of Filing of a
Transcript Notice Date 04/17/2015. (Adrnin.)

1JO

04/17/2015

04/17/2015

Martin Frantz

Hawley

(3 pgs)

BNC Certificate of Mailing - Notice of Filing of a
Transcript Notice Date 04/17/2015. (Admin.)

ill

(2 pgs)

No.

F

No,
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04/30/2015

04/30/2015

ill

Pre-tlial Brief Filed by Plaintiffidaho Independent
Bank. (Schwager, Sheila)

114

Pre-u·iaJ Brief Filed by Defendants Cynthia M.
Frantz, Martin D. Frantz. (Frantz, Jonathon)

(40 pgs)

(2 pgs)

115
(2 pgs)

05/14/2015
116

Notice of Hearing Filed by the Court. Please take
notice a Status Conference in the adversary
proceeding shall be held on Wednesday, May 20,
2015, at 9:00 a.m. (PDT)/10:00 a.m. (MDT), and
counsel shall appear at either the United States
Courthouse. 6450 Mineral D1ive, Coeur dAlene,
Idaho, or the James A. McClure FedL Bldg. and
U.S. Courthouse, 550 W. Fo11 St, Boise, Idaho.
(Battle, Mel)
Heming .Held

Appeantnces: Sheila Schwager and .John Kurtz Counsel for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank,
Ste,,e MtC1·ea and Jonathon F1·antz ~ Counsel
for Defendants Martin i.md Cynthia F1·antz,
Corey Quinn - Rep1·escnting Cha11tm· 7 Trustee
Report of Proceedings: Trial Status Conference.
Argument presented rcgiu·ding the effects of the
Approved Wnivor of Discharge. The Court
orally enters ftndings and conclusions. Due to
the Approved Waiver olDischa1·gc this
AdvcrSlU'Y Proceeding i-~ re11dcrcd MOOT. The
h·ia.l scheduled t.o commence on Mny 26, 2015 is
bereby VACATED. (Proceeding~ recorded in
Boise, ID.)

(RE: related documeot(s)l Complaint filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank, ill Notice of
Hearing) (Battle, Mel) Modified on 5/20/2015
(Battle, Mel).

05120/2015

06/02/2015

(44 pgs)

Motio11 For Sanctions Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bani< (Schwager, Sheila)

06/02/2015

118
(44 pgs)

Affidavit Re: Affidavit ofSheila R. Schwager in
Si1pport of Motion/or Sane lions FiJed by Plaintiff

ill
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pgs)

06/02/2015

120
(19 pgs)

06/03/2015

Bill of Costs Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent
Bank. Objections to Bill of Costs due by:
06/17/2015 (Schwager, Sheila)

121
(156 pgs; 4 docs)

Application for Compensation Filed by Plaintiff
Idaho Independent Ba.:nk. (Attachments: # l
Memorandum in Support# 1 Affidavit of Sheila R.
Schwager# J Affidavit of John F. Kurtz)
(Schwager, SheiJa) Modified on 6/4/201 S (alw).

122

Notice of Hearing Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Ba11k (RE: related document(s)] 21
Bill of Costs Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent
Bank. Objections to Bill of Costs due by:

06/03/2015

(3 pgs)

06/17/2015 (Attachments:# 1 Memorandum in
Support # 2 Affidavit of SheiJa R. Schwager # 3
Affidavit of John F. Kurtz) filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank). Miscellaneous hearing to be
held on 7/28/2015 at 09:30 AM CDA- US
Cou11house, Bankruptcy/Magistrate Courtroom for
121, (Schwager, Sheila). Related document(s) 123
Application for Compensation Motion for
Attomeys' Fees and Costs for Sheila Rae Schwager,
Creditor's Attorney, Fee: $385402.50, Expenses:
$23210.42. filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent
Bank. Modified on 6/4/2015 (alw).

06/03/2015
123
(156 pgs; 4 docs)

06/04/2015

Independent Bank (RE: related document(s)l 17
Motion For Sanctions Filed by Plaintiff Idaho
Independent Bank). Motion for Sanctions hearing
to be held on 6/15/20 J 5 at l 0:00 AM Video Baise
to Coeur d' Alene (Mountain Time) for 117,
(Schwager, Sheila)

Amended Application for Compensation Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs for Sheila Rae Schwager,
Creditor's Attorney, Fee: $385402.50, Expenses:
$23210.42. Filed by Attorney Sheila Rae Schwager
Objections to Application for Compensation due by
06/29/2015. (Attachments:# l Memorandum in
Support# J Affidavit of Sheila R. Schwagel' # 1
Affidavit of John F, Kt111:Z, Jr.) (Schwager, Sheila)
Modified on 6/4/2015 (alw). *a111ended to use

correct event code*
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Jonathon
for Sanctions# i Exhibit to Declaration of
Jonathon Frantz # 1 Exhibit B to Declaration of
Jonathon Frantz# 1 Exhibit C to Declaration of
Jonathon Frantz# 2. Exhibit C-1 to Declai·ation of
Jonathon Frantz) (Frantz, Jonathon)
125

Supplement to Motion for Sanctions Filed by
Plaintiff Idaho Independe11t Bartle (RE: related
docurnent(s)l J7 Motion For Sanctions).
(Schwager, Sheila)

(3 pgs)

06/12/2015

Affidavit Re: Jane Bodle-Hill in Support of Motion
for Sanctions Filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent

126
(7 pgs)

Bank (RE: related document(s)l25 Supplement).
(Schwager, Sheila)

06/12/2015

Hearing Held

127

Appeal'ances: Sheila Schw~lgcr - Counsel for
Plaintiff, Jonathon Frantz - Counsel for the
Defendant
Repol't of Proceedings: Plaintiff Motion for
Sanctions, Doc. No. 117. Argument presented.
The Court deems the matt:cr submitted and
undc.- advisement. A decision is forthcoming.
(RE: related document(s) J 17 Morion for Sanctions
filed by Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank) (Battle,
Mel)

06/15/2015

Objection to (related docim1ent(s): 121, 123) !]B's
Motion.for Auorney Fees and Costs Filed by
Defendants Cynthia M. Frantz, Ma1tin D" Frantz

128

(7 pgs)
07/14/2015

(Frantz, Jonathon)
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1 West Sprague
Suite 1
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (S09) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007

Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & HawJey LLP

1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR n IE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN fR/\NTZ,

)

)
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

Defendant.

)
)

Cast! No. CVI5~1406

l)KFENDANT'S REPLY RE
DISMISSAL/ADA Tl(

)
)

)
-~--.)
ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs response is three-fold:
(a)

That the adversary proceeding wilhin the bankruptcy was "rendered moor'

so that there are no longer two pending actions;
(b)

Ri;s judicata does not apply because there has been and will be no finaJ

judgment; and

(c)

A motion for

disqualification is different Lhan an action for legal

malpractice and breach of fiducjary duty.

VVV

~AlNt HAM~ltN Lr
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it pending

the

tgJVVV/VVl.J

adversary

proceeding, or in the bankruptcy proceeding.
1.

The Adversary Proceeding as well as the Bankruptcy Proceeding Remain PendingBoth WiU Result in a Fb1at Judgment.

Plaintiff's first argument makes the factually incorrect statement I.hat the adversary
proceeding is no longer pending because it was determined to be moot. As reflected in the
Allidavit of Ms. Schwager, Mr. Fra.ntz filed an agreement that none of his debts were
dischargeable. Thus, no trial of whether Mr. Frantz committed fraud is necessary. However, that

docs not determine the proceeding. There are two motions pending - one for sanctions, and one
for attorney's fees, which the Court has not ruled upon. Once the Court rules, ajudb1ffient in the
amount of the sanctions as wcJI as auorney's fees will be entered. That wm be a 11nal judgment.
Further, the bankruptcy remains pending. The precise issue which is fundamental to
plaintiff's suit i11 this action, i.e., whether Merlyn Clark became Mr. Frant7.'s attorney in
providing expert services to Mr. Bruce Owens, has been determined. That issue was not
detennined solely for the Adversary Proceeding, but is a finding and conclusion of the

Bankruptcy Court and wiJI continue through the conclusion or the bankruptcy. Defendant HTEH
continues to represent JIB as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding, adver.~e to Mr. Frantz.
In short there remain at Jeast two pending proceedings, and plaintiff's argument to the
contrary is factually inaccurate.

~

PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

004/ 0

There wm Be a Final Judgment Binding on Plaintiff,

collateral cstoppe1 will never apply. That is based on the faulty assumption

a final judgment

wilJ never be entered in either the adversary proceeding or the bankruptcy.
Plaintiff appears to also be arguing that the final judgment has to be one determining the

issue subsequently litigated, i.e., the issue to be litigated in this action. That represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the law of res judicata in Idaho. While it is true that there does
have to be a ".finaJ judgment" which concludes the action where the issue in question arose, there
does not have to be a "final judgment" that Mr. CJark was not acling as Mr. Frantz's attorney.
Where the specific issue raised m the subsequent action was actually determined in the previous

action, a judgment finally concluding the action suffices for this element of res judicala.
One of the cases cited by plaintiff, Fanners Nat'] Bank v. Shif~_y, 26 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d
762 (1994) is instructive on this issue. In that case, Fanner's National loaned money to Allen to

purchase ca1l1e and equipment from Shirey, pursuant to a Dairy Sales Agreement. Both Shirey
and the bank took a security interest in the ca1tlc and equipment, with Shirey subordinating its
interest lo 1h0 Bank. Allen came to financial grief and Dlcd for protection from creditors under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Both Bank and Shirey filed claims as secured creditors and a
Trustee was appointed. Bank proposed that it be allowed 10 sell the co!lateraJ and moved to lift
lhe stay. Trustee agreed and signed a stipulation to that effect. Shirey did not object to e.ilher the

motion or the stipulation until after Bank had sold the coHatcra]. Shirey then sued Bank in state

court for the balance owed it by AlJen under a variety of theories . .Bank moved for summary
judgment on the basis, inter alia, of res judicata. The trial court agreed, dismissed Shircy's action
and the Idaho Supreme

upheld that dismissat Holding that all three clcmcnls for res

7

14] 00!> QO

NE HAMBlE

0

held

a

subsequent action.
The case includes an excellent discussion of re~ judicata commencing

at

page 68 and

concluding on page 71 of 1.he Opinion at 126 Idaho. The case recog_nizcs that a different analysis

applies depending on whether the second action is attempting to litigate the same claim between
the same parties, or whether the same parties arc litigating a di11erenl claim, but involving issues
which were determined in 1.he first The former situation is referenced ai:; the "Joyce" RuJc which
states that:

In an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand the
former adjudication concludes parties and privies, not only as to every

matter offered and received to sustain or defeat tho claim, but also as to
every matter which might and should have been litigated in the First suit.

It is correct that the claim in the Adversary Proceeding in the Frantz bankruptcy was nondischargeability due to fraud, while the claim in the instant action is for damages due to attorney
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, under the J()yce Rule, res judicata/collateral
estoppcJ would not apply. However, the analysis does not end there. For where, as here, the issue
arjscs in a subsequent action based upon a different claim or demand, the "Marshall Rule"
applies, based on Marshall v. Underwood, 38 ldaho 464, 466, 221 Pac. 1105 (1923). The

Marshall Rule holds that judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppcl onJy as to those
precise matters which were in fact decided. Fam1ers Nat'! Bank, supra at 126 ldaho 70.
The Marshall Rule applies here to defeat plaintiff's claims. Here, the precise issue

dispositivc of both the disqualification claim as well as the current malpractice/breach of
fiduciary duty claim has been litigated between Mr. Franti!, IIB, and HI3's privy, HTEH. 'Jbat
issue is whether Merlyn Clark became Mr. Frantz's attorney back in 2008 when he provided

F

0
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that

Once the final judgment is entered

either or both, thal ruling becomes the

the case and

is binding on plaintiff.

Based on Idaho Jaw as reflected in the Farmers Nat'l Bank case, p1aLnli ff is barred from

relitiga1ing the issue of whether Merlyn Clark was ever acting as an attorney for Mr. frantz. 1
3.

Plaintiff's Distinction Between the Two Actions is lrrelev11nt to Disposition of this

~.

Plaintiffs final argument is that an action for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary
duty is different than a motion for disqualification. The difference cited is that the Court, in a
disqualification motion, conducts a "multi-faceted analysis_" The argument simply misses the

point Tn order to succtled on his claim that Hr.EH violati;,d the rules regarding former clitmts,
Frantz must prove that an attorney-client relationship existed between him and Merlyn Clark. In
order to succeed on his current malpractice claim, Mr. Frantz is required to prove that an
attorney-client relationship existed between him and Merlyn Clark. Although the ramifications of
the determination of the issue are different (disqualification versus damages), the issue is the
same. Neither chum can be successfully prosecuted without establishing that attorney-client
relationship. In this case, lhat means that Mr. Frantz must prove that Merlyn Clark acted as his
atlorney at law_ The bankruptcy court, sitting as trial judge in the adversary proceeding, after a
two day cvidcntiary hearing, specifically found that there was no such relationship.

Plaintiff doc:, nol ar~ue. and thus concedes. thatthe ''identity of the parties" requirement. through privily, exists_
In that regard, the Fannon; Nat'l Bank case, supr~ provides a good example of how the party ass1..ning res
judicaui in the subsequent action need not be identical if he wa..s in privity with a party in the prior acLion.
(Trustee in bankruptcy representing creditors-privily existing to bar later action in creditor's name_)

0
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CONCLUSION

the adversary proceeding, as wet I as the bankruptcy is

Alternatively, the Court

should stay this action until such final judgment is entered.
DATED this U day of July, 2015.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
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Falls, Idaho

Ph:208-262-38931Fax: 208-262-3894
j9nathon@cdalegal.com
lSB No. 9129
Anorney for Plaintiff, Martin Frantz.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

Case No.: CV 15-1406
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY re: MOTION FOR
PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record and hereby submits his reply

regarding his motion for pro hac vice admission of Jeffery Katz.
The Defendant is now disingenuously insisting that Mr. Katz will be a witness despite the
fact that Defendant filed to ever submit this argument in any of its previously filed briefs.
Instead, Defendant cunningly attempts to create an issue in order to prevent Mr. Frantz from
using the attorney of his choice.

InitiaJly, while Defendant attempts to discredit Plaintiff's citation of authority,
importantly, Defendant provides no contrary citations. This is because there is no guidance in
Idaho law on the subject As a result, the Plaintiff has turned to well respected federal circuit

case law, which has already had a substantial opportunity to consider the issue. The federal

24-Ju

08:51

p.

is well reasoned and should apply here.
Additional]y, Defendant is attempting to manufacture a scenario wherein Mr. Katz

wrn

be a witness in order to prevent him from being granted pro hac vice admission. However, what
Defendant fails to recognize is that even were Mr. Katz to be a witness, it would still not prevent
bim from representing Mr. Frantz in the remainder of the proceedings. I.R.P.C. Rule 3.7 only
bars a lawyer from acting "as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a

necessary witness unless: ( 1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue." First, even if Mr.
Katz was a necessary witness at tiial, it would only prevent Mr. Katz from being an attorney at

trial. The purpose of rule is to ensure there is no confusion during the trial (as that is the only
time the attorney's dual roles could be confused). See I.R.P.C. Rule 3.7, cmt. 2. Therefore, this
rule could only bur Mr. Kutz from being an·-attornoy-at trial It cannot stand to bar him from pro
hac vice admission entirely.
Second, the Defense claims it wants to question Mr. Katz and determine "motives." To
the extent Hawley Troxell desires to discover Mr. Frantz's motives in bringing this lawsuit, such
is protected by the attorney-client relationship and not subject to discovery. To the extent the
Defendant desires to question Mr. Katz regarding his motives (which are subjective) Mr. Katz
testimony on the subject would necessmiJy be uncontroverted (there can be no other testimony as
to Mr. Katz subjective motive). As a resu]t, such testimony would be excepted from rule 3.7.

See I.R.P.C. Rule 3.7(a)(l) (an exception for testimony relating "to an uncontested issue").
Lastly, Mr. Katz's testimony is not "necessary" as required by rule 3. 7. Mr. Frantz' s
motive in bringing this lawsuit is not an element of professional malpractice, nor is it an element
of any defense thereto. Of course Mr. Frantz wants money from Hawley Troxel] to rectify

08:
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not

the least bit to the lawsuit at hand and therefore Mr. Katz is not and would not be a necessary
witness. Indeed, Mr. Katz testimony would not even be admissible as it would not be relevant.

In conclusion, Mr. Katz at most could only be barred from representing Mr. Frantz at trail
(not during the entire litigation); however, since Mr. Katz testimony would be both unnecessary
(and irrelevant) as well as uncontested, rule 3.7 is inoperable in this circumstance. As a result,

Mr. Katz shou]d be granted admission.
DATED thls 24th day of July, 2015.

FRANTZ LAW, PU.C
By: Isl Jonathon Frantz

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of July, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the
instrument above to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:

John C. Riseborough
[ ]
[ ]

[X]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
FAX
(509) 838-0007
Hand Delivery

Isl Jonathon Frantz
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF !DAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY,
LLP,

)
)

)
Defendant.

)

Case No.

CV 20151406

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS OR ABATE,
AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PRO HAC VICE
ADMISSION

)
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
This matter is before the Court on the "Motion to Dismiss or Abate" defendant
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley (Hawley Troxell), against plaintiff, Martin Frantz
(Frantz). Frantz' positions taken in this case demonstrate his misunderstanding of state
and federal bankruptcy laws and their interaction. The relief sought by Frantz and the
legal theory underpinning that requested relief demonstrate the absurdity of this
litigation. Frantz is currently represented in this litigation in state court, and in his
concurrent litigation in federal bankruptcy court, by his son, attorney Jonathon Frantz.
Frantz' misunderstanding of our laws is discussed below. The relief sought in
the Complaint and Jury Demand filed on February 20, 2015, are damages sustained by
Frantz caused by Hawley Troxell's "legal malpractice and/or breach of fiduciary duty".
Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 9,

1J B.

The legal theory espoused in that Complaint

and Jury Demand is Frantz' claim that when Frantz filed bankruptcy in October 2011,

confidential

a

IIB was
allegedly
his assets." Id., p. 2,

1f 3.

reporting

the

The fatal factual problem with Frantz' theory is that Hawley

Troxell did not represent Frantz as an attorney in that prior litigation, thus, no conflict,
and no malpractice in the bankruptcy proceeding. The fatal legal problem with Frantz'
theory is that the Honorable Terry L. Myers, Presiding Chief Judge of the United States
Bankruptcy Court, already decided that precise issue on December 10, 2014, after a
two-day evidentiary hearing. Judge Myers found Merlyn Clark, an attorney for Hawley
Troxell, was hired in this earlier litigation by Frantz' attorneys, Bruce Owens and Regina
McCrea, to provide expert testimony, not to act as Frantz' attorney. Affidavit of John C.
Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit IX, p. 12, LI. 10-15. Frantz breathed not a word
about that prior decision in his Complaint and Jury Demand filed before this Court, filed
two months after Judge Myers' decision.
While not relevant to resolving this case, the Court feels compelled to note the
manner in which Frantz alleges he sustained his damages in this case. Essentially,
Frantz claims in his Complaint and Jury Demand that he did not lie to 118 and the
bankruptcy court about his assets, but if he did lie, the only way the bankruptcy court
could have found out that Frantz lied to IIB and the bankruptcy court was by Hawley
Troxell disclosing confidential information to IIB and the bankruptcy court which was
obtained in that prior litigation. Frantz alleges:
23. Mr. Frantz's personal financial statements provided to 118 were
not fraudulent. The only basis for a claim that they may have been
fraudulent is if the claimant had knowledge of Mr. Frantz's business entity
and the entity's ownership of the Guardian Angel Homes project.
Complaint and Jury Demand, p.5,
Hawley

1f 25.
No.

Let that sink in for a moment. The only way

can

case

118
damages in this state court action.
At least Frantz was honest with this Court in his Complaint and Jury Demand
about what he tried doing before the bankruptcy court (pursuing disqualification of
Hawley Troxell as IIB's counsel in bankruptcy court), as Frantz alleges in this state court
action:
25. As a result of Defendant's use of information relating to
Defendant's prior representation of Mr. Frantz to Mr. Frantz's
disadvantage in the current proceedings, Mr. Frantz immediately began to
pursue disqualification of Defendant from representing 118 in the
bankruptcy proceeding as well as other proceedings in which Frantz'
financial status was a significant issue.

Id., p. 5,

1f 25.

However, Frantz was completely silent in his complaint about what

Judge Myers did with Frantz' effort to disqualify. As mentioned above, Frantz
conveniently omitted any reference in his Complaint and Jury Demand filed before this
Court the fact that two months earlier Judge Myers' decided Frantz had absolutely no
basis upon which to disqualify Hawley Troxell.
The wake of litigation left by Frantz is described as follows:
In 2008, Frantz was at that time pursuing an attorney malpractice lawsuit against
the law firm of Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S. (Witherspoon Kelley).
Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit I, p. 2,

1f 2.

This Court is more

than familiar with that litigation, being assigned to preside over Marty D. Frantz v.

Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., Kootenai County Case No. CV 2008
2630. On June 8, 2009, this Court issued a "Memorandum Decision and Order on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" in that case.
Frantz

Hawley

that

on

1

2008, Regina MCrea,

&

for Frantz

expert

standard of care for the attorney malpractice claim. Affidavit of John

Riseborough,

May 7, 2015, Exhibit Ill. Clark informed McCrea and Bruce Owens, McCrea's cocounsel, that "any information [he] received would be discoverable in the Malpractice
Lawsuit by the defendants in that case and that they should not provide [him] any
information they would not want defendants to discover." Affidavit of John C.
Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit V, p. 4, ,I 14. McCrea sent Clark materials he would
need to review in order to render an opinion. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7,
2015, Exhibit Ill "Mr. Clark reviewed the materials and authored a 21 page report
dated May 4, 2009, reflecting his opinions." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 2; Affidavit of John C.
Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit I, p. 2,

,-r 5.

That report was sent to McCrea.

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Abate
(I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 3; Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit I, p. 2,

,-r

5. After this Court's June 8, 2009, "Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment", the attorney malpractice case Frantz v. Witherspoon

Kelley resolved through mediation. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015,
Exhibit I, p. 2,

,-r 7.

In "June 2010, Idaho Independent Bank (118) retained Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley to pursue claims against Mr. Frantz for failure to pay a loan that fully matured."
Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 4,

1f 18.

On June

Hawley Troxell,

its

capacity as counsel for 118, sent a demand letter to Davidson, Backman, Medeiros,

1,

John

proceedings against
During the bankruptcy proceedings Frantz and his wife, Cynthia M. Frantz,
sought to disqualify Hawley Troxell as counsel for 118 pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.9. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit IX, p.
7, LI. 24-25 through p. 8, LI. 1-2. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9 instructs: "A

lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing." I.R.C.P. 1.9(a). "The defendants
assert[ed] that in 2008, Merlyn Clark, a partner at Hawley Troxell formed an attorneyclient relationship with Marty Frantz." Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015,
Exhibit IX, p. 8, LI. 5-7. The bankruptcy court held a two-day hearing on this matter,
heard testimony from four witnesses, all of whom were subject to cross-examination,
and the court reviewed an extensive number of exhibits. Id., p. 6, LI. 4-25 through p. 7,
LI. 1-15. The Honorable Terry L. Myers, Presiding Chief Judge of the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, concluded "Mr. Clark was acting as

a

testifying expert witness only. As such, an attorney-client relationship was not created."

Id., p. 12, LI. 10-13.
Specifically, Judge Myers made the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law:
The defendants' motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell as counsel for
the plaintiff urges that disqualification based on Idaho Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.9. And as all the parties acknowledge, the IRPC are applicable
in adversary proceedings in this Court under our local Bankruptcy Rule

v~l,Qy1i{g)ell, e!al

defendants
2008, Merlyn
a
formed an attorney-client relationship
Marty
Professional
1 instructs that a lawyer who has
thereafter,
represented a client a matter shall
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially averse to the interest of the former client,
unless the former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing.
The plaintiff responds to this contention by noting that in 2008,
Merlyn Clark was retained and acted solely as a testifying expert witness
and did so on the subject of professional malpractice in Marty Frantz'[s]
State Court lawsuit against Witherspoon Kelley in which Mr. Frantz was
represented by Owens & Crandall. The plaintiff argues that Mr. Clark was
not retained as co-counsel, nor did he in any way act as an attorney to Mr.
Frantz. Thus plaintiff argues no attorney-client relationship was ever
formed.
The defendants respond that Clark, even if initially hired as an
expert witness, became a consulting attorney expert when he reviewed
confidential information and provided opinions on damages with the
attorneys at Owens & Crandall, particularly Ms. McCrea.
At hearing Mr. Clark was clear and direct and credible in his
testimony. He testified, and the Court finds and concludes that his role in
the malpractice litigation was solely that of a testifying expert witness. In
that capacity he prepared and affidavit, Exhibit 200, to which he attached
his expert opinions. Within that report Mr. Clark listed all the information
he reviewed and considered in forming his opinion, as would be required
for expert disclosure. No confidential information was there listed.
Indeed, Mr. Clark stated that he did not receive any confidential
information while evaluating the malpractice case as a testifying expert
witness in such case.
Mr. Clark was also clear that not only did he not review confidential
information, he discussed with Owens & Crandall the fact that any
information provided to him would be subject to discovery by the State
Court defendants and thus, obviously, should not be included in any of the
information provided to him. Such a warning is consistent with the limited
role of a testifying expert witness, not one as a retained attorney or as cocounsel.
The defendants have placed a great deal of emphasis on the
words, quote, "confidential and privileged," close quote, that appear on the
top of Mr. Clark's communications with Owens & Crandall, as well as on
his statement that he was hired, quote, "as an expert witness to provide
advice and testimony on the subject of the alleged professional
malpractice," close quote, as in Exhibit 200 at 9.
Mr. Clark credibly testified that the word "advice" was in effect, as in
advising Owens & Crandall which he would be able to testify to and what
his opinion would be. Moreover the confidential and privileged
nomenclature was intended, consistent with the rules that Mr. Clark and
Owens & Crandall understood to reflect the fact that if they decided not to
disclose him as a testifying expert witness, the report he created would
~9it~~ Wdai~&1t 1to discoveryB0 !ntfiW5,i~@l@~ and given whole

one of Marty Frantz'[s] State Court attorneys. She stated
Mr. Clark was hired as an expert to establish and later testify to the
standard of care in the malpractice litigation.
While she testified that she asked Mr. Clark questions about
damages, her testimony was not materially inconsistent with Mr. Clark's;
and the question of what sorts of damages might be recoverable was
certainly part and parcel of the charge to an expert on this subject.
Moreover she did not recall providing any of the documents attached to
her notes to Mr. Clark. Instead she asserted that her questions for Mr.
Clark were based on his review of the depositions and the exhibits
attached to those depositions. She did not testify that Mr. Clark provide
advice beyond what Mr. Clark himself testified to. He did not believe
certain damages were available and he would not provide expert
testimony on that aspect of the litigation. But again, such discussions
would be consistent with an expert's analysis of the facts in defining the
testimony the expert is willing to provide in the litigation and the opinion
that he would provide in his report.
Ms. McCrea's testimony was responsive to questioning. I was
impressed that she acted not as an advocate for the defendants' motion
but as a percipient fact witness and she was careful and measured and
clear in her testimony and in that was she was credible. Her testimony did
not establish that Mr. Clark was a consulting expert, nor that he had
entered into an attorney-client relationship with either her firm or with her
firm's client.
Marty Frantz testified as well. He testified as to the retention and
use of Mr. Clark by his former malpractice lawyers at Owens & Crandall.
But his testimony in that regard was not probative. He was not engaged
in the discussions. He never spoke with Mr. Clark. He had no firsthand
knowledge of the facts. Instead, he was simply interpreting the other
evidence and expressing his opinion about its significance or its
consequence.
Whether it was volunteered from the witness stand or, more often
than not, proffered in response to patently leading questions, it was not
entitled to weight, even where arguably relevant.
The Court concludes plaintiffs' analysis of the facts and the law is
supported by the record. Mr. Clark was acting as a testifying expert
witness only. As such, an attorney-client relationship was not created.
There's no basis to disqualify Hawley Troxell under IRPC 1.9 and
defendants['] motion ... will, therefore, be denied.

24- p. 1
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On February 20, 201

in the instant case before the undersigned, Frantz filed

Kelley.

Specifically

Hawley

Represent[ed] IIB, a party with materially adverse interests to Mr. Frantz,
in litigation and bankruptcy proceedings that are substantially related to
the matter in which Defendant represented Mr. Frantz; [and]

***
Us[ed] information related to Hawley Troxell's representation of Mr. Frantz
to Mr. Frantz's financial disadvantage in the bankruptcy proceeding by
claiming the Mr. Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent.
Complaint and Jury Demand, pp. 5-6, ,T,I 29(a), (d); p. 7, 1J1J 38(a), (c). The bankruptcy
case was ongoing at the time the Complaint in this instant case was filed. See
Declaration of Jonathon Frantz in Support of Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley, LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), Exhibit A.
Hawley Troxell now "seeks dismissal of the instant action because issues
fundamental to Plaintiff's claims herein, including whether an attorney with defendant
Hawley Troxell formed an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff, has been raised by
Plaintiff Frantz and litigated in an action currently pending in the United States
Bankruptcy Court .... " Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 1. In support, on May 7, 2015, Hawley Troxell
filed a "Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)"; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8))"; and the
"Affidavit of John C. Riseborough". On July 14, 2015, Frantz filed his "Response to
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8))";
and the "Jonathon Frantz in Support of Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley,
LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (1.R.C.P. 12(8}(8))". On July 21, 2015, Hawley
Troxell filed "Defendant's Reply Re Dismissal/Abate".

was

a

pending case. Frantz' counsel also admitted the adversary proceeding in bankruptcy
court was still proceeding, but claimed that proceeding was now moot, the only issue to
be decided was attorney fees.
Frantz' attorney's claim that the adversary proceeding is moot is not well taken.
Attached as Exhibit B to the Response of the Defendant Re: Pro Hae Vice Objection, is
the Affidavit of Sheila Schwager, dated July 20, 2015. Schwager is a partner in Hawley
Troxell, and has been involved in Frantz' bankruptcy proceeding. Schwager's Affidavit
states in pertinent part:

4. I have reviewed the Declaration of Jonathon Frantz and in
particular the assertions that the Adversary Proceeding has been
dismissed as moot. That is inaccurate, as indicated by the entire Docket
of the Adversary Proceeding, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and
incorporated herein by reference.
5. On the eve of the two week trial of the Adversary Proceeding,
Mr. and Mrs. Frantz filed a Section 727 Waiver of Discharge in their
Bankruptcy Case, conceding the non-dischargability relief requested om
the Adversary Proceeding, thus rendering a determination of
dischargability moot. Specifically, the 727 Waiver of Discharge meant that
none of the obligations owed to 118 would be discharged and therefore a
trial on the section 523 non-discharge issues were not necessary.
Accordingly, the trial date was vacated. However, despite counsel's
suggestion to the contrary, no Order of Dismissal has been entered, and
in fact the Adversary Proceeding remains pending.
6. In that regard, 118 filed in the Adversary Proceeding on June 2,
2015, Docket No. 117, a Motion for Sanctions, which was argued on June
15, 2015. The court deemed the matter submitted and under advisement,
with a decision to be forthcoming. See Ex. A, Docket No. 127. Further,
on June 3, 2015, 118 filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs as the
prevailing party in the Adversary Proceeding. That Motion is set for
hearing for July 28, 2015. See Ex. A, Docket No. 121, 122, 123, 128. In
short, no final order has been entered at this point in the Adversary
Proceeding. If either or both of the motions are granted, a judgment will
be entered accordingly.

as
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The determination of whether to proceed with an action where a similar case is
pending before another court is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

K!aue v. Hem, 133 Idaho 437,439, 988 P.2d 211,213 (1999) (citing Za/eha v. Rosholt,
Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 532, 533, 927 P.2d 925, 926 (Ct. App. 1996)).
On appeal, the appeals court reviews the trial court decision

to determine "(1) whether

the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower
court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) and whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc.

v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991 )).

Ill. ANALYSIS OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR ABATE.
A. Frantz is Judicially Estopped from Pursuing this Malpractice Claim due
to the Pending Bankruptcy Proceeding.
While not addressed by the parties in briefing, the Court must first address
whether Frantz, a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, has standing to pursue this cause
of action against Hawley Troxell for claims arising during the pending bankruptcy
proceeding. This Court finds he does not have standing.
A debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding is required to disclose all existing and
potential assets. McCallisterv. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,895,303 P.3d 578,582 (2013)
(citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 521 (1 ), 541 (a)(7)). "[T]itle to the debtor's assets, including causes
of action that belong to the debtor when bankruptcy is filed, vest in the bankruptcy

a cause
3d at 385).
The doctrine of "[j]udicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking
one position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the
first." Id. at 894, 303 P.3d at 581 (citing A & J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684,
116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). At oral argument in this state court case on July 28, 2015, this
Court asked counsel for Frantz about standing. Counsel for Frantz was unclear
whether this state court case was disclosed as an asset in the bankruptcy litigation, but
the inference this Court is left with was it was not disclosed. The Court makes that
inference based on Frantz' counsel's remark in oral argument to this Court. That
remark was that Frantz only had a duty to disclose assets to the bankruptcy court which
were in existence "at the time the bankruptcy case was filed." And, since this case was
filed on February 20, 2015, " ... this case and Frantz' claim against Hawley Troxell, arose
after the bankruptcy." Frantz' counsel's legal claim is contrary to the law.
Judicial estoppel will be applied "when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts
to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy,
but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action
as a contingent asset." Id. at 895, 303 P.3d at 582 (citing A&J Const. Co., 141 Idaho at
686, 116 P.3d at 16 (quoting Burnes

v. Pemco Aerop/ex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286

(11th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). It is necessary "to discourage debtors from
concealing potential assets." Id. (citing Hamilton v. State

&

F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2001); Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286; Oneida Motor Freight,

United

4,
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1

on

1
In this case, the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Frantz from pursuing this
instant cause of action before this Court against Hawley Troxell. It is clear that the
cause of action in this present case arose during the pendency of Frantz' bankruptcy
proceedings.
As mentioned above, in 2008, Frantz was pursuing an attorney malpractice
lawsuit against Witherspoon Kelley. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015,
Exhibit I, p. 2,

,r 2.

On December 16, 2008, counsel for Frantz in that case against

Witherspoon Kelley contacted Merlyn Clark, an attorney with Hawley Troxell, to serve
as an expert witness for that case. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015,
Exhibit Ill. Clark informed Frantz' counsel at the time in that lawsuit that "any
information [he] received would be discoverable in the Malpractice Lawsuit by the
defendants in that case and that they should not provide [him] any information they
would not want defendants to discover." Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7,
2015, Exhibit V, p. 4,

,r 14.

Counsel for Frantz sent Clark materials to review that he

would need to render an opinion about whether Witherspoon Kelley had violated the
standard of care. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit Ill. "Mr. Clark
reviewed the materials and authored a 21 page report dated May 4, 2009, reflecting his
opinions." Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss or
Abate (1.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 2; Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit I,
p 2,

iT

That report was sent to counsel for Frantz. Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)),

Affidavit of

&

18)

Hawley to pursue claims against Mr. Frantz for failure to pay a loan that fully matured."
Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 4,

1f 18.

On June 28, 2010, Hawley Troxell, in its

capacity as counsel for IIB, sent a demand letter to Davidson, Backman, Medeiros,
PLLC, counsel for the guarantors on the obligation, which included Frantz. Affidavit of
John C. Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit IV. In October 2011, Frantz filed for
bankruptcy. Id., p. 4,

1f 19.

Hawley Troxell represented IIB as a creditor in the

bankruptcy proceedings against Frantz. Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 4,

1f 20.

In this present case, Frantz filed his Complaint against Hawley Troxell for
attorney malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty on February 20, 2015. See Complaint
and Jury Demand. The allegations stem from Clark's role as an expert witness in the
case between Frantz and Witherspoon Kelley. Id.

Specifically Frantz claims Hawley

Troxell:
Represent[ed] IIB, a party with materially adverse interests to Mr. Frantz,
in litigation and bankruptcy proceedings that are substantially related to
the matter in which Defendant represented Mr. Frantz; [and]
***
Us[ed] information related to Hawley Troxell's representation of Mr. Frantz
to Mr. Frantz's financial disadvantage in the bankruptcy proceeding by
claiming the Mr. Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent
Complaint and Jury Demand, pp. 5-6,

,m 29(a), (d); p. 7, ,-r,-r 38(a), (c).

The bankruptcy

case was ongoing at the time the Complaint was filed. See Declaration of Jonathon
Frantz in Support of Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP's Motion to
Dismiss or Abate (LR.C.P. 12(8)(8)), Exhibit A

is

aware

Hawley

proceeding, when he was unable to discharge the debt against 118. Once Frantz filed
for bankruptcy, any potential malpractice claim he had against Hawley Troxell was no
longer his to assert; it was no longer his asset. Rather, it became an asset of the
bankruptcy estate that only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to assert. It is
immaterial that the bankruptcy proceeding was filed before the instant action. There is
no evidence before this Court that Frantz claimed the malpractice as a potential asset
in the bankruptcy proceeding. In any event, whether Frantz included it as an asset
before the Bankruptcy Court is of no import to this Court. "Property that is not disclosed
on the asset schedule, or otherwise administered by the time the bankruptcy case
closes, remains property of the bankruptcy estate forever." McCal/ister, 154 Idaho at
898, 303 P.3d at 585. There is no evidence that Frantz amended his asset schedule in
the pending bankruptcy proceeding to reflect this subsequent state court lawsuit.
Moreover, Frantz has not provided this Court with any evidence that, having initially
claimed or amended his asset schedule to include the potential malpractice asset, the
bankruptcy trustee waived the potential asset as property for the bankruptcy estate. As
such, Frantz is judicially estopped from asserting this cause of action against Hawley
Troxell.

B. Dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8).
Alternatively, even if the Court found Frantz was not judicially estopped from
brining this suit, the Court finds Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) merits dismissal
of this action.
vs

same cause.

1

determine

are

a

proceed in such an instance: "First, the court should consider whether the other case
has gone to judgment, in which event the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion may bar additional litigation. The second test is whether the court, although
not barred from deciding the case, should nevertheless refrain from deciding it." Klaue

v. Hem, 133 Idaho 437, 440, 988 P.2d 211, 214 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
Each of these tests will be discussed in turn below.

1. Test One: Res Judicata.
Relitigation of a matter that was previously adjudicated is precluded by the
doctrine of resjudicata. Aldape

v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,256,668 P.2d 130, 132 (Ct.

App. 1983). Res judicata encompasses both claim preclusion and issue preclusion or
collateral estoppel. Ticor Title Co.
(2007) (citing Hindmarsh

v.

v.

Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613,617

Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002)). "Claim

preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or
upon claims 'relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made.'
Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party

or its privy." Id. (internal citations omitted).
a. Claim preclusion.
For claim preclusion to apply, the subsequent action must have the same parties
or their privies, same claim and a final judgment. Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618 (citing

Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805; Farmers Nat'/ Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho

68, 878

762, 767 (1994)); see a/so Foster v.

Anthony, 122 Idaho

8

(citing

1

at

418 (quoting Kite v. Eckley, 48 Idaho 454, 459, 282 P. 868, 869 (1929))). Attorneys are
in privity with their clients from a prior action when "their only interest in the present
action ar[ises] from their representation of their clients in the former action, and they
were named solely for their alleged conduct in that capacity." Berkshire Investments,

LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81,278 P.3d 943,951 (2012).
Moreover, "[c]laim preclusion bars adjudication not only on the matters offered
and received to defeat the claim, but also as to 'every matter which might and should
have been litigated in the first suit"' Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho at 126, 157
P.3d at 620 (citing Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434,437, 849
P.2d 107, 110 (1993)).
Here, the Court finds that since at the present time there is no final judgment in
the bankruptcy proceeding (at least in the proof presented to this Court), claim
preclusion does not bar litigation of the malpractice and fiduciary duty claim in the
instant action. In the near future, there may be a final judgment in the bankruptcy
action. At that time this state court action would be barred based on the additional
ground of claim preclusion. However, at the time of this decision by this Court there is
no final judgment. Thus, claim preclusion does not apply at this moment.

b. Issue Preclusion.
For issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior
proceeding, five factors must be met:
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the

Title

114 Idaho at 124,157 P.3d at618 (citing Rodriguez v. Dep'tofCorr.,

136 Idaho 90, 93, 29 P.3d 401, 404 (2001 )).
The matter litigated before the bankruptcy court was whether Hawley Troxell
should have been disqualified as counsel for 118 in the bankruptcy proceeding based on
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9. Affidavit of John C. Riseborough, May 7,
2015, Exhibit IX, p. 7, LI. 24-25 through p. 8, LI. 1-2. Idaho Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.9 instructs: "A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client
unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing." i.R.C.P. 1.9(a).
"The defendants assert[ed] that in 2008, Merlyn Clark, a partner at Hawley Troxell
formed an attorney-client relationship with Marty Frantz." Affidavit of John C.
Riseborough, May 7, 2015, Exhibit IX, p. 8, LI. 5-7. The bankruptcy court held a twoday hearing on this matter, heard testimony from four witnesses whom were subject to
cross-examination, and reviewed an extensive number of exhibits. Id., p. 6, LI. 4-25
through p. 7, LI. 1-15. The bankruptcy court concluded, "Mr. Clark was acting as a
testifying expert witness only. As such, an attorney-client relationship was not created."

Id., p. 12, LI. 10-13.
The cause of action in this present case is for attorney malpractice against
Hawley Troxell, alleging the same misconduct by Merlyn Clark. See Complaint The
four elements of a legal-malpractice claim are:

) there is an attorney-client

care
a
1)

1

650, 654 (1982)).

The first element was clearly litigated in front of the bankruptcy court. Judge
Myers held a two-day hearing solely on the issue of whether Merlyn Clark had formed
an attorney-client relationship with Frantz during the litigation between Frantz and
Witherspoon Kelley. Judge Myers definitively found no such attorney-client relationship
was created. Frantz argues that "the issue raised in the [bankruptcy p]roceeding,
although similar, is legally distinct and would not have any preclusive effect" Response
to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (I.RC.P. 12(8)(8)),
p. 4. Frantz claims, "[a] legal malpractice claim requires that an attorney owe a duty to
the Plaintiff, a different requirement than the 'former client' of Rule 1.9 that
encompasses a broader category of individuals." Id.
While it is true that a claim for attorney malpractice requires a showing that the
defendant attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff, it also requires an attorney-client
relationship. All four elements must be present for a plaintiff to prevail on a malpractice
claim. Frantz had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the attorney-client relationship
issue in the bankruptcy case. It is identical to one of the elements required for a
malpractice cause of action, and a finding against Frantz on that one element is
dispositive of the entire cause of action before this Court.
Moreover, the bankruptcy court actually decided the issue of whether an
attorney-client relationship existed between Merlyn Clark, a partner for Hawley Troxell,
and Frantz. While Hawley Troxell was not a party to the bankruptcy action, as stated in

Martittwa~f~~QJAA-r§~~~i9Jil'

a
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation". Both parties agree there is no final
judgment in this case. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
Dismiss or Abate (I.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), p. 6; Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley,
LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate (1.R.C.P. 12(8)(8)), pp. 3-4. "The ninth circuit has
defined a final bankruptcy decision as one that ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. [Moreover], an order that
grants relief from the automatic stay is final for the purposes of appeal." Farmers Nat.
Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Among other things, an automatic stay ends at the time the debtor's
discharge is granted or denied. 11 U.S.C. § 362. There has been no evidence
presented to this Court showing Frantz was granted a discharge of the debt owing to

IIB, or was denied or waived discharge of the debt owing to 118. Absent such a
showing, there is no evidence before this Court of a final judgment on the merits in the
bankruptcy proceeding. As such, issue preclusion cannot be used to bar Frantz'
malpractice suit at this time.

2. Test Two: Another Pending Action.
"The determination of whether to proceed with a case where a similar case is
pending elsewhere, and has not gone to judgment, is discretionary, and will not be
overturned absent an abuse of that discretion." Klaue, 133 Idaho at 440, 988 P.2d at

214 (citing Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 532, 533, 927 P.2d
925, 926 (Ct. App.1996); Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar, 106 Idaho 905,908,684 P.2d

310

case

a
identity

and

degree

which the claims or issues are similar." Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23,
855 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Wing, at 106 Idaho at 908, 684 P.2d at
310). Moreover, the court should "consider whether the court in which the matter
already is pending is in a position to determine the whole controversy and to settle all
the rights of the parties." Id. (citing 21 C.J.S. Courts§ 188, at 222 (1990)).
As discussed above, the matter before the bankruptcy court involves the same
parties, Hawley Troxell being in privity with a party to the bankruptcy litigation, IIB, as
counsel in that case, and the same issue, whether an attorney-client relationship
existed between Frantz and Merlyn Clark of Hawley Troxell. The bankruptcy court has
"original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). "'[A]rising in'
proceedings are those that are not based on any right expressly created by title 11, but
nevertheless, would have no existence outside of the bankruptcy." In re Old Cutters,

Inc., 474 B.R. 219, 226 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012) (citing Eastport Assocs. v. City of Los
Angeles (In re Eastport Assocs.), 935 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.1991)). In other words,
but for the bankruptcy, the claim would not exist. See also A.H. Robins Co. v. Dalkon

Shield Claimants Trust, 86 F.3d 364, 372 (4th Cir. 1996).
Here, the legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims did not originate
from any work Hawley Troxell did for Frantz in the bankruptcy case. This is not a case
where Hawley Troxell represented Frantz in the bankruptcy proceeding and then
provided him with negligent advice during those proceedings. See A.H. Robins Co.

v.

a
duty, Frantz claims in part that Hawley Troxell:
Represent[ed] 118, a party with materially adverse interests to Mr. Frantz,
in litigation and bankruptcy proceedings that are substantially related to
the matter in which Defendant represented Mr. Frantz; [and]
***
Us[ed] information related to Hawley Troxell's representation of Mr. Frantz
to Mr. Frantz's financial disadvantage in the bankruptcy proceeding by
claiming the Mr. Frantz's financial statements were fraudulent.

Complaint and Jury Demand, pp. 5-6,

,m 29(a), (d); p. 7, ,m 38(a), (c). As such, the

Court finds this case arises under the title 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
In the alternative, even if this Court could find that this case does not arise under
title 11 (and, as just stated, this Court does not), it is a "related to" proceeding. See In
re Old Cutters, Inc., 474 B.R. at 226. To determine whether a proceeding is "related
to", the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the following test:
[W]hether the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. ... Thus, the
proceeding need not necessarily be against the debtor or against the
debtor's property. An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could
alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either
positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling
and administration of the bankruptcy estate.
Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300,308, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d
403 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984,994 (3d Cir.1984) (emphasis
in original)). "In vesting jurisdiction over matters "related to" bankruptcy cases in the
district courts, and in allowing those district courts to refer such matters to bankruptcy
courts, 'Congress intended

to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts

so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the
etal
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1

IIB's claim against Frantz was not discharged from the bankruptcy proceeding
due to fraud on the part of Frantz. Defendant's Reply Re Dismissal/Abate, p. 4;
Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 4,

,r 22.

Frantz maintains that IIB would not have

claimed his financial statements were fraudulent without the knowledge it gained from
Hawley Troxell because of its prior relationship with Frantz during the Witherspoon
Kelley malpractice action. Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 6,

,r 29(d); p. 7, ,r 38(c).

The malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims arose during the pendency of the
bankruptcy proceedings. As stated above, once Frantz filed for bankruptcy, any
potential claims he had against Hawley Troxell no longer belonged to him, but rather
became an asset of the bankruptcy estate. As property of the estate the claims are
clearly "related to" the bankruptcy proceeding. The outcome of the action would alter
the administration of the bankruptcy estate.
This Court find that this case falls within the "comprehensive jurisdiction [of] the
bankruptcy courts." As such, the Court, in its discretion, dismisses this action pursuant
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) as "another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause" exists. The same parties in the present case are (and
have) litigating (and have litigated) the same issues in the bankruptcy case.
It is noted that the Court "may take into account the occasionally competing
objectives of judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to litigants, obtaining prompt
and orderly disposition of each claim or issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent
judgments." Diet Ctr., Inc., 124 Idaho at 22-23, 855 P .2d at 483-84 (citing Wing, 106
M:artih'-µ;;jc!rlf,,;,l;j'4aQij,

1®,,

3
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regarding judicial
minimizing costs and delay to litigants, obtaining prompt and orderly disposition of each
claim or issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent judgments, it is unnecessary to
evaluate those factors in light of the analysis reached above, ie., another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause.

IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE IS DENIED.
On April 7, 2015, counsel for Frantz filed a Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission of
Jeffery Katz. Katz is an attorney licensed in Illinois, Kentucky and Wisconsin, but not
Idaho. Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission p. 1.
While dismissal of Frantz' case due to lack of standing and alternatively, due to
another action pending, causes the issue of Frantz' Motion for Admission Pro Hae Vice
to now be moot, this Court will briefly discuss the same in case there is a claim on
appeal that this Court denied Frantz a competent attorney to represent him in this state
court litigation. Also, at oral argument on July 28, 2015, counsel for Frantz made the
claim that he had intended Katz to handle the oral argument on Hawley Troxell's Motion
to Dismiss or Abate, and were it not for Katz' hospitalization, Katz would have handled
the argument. It is unknown how or why counsel for Frantz planned on having Katz
make argument regarding the Motion to Dismiss or Abate, because on July 28, 2015,
Katz had yet to be admitted pro hac vice.
On April 22, 2015, counsel for Hawley Troxell filed an "Objection to Motion for
Pro Hae Vice Admission". Hawley Troxell claims that Katz violated the provisions of
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 by making "unauthorized contact with the

Marti,;1f:}~c;lfm~µi@,Q~ 1 J~ia ho 1nm~pe1~~:Wl'Je~&!'M~a

was

aware

IBwas

an attorney

118, forwarded to

Troxeli

representing 118 in the bankruptcy matter, which read: "I represent Marty Frantz in a
newly filed action against his former attorneys at the Howley (sic) Troxell firm. I would
like to discuss this matter with you and discuss how it may be financially beneficial to
you." Affidavit of John F. Kurtz, Jr., p. 3,

1i 9.

On June 1, 2015, Frantz filed his

"Response to Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission." On June 26, 2015,
Hawley Troxell filed its "Reply Re: Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission."
Oral argument on this motion was held on June 30, 2015, at which time this Court
asked counsel how, in light of that email, could Katz not become a witness in this case.
That is an additional and separate issue from the unauthorized contact issue.
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3. 7 "Lawyer as Witness" reads:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer
is likely to be a necessary witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.
The Court finds Katz will likely have to testify in this case. The Court finds none of the
three exceptions to IRPC 3.7 (a) apply to Katz as a witness. Thus, this Court finds that it
would be improper to allow admission pro hac vice of an out of state attorney who
would, if appointed, violate the Idaho Rules of Professional Responsibility, possibly for
unauthorized contact (the Court does not decide that issue now), but without a doubt as
to the prohibition of likely being a witness in a matter. It would be irresponsible of this
Court to knowingly put Katz in that position. Accordingly, plaintiff Frantz' Motion for

AND ORDER

or Abate

Hawley
is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff Frantz' Motion for Admission Pro Hae Vice
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendant Hawley Troxell is the prevailing party in
this action as against Martin Frantz.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED counsel for defendant Hawley Troxell prepare a
Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order.
Entered this 29th day of July, 2015.

rhn

T. .Mitchell, District Judge
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I certify that on the
day of July,\Ql5, a tru copy of the foregoing was mailed
postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile to eacl'lof the following:

Lawyer
Johnathon Frantz

Fax#
208-262-3894-/

Hon. Terry L. Myers, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge
Via fax 208 334-1334 /

I

Lawyer
John C. Riseborough

509-838-0007
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PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
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E HAMBLEN
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite l200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455~6000

Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DTSTRTCT COlJR'I' OF THE FIRST JUDLCIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF JDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,

)
)
)

Plaintifl:

Case No. CV 15-1406

)

vs.

) DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
)

Ott AW AIU) OF COSTS, INCLUDING

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNTS & HA WI .EY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

)
)

REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES

)

Defendant.

)
.

--· ·-~·)

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed this action on February 20, 2015, alleging legal malpractice against

defendant l lawley Troxwell Ennis & Ilawley, LLP ("HTEH") contending that HTEH, through
its partner, Merlyn Clark, had fonned an attorney-client relarionship with plaintiff in 2008 in

association with a suil by plainliff against one of his former law finns. That suit was concluded
in mid-2009. ln this action plaintiff contends that, subsequent to Mr. Clark's representation,
HTEH, through other members of the firm, began representing a creditor, Idaho Independent
Bank, adverse to plaintiff Frantz in a bankruptcy proceeding he had filed in the United States
Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho, Docket No. BK-11-21337-TLM, and an Adversary

A
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was
or
through the prior representation against plaintiff Frantz, resulting

damages. Plaintiff brought

this suit de.spite having failed in his c1Iort to disqualify IITEII in said Adversary Proceeding

based on identical contentions. To determine plainti.:ff s Motion to Djsqualify, the Honorable
Judge Terry L. Myers held a two-day cvidentiary hearing and found that Merlyn Clark had never
been plaintiff Frantz's attorney and that neither Mr. Clark nor HTEH had received, iet alone
used, confidential information. Uy Order dated December 9, 2014, Judge Myers denied
plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify and HTEH continues to represent Idaho Independent Bank in

those bankruptcy proceedings which remain pending.
Defendant in this action filed on Amended Answer on May 14, 2015, denying plaintiffs

allegations, aJleging that plaintifrs claim is based

011

a commercial transaclion within the

provisions of Idaho Code 12-120(3) asserting defenses including, inter alia, res judicata and

seeking an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12~ 121, 12-120(3) and 12-123. After
reviewing the testimony and evidence presented to Judge Myers in connection with Plaintifrs
Motion to Disqualify HTEH, counsel for the defense moved for dismissal of plaintiff's action

under IRCP I2(b)(8).
This Court, after reviewing the briefing and evidentiary materials submitted, and h~aring
the argument of counsel, granLed the defense's motion and dismissed plaintiff's action on the

basis that (a) Frantz lacked standing as an individual to assert a cause of action which should be
an asset of the bankruptcy estate; and (b) that the identical issue had been previously determined

in an action that is currently pending, which decision will likely fuUy determine lhe righls of the
parties as to the issue of whether Merlyn Clark was ever an attorney of plaintiff Frant;,:.

21
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The defense now assens ils ba!5is for an award of attorney's fees.
IT. DEFENDANTS ARF: ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES PURSUANT TO

IDAHO CODE 12-120(3)

As the Court is likely aware, the ldaho Code allows for an award of allorney's
fees to the prevailing party where the suit involves a contract relating to the purchase or sale of
services. The statute provides Lhat:
IC 12-120. Attorney's Fees in Civil Actions - ...

(3)
In any civil action to recover oo an open account, account
stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to
the purchase or sale of goods. wares, merchandjse, or services and in any
commercial transilcliun unless otht.'rWi!-itl provided by law, the prevailing
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's foe to be set by the court,
to be taxed and collected as costs.

The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. The
term ''party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation,
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
The determination of whether a case is based on a commercial transaction for the purpose

of J.C. §12-120(3) is a quei,tion of law. Great Plains Eguipment. Inc. v. NW Pipeline Corp., 136
Idaho 466, 336 P.3d 218 (2001). The appropriate inquiry is whether the commercial transaction
constituted the gravamen of the lawsuit and was the basis on which a party was attempting to
recover. Id. at 472, 36 P.3d at 224.
For the purposes of this section, Idaho recognizes that negligence in providing legal
representation can qualify as a ''commercial transaction." See City
Idaho 656, 201 PJd 629 (2009)

or McCall

v.

Buxton, 146

.:1Howcd where attorney advice caused losses arising out of

construction contract). Herc, plaintiff's damages are alleged to be his inability to discharge his

1 03
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indebtedness arose from real estate development transactions. Further, plaintiff's claim arose out

of his alleged retaining of Merlyn Clark to act as his attorney in representation regarding a

lawsuit against his former firm, whic.:h <.:laim was based on a i.,ommercial transaction as weil, i.e.,
misrepresentation in the value of real property purchased by Frant7..
Given the Court's disposition of the issue, the existence of a commercial transaction was
not established. However, where ~ t:01nmcrciaJ lransac1ion has been alleged, an award of fot.:s

under this statute is aJlowable even if the commercial transaction is not established. See Gamer

v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462 at 469-470. Jn its Amended Answer, the defense affirmatively alleged
that plaintiff's claim wai;; based on a commercial transaction (17), and affimu:i.tively ~ought an

award of fees Wlder LC. §12-120(3),

c,~, Claim for Fees).

Under the circumstances of this case. an award of fees pursuan1 to LC. §12-120(3) is appropriate.

Ill. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF FEES PURSUANT TO
J.C. §12-121.
Idaho Code §12-121 provides:
12-i21. ATTORl"{EY'S FEES· ln any civil ac1ion, the judge may award
reasonable attorney's foes Lo Lhe prevailing pany <.)r panies, provided that thi~
section shalJ not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for
the award of attorney's fee;:;. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include
any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof

The statute however must be read in conjunction with Rule 54(e)(l) which provides that

foes arc appropriate in a civil action where the case has been brought frivoloLtSly, unreasonably,
or without foundation.

0
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In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees,
which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided
for by any statute or contract Provided, attorney's fees under section 12121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from
th(;! facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; ....
This Court specifically found that defendant was the prevailing party. Thus the remaining issue

is whether this is a frivolous suit without foundation.
Here, plaintiff brought a motion to disqualify defendant HTEH in the Adversary
Proceeding in plaintiff's bankruptcy, contending that Merlyn Clark was his attorney, had

obtained confidential information, and that defendant l JTr:11 was utilizing that confidential

information in representing Merlyn framz's creditors in the bankruptcy. The United States
Bankruptcy Judge for the District of ldaho, Judge Myers, held a two•day cvidcntiary hearing
during which time plaintiff and others Lestified and were subject to cross examination. Judge
Myer::; issu1.1d an exlensivc oral ruling denying the motion and specifically finding Merlyn CJark
had never been plaintiff Prantz's attorney, had not been provided confidential infonnation, and

that HTEH was not utilizing confidential informatfon

jn

the bankruptcy proceeding. The Court

entered an Order denying Frantz 1 s motion based on those factual findings, which Order was
entered D~cember 9, 2014.

Nevertheless, on February 15, 2015, plaintiff F'rantz brought this action.
Plaintiff Frantz asserted no legal or factual basis for his ability to rclitigatc this action
and, indeed, his Complaint did not mention that the issue had been previously determined.

:2
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Court is fully apprised

or the

facts and circumstances which preceded plaintiff

Frantz's initiation of this action. Before the Court is the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of the

Memorandum of Costs and r'ecs, as well as the Memorandum of Costs and Fees itself The Court
should therefore allow an award of cnst5, including reasonable auomey fees, wider the statutory
provisions cited.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMflTED this~day of AUb'11St, 2015.
PATNE HAMBLEN LLP

lg]U lb/V;;J:J

ISB
7 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201 ~3505

Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007

Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE D1STR1CT COURT OF THF. FIRST JUDrCIAL DJSTR1CT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

)

)
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

l lA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & f IA WLEY
LLP, an Jdaho Limited Liability Par1ncrship,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant.

Case No. CVIS-1406

__

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSf:L JN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
Mfl:MORANDUM 014' COSTS
INCLUDING ATTORNEYF:EES

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
County of Spokane

: ss.
)

JOHN C. RJSEBOROlJGH, being first duJy swom on oath deposes and states:

1.

J am the auomey representing defendant Hawley Troxell r:nnis & I lawlcy, LLP

("IITEII") in this action, and Jhave personal knowledge of the matters asserted herein.
2.

The rate for my services for defendant in this action is $190 an hour. The hourly

rate for Rebecca Stewart, an associate with this finn, is $175. The hourly rate for Cynthia Bryan,

a paralegal with this firm is $90. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this rcforcnce

incorporated herein is a true and correct itemized statement of the work done by me,
Ms. Stewart, and Ms. Bryan relative to this matter.
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that the amount

are
reasonable considering the factors set forth

Rule 54(c)(3) of the Idaho Rules

Civi1

Procedure, to wit:
Rule 54(e)(3)
A.

B.

Explanation

The time and labor required:

See exhibit aLtached hereto.

The novelty and difficulty of the

Not particularly
novel
Procedurally unusual.

question:

C.

The skill requisite to pcrfom1 the
legal service properly and Lhc
experience and abflity of the attorney
in the particular field of law:

or

difficult.

This representation required the average skill
of an cxpe1ience.d trial attorney. I have
reasonable skill, a)though no special
knowledge or experience with bankruptcy
proceedings.

D.

The prevailing charges for like work:

The fees requested are within the range of fees
in this area for this type of case.

E.

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent:

The fee was calculated on an hourly basis.

F.

Time limitations imposed by client or

None.

circumstances of this case:

0.

The amount involved and the results:

Plaintiff sought damages in the form of
recoupment of fees expended in the
bankruptcy action, as weH as damages for the
inability to discharge over $6 million of debt
in bankruptcy. •4Jl plaintiff's clai.-ns were
dismi~sed upon motion.

H.

Undesirability of case:

Not a factor.

f.

·l'he

nature

profos::;icmal

and

length

relationship

of the
with the

This is tht:: first time I have represented
HTEH.

cJient:
J.

Awards in similar cases:

I believe and state that the dismissal obtained
in this action is appropriate and within the
range of outcomes for similar cases.
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Costs as a Matter of Right - lRCP 54(J)(l)(C):

Court Filing Fees:

$

140.95

Hearing Transcript Bankruptcy Cou1t:

$

J ,208. t S

TOTAi, COSTS:

$

1,349.10

Discretionary Costs-IRCP 54(d){J)(D):

Attorney's Fees - IRCP S4(c)( 1):
John C. Riseborough 75.40 hours at $190 per hour

$ 14,326.00

Rebecca L. Stewan 26.5 hours at $175 per hour

$

4,637.50

Paralegal Fees:

Cynthia L. Bryan 9. 7 hours at $90 per hour

$

873.00

TOTAL ATTORNEY AND PARALEGAL FEES:

$

19,836.50

Total costs:

$

1,349.lO

Total Attorney/ParaJegal Pees:

$

19,836.50

$

21.185.60

Rceapitu Jation:

TOTAL FEES AND COSTS CLAJMED:
DATED this .lt!:_ day of August, 2015.

JLc/Zr

C. RJSEBOROUGH

Vl:S/U//<:'.Vl:J
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STATE OF WASHINGTON )
: ss.

County of Spokane

)

John C. Riseborough, being fi rst duly sworn on oath, deposes and states:
I am the attorney of record for the above•named defendant.c,; T have read the contents of
the foregoing Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and Exhibit "A" thereto; th.at to my best
of knowledge and belie( the items therein are true and correct; that the costs claims are in
compliance with Rule 54(d)(5), I.R.C.P., and that the items in the above bill have been
reasonably and necessarily incurred in this action.

JO~SEBOROUGH
SUBSC.Rl.BED AND SWORN to before me this _JQ_ day of August, 2015.
Print Nami::: _ _ _ __...._.............__.:...;:'-1.::-.1..""'-'-.:;.+-Notary Public in and for the State
of Washington, residing at Spokane
My Commission Expires: 6 \ S\ \ t)

At~JIJ.r\~13'J1tOis6~Sliru<dW&J PPORT OF DE~lil~"fl.$76·2015
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS INCLLIDINti Arl'ORNEY FEES· 4

465 of 513
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SERVICE

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAlL

Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A

FAX TRANSMISSION

Post falls, fdaho 838S4

l;\Spodo<.-s\00196\00038\J>LEAD\O I4 73785. I)()('
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FRANTZ V. HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP

., . :Di'te, v''. ·~4~·.,, : .,',If'' ' ,Descl'.~l1ti"n
~
]fil
'
,,l. ',,
~!~ ' ..

·';'~Hi.~· i
/

• \Ji, ,, '~··

'

\ I

I

(

'

''

~

1,..

02/25/2015

'

'

JCR

' ·~ '· · "" '· LJ/,~
' ' ' e, ,\
;;
Expended
; · .~ ',' .:
,'

Review Complaint, review
docket entries for .suits where
FranLz was plaintiff from 2007
to present~ e-message to Ms.
Amrine.

',

c

'

Time·

Amount

Cbmrged:

;

'

I.40

$ 266.00

.20

.20

18.00

2.00

2.00

380.00

1.40

.

I

I

02/26/2015

JCR

Follow~up with Ms. Amrine re
new assignment and col1atera1
estoppeL

02/28/2015

JCR

Review of investigative file,
Complaint and accompanying
materials re bankruptcy
hearing.

03/03/2015

CB

Review Court Rules re
Appearance and Special
Appearance.

.30

.30

27.00

03/03/2015

CB

Draft Special Appearance.

.20

.20

18.00

03/03/201 S

CB

Telephone call to advise
Jonathan Frantz of Special
Appearance on behalf of
Defendant.

.10

.JO

9.00

03/09/2015

JCR

E·message exchange with
Client re contact by Mr. Katz,
.Frantz bankruptcy expert, with
IIB CEO and response.

.30

.30

57.00

03/09/2015

CB

Draft initial co1Tespondence to
client.

.20

.20

18.00

____

03/09/2015

CB

Draft initial correspondence to
Ms. Amrine.

.20

.20

18.00

03/11/2015

JCR

Complete review of file from
bankruptcy court on hearing
for Motion to Disqualify.

.60

.60

114.00

03/11/2015

JCR

Review notes; telephone
conference with Mr. Meadows
re scope of hcaring, transcript
and response to Mr. Katz.

.30

.30

57.00

"-·--

l

.
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Amrine re proposed handling.
03/12/2015

JCR

E-message to coordinate
ordering of transcript of

.20

.20

38.00

hearing on Motion to
Disqualify.

03/23/2015

JCR

E-message to/from client re
recovery of Merlyn Clark's
expert file.

.20

.20

38.00

03/27/2015

JCR

Review transcript or Judge's
oral ruling re disquaJification.

.40

.40

76.00

04/0l/2015

RLS

Review transcript of ruling by
Judge Myers re Motion to
Disqualify Hawley Troxell.

.60

.60

105.00

04/02/2015

R.LS

Research claim and issue
prccJusion as it would relate to
the hearing at the Bankruptcy
level.

2.30

2.30

402.50

04/02/2015

RLS

Draft memorandum section re
claim precJ usion.

.80

.80

152.00

04/06/20] 5

RLS

Finalize draft memorandum

.90

.90

J 57.50

l.90

1.90

361.00

with inclusion of claim

preclusion and analysis based
011 our facts in this matter.
04/13/2015

RLS

Continue drafting analysis
section, to include whether res
judicata is "ripe" at this time
for ultimate inclusion in

Motion to Dismiss.

-·--·--

04/14/2015

JCR

£-message exchange 1with
client re service of Complaint
and invoice or reporter for trial
transcript.

.20

.20

38.00

04/14/2015

RLS

Finalize Emalysis regarding
ripeness for res judicata/
collateral esloppel and proof
necessary to prove professional
malpractice.

LOO

LOO

175.00

2
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exchange with
Schwager re Answer
Hae Vice Petition.
04/21/20[5

JCR

Extended telephone conference
with Mr. John Kuru re

.50

.50

95.00

background of suit, Katz
contact and Motion to Dismiss.
JCR

Review memo re collateral
estoppe1; brief research re
whether a summary judgment
ruling can supply the "final
judgmenl on the merits''
requirement.

.40

.40

76.00

04/21/201 S JCR

Review Rules of ProfessionaJ
Conduct re ..:x-parte contact
with client and lawyer as

1.20

1.20

228.00

Complete objection to Motion
for Admission Pro Hae Vice;
draft Affidavit of JCR; review
additional malerials on issue
from client.

1.00

1.00

190.00

Review numerous emails from

.50

.50

45.00

04/21/2015

witness; draJ'l o~jcction to pro

hac vice motion by frantz's
counsel and Affidavit of Sheila
Schwager.
04/21/201 S JCR

04/21/2015

CB

cJient re status, pleadings filed,

Motion for Pro Hae Vice of
Frantz.
04/22/20l5

JCR

Revise Affidavit of Sheila
Schwager, Objection to Pro
Hae Vice admission and
Affidavit of JCR~ e-message to
cJicnt re same.

.70

.70

133.00

04/22/2015

CB

Review two transcripts in
Bankruptcy mancr to locate
testimony of various witnesses
re Merlyn Clark acting as an
expen witness vs. attorney and
draft summary of same.

4.20

4.20

378.00

3
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argued.

04/22/2015

RLS

Research is~ue of whether

.40

.40

70.00

.50

.50

45.00

Order on Summary Judgment

is a "linal" jm.lgmcnt for
purposes of res judicatal
collateral estoppel in Idaho.

04/23/2015

CB

Review and revise summary of
witness testimony re Merlyn
Clark.

JCR

Review Affidavit of John
Kurtz and approve for
transmhtal to court.

.50

.so

95.00

04/24/201 S JCR

E·message exchange with
clients re John Kurtz's

.20

.20

38.00

04/24/2015

Affidavit and Objection 10 Pro

Ilac Vice request.

04/24/2015

JCR

-- . ··- ~-.~
Study An::iwcr and materials
from client to prepare
Answer.
._

.70

.70

133.00

04/27/2015

JCR

E-message to cljents re

JO

.30

57.00

___

Answtr.
04/29/2015

JCR

Review of transcript and
bankruptcy file.

2.00

2.00

380.00

04/30/2015

JCR

Draft Answct· and Affirmative
Defenses.

1.30

1.30

247.00

04/30/2015

JCR

Complete draft of Answer and
Affirmative Defenses; cmessage to clients re same.

1.20

1.20

228.00

04/30/2015

RLS

Research lRCP 12(b)(8) for

.80

.80

140.00

.70

.70

133.00

.30

.30

-•~w,

<&U-"',

affinnaLive <lefense in
Answer/afiim1at1ve pleading.

05/01/2015 JCR

Complete Answer and transmit
to clients.

05/0J/2015

RLS

Draft the Motion to Dismiss.

4
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Research
standards of affirmative
defense motion to dismiss

pending action based on same
cause of action and same
parties.
05/01/2015

RLS

Draft Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss/Stay
pursuant to 12(b)(8).

05/01/2015

RLS

Research quoted bankruptcy
rules by Honorable Terry
Myers in oral ruling.

05/02/2015

JCR

Continue drafting initial 60-day
report.

05/02/2015

JCR

05/03/2015

3.00

3.00

525.00

.40

.40

70.00

2.00

2.00

380.00

Prepare budget estimate.

.80

.80

152.00

JCR

E-message cxchang-es with Ms.
Si.:hwagcr n: revision.'$ lo
Answer and 12(b)(8) motion.

.40

.40

76.00

05/03/2015

JCR

Extended telephone conference
with John Kurtz re Answer and
Motion per 12(b)(8).

.30

.30

57.00

05/03/2015

JCR

Revise Answer and
Affinnati ve Defenses per cJient

.80

.80

152.00

.60

.60

114.00

1.00

1.00

190.00

---

suggestions.

05/03/2015

JCR

Review case law re 12(b)(8)
discretion and decision points.

05/03/2015

JCR

Review and revise
Memorandum in Support of
J2(b)(8) Motion; dictate

expanded fact section.
05/04/2015

JCR

Revise Memorandum re
12(b)(8) Motion.

1.60

1.60

304.00

05/04/2015

JCR

Additional legal research re
formation of attorney/client
relationship; ABA Op 97-401

1.20

1.20

228.00

.50

.50

95.00

and fiduciary duty creation.

05/04/2015

JCR

Revision and addition to
Answer.
5
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review
Research
privity as it applies to the
"same party" aspect of l2(b)(8)
rule to support argument to
dismiss.

05/04/2015

RLS

Draft legal section of Motion to
Dismiss to include law and
analysis on privity.

1.80

1.80

176.80

05/05/2015

JCR

Complete draft of
Memorandum in Support of
l 2(b)(8) Motion.

2.00

2.00

380.00

05/05/2015

JCR

Draft Affidavit re Exhibits in
Support of Motion.

.40

.40

76.00

05/05/2015

RLS

2.00

2.00

350.00

Draft section of Brief on
judicial economy and relate to
issues of Hwt in our case.

,-n.---t•.---

05/05/2015

RLS

Research regarding application
of judicjal economy in 12(b)(8)
dismissal.

.40

.40

05/06/20] 5

RLS

Prepare and assemble exhibits
to be attached to Declaration of
JCR in support of the Motion
and Me111orandu111 to Dismiss

.60

.60

105.00

1.00

1.00

190.00

1.60

1.60

304.00

.20

.20

38.00

70.00

pursmmt to 12(b)(8).

JCR

05/07/2015

Revise Affidavit and select

exhibits for Motion per
12(b)(8).

JCR

05/07/2015
I

Review and approve changes
suggested by Ms. Schwager for
Memorandum in Support of
12(b)(8) Motion: review

changes proposed by John
Kurtz; final revision and
approve for service and filing.
05/07/2015

.ICR

Review 3-dayNoticc of
Default.
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E-message 1;xchange with
Meadows re slatute of
limitations dcicnse; review
Minnick case; e-message to
Ms. Amrine re correction to

60-day report.
05/07/2015

JCR

Review declaration of Nick
Miller re Trigeo motion.

.20

.20

38.00

OS/07/2015

CB

Draft Notice of Appearance.

.20

.20

18.00

05/08/2015

JCR

E-message to Ms. Amrine re

.to

.10

19.00

L50

1.50

285.00

.40

.40

76.00

.30

.30

57.00

.10

10

9.00

setting of motions and status.

05/13/2015

JCR

E-message from Ms. Amrine;
research re application ofJC
12-120(3) to these facts; c~
message and advice re results
and opinion on opportunity to
obtain fees under that statute.

05/13/2015

JCR

Amend Answer to allege 12120 entitlement to fees.

05/13/2015 JCR

Review notice of change in
date for scheduling conference;
e-mcssagc to clients re same.

05/14/2015

CD

Review Notice of Scheduling
Conference.

05/20/2015

CB

Review emails of client re
Frantz's Waiver of Discharge.

.20

.20

18.00

05i22/20]5

JCR

Review Waiver of Discharge

"l I\
. .:JV

.30

57.00

.30

.30

57.00

and correspondence from client
re same; e-message re

significance or plaintiffs
action in that regard.

06/02/2015 JCR

Review response of plaintiff to
Objection to Admission Pro
Hae Vice.

7
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14) 0 9/03

'Telephone

Mr. Frantz re date for hearing;
Motion for Pro Tlac Vice and
scheduling conference;
conference with Mr.
Riseborough re same.
06/03/2015

CB

__ ___
,._..,.

Review emrli I correspondence
of clients re scheduling

1.00

LOO

90.00

conference. Tcl ephone
conference with court clerk;
draft A111cnded Note for
Hearing;, docket dates.
06/08/2015

JCR

Review c-maiJ from Frantz to
JIB and earlier transmittals.

.50

.50

95.00

06/08/2015

JCR

Telephone conference with
John Kurtz re Frantz e-mai)
and appropriate response .

.30

,30

57.00

06/08/2015

JCR

Telephone cunforcncc with
expert John Strait re potential
assistance on conflicts issue.

06/08/2015

JCR

E-messagc to/from clients and
Ms. Amrine re selection of

. ·--·-···I" .. -,

.

---.,,-. ,~.
.30

·---···-·.., ...

--

.30

.....

-- ~--57.00
...

.30

.30

57.00

expert for professional liability.
06/08/2015

JCR

Review Memorandum
Decision of Judge Myers re
Motion to Reconvert or
Dismiss.

1.00

1.00

190.00

06i09/2015

JCR

£-message to/from clients re
liability expert selection.

.20

,;;.v

'Jf'l

38.00

06/09/2015

JCR

E-me5sage and re$iponse to Ms.
Schwager's im.1ufry of
testimony of Frantz and
conversion hearing.

.30

.30

57.00

06/09/2015

JCR

Review pleadings and affidavit

.50

.50

95.00

re motions for sanctions, note

witnesses and documents
recovered.
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"

re
implicalions of former
client assertion of conflict.

06/lS/201 S CB

Download bankruptcy
materials received from clients.

JO

.30

27.00

06/16/2015 JCR

Draft Affidavit of Mr. Gustave!
re e-message from Katz and

.30

.30

57.00

.20

.20

38.00

1.00

1.00

190.00

Frantz.
06/16/2015

JCR

E-message from client and
revise Gustave! Affidavit.

06/16/2015

JCR

Draft reply to response to
objection to admission pro hac

vice; draft Affidavit of JCR re
"probate" of plaintiffs in
Bank.rnptcy Cou11.
06/16/2016

JCR

Review bankruptcy pleadings
from Ms. Schwager re Frantz's
Motion for Waiver of
Discharge.

1.10

1.10

209.00

06/16/2015

JCR

Review pleadings from State
Court action and counterclaims

1.20

1.20

228.00

2.00

2.00

.380.00

of Frant:t. v::;. llB; review of

bankruptcy pleadings re
termination of stay as to some
claims.
06/17/201 S JCR

Review of correspondence and

e-mail files from client re Mr.
Clark's work as expert.
06/17/2015

RLS

Review ail pleadings filed on
the pro hac vice matter.

.40

.40

76.00

06/17/2015

RLS

Review Idaho Rules of

.60

.60

105.00

.60

.60

105.00

Professional Conduc1 for
appropriate language for Reply
Brief.
06/17/2015

RLS

Draft anaJysis of plaintiff's
Reply Brief regarding the Pro
Hae Vice Motion.
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Research and begin drafting
RepJy Brief to suppon
Objection to Pro Hae Vice
Motion.
06/19/2015

JCR

Complete review of

.40

.40

76.00

1.70

1.70

297.50

.20

.20

38.00

--·
.40

.40

76.00

.40

AO

76.00

correspondence and e-mail file
from client re Clark's
representaLion.
06/19/2015

RLS

Review and incorporate
recommended additions to
Reply Brief ohjecting to Pro
Hae Vice c1umission.

06/25/2015

JCR

E-messagc exchange with John
Kurtz re Katz's disclosure to
Bankruptcy Court and Reply
Memo.

06/25/2015

JCR

E·mcssagc with Ms. Schwager
re conlacl wiLh Mr. Frantz re

mediation; forward plaintiffs
request for combined
mediation with JJ8 lawsuit.

06/25/2015

JCR

Revise reply per John Kurtz'.s

t..:ommcnts; c•messagc to
forward proposed changes.
06/25/2015

JCR

E-mcssagc to and from Ms.
Amrine re mediation proposal;
e-message lo Mr. Frantz re
declination to joint mediation.

.30

.30

57.00

06/29/2015

JCR

Review Motion to Strike

.50

.50

9S.OO

.10

.10

19.00

Defense Affidavits, Affidavit
of Mr. FrantL: and

Memorandum in Support;
analysis of appropriate

response.
06/29/2015

JCR

Review c-mcssagc from Mr.
Frant:l re mediation.
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argument on
Prepare
Motion to Allow Katz
Admission Pro Hae Vice;
research re Bar Commission
Rules re proc.:edure; prepare for
scheduling conference.

06/30/2015

JCR

Attend hearing on Motion to
allow admission of Kat:r. and
scheduling conference; followup conforcncl: with Mr. Frantz
re theory of damages and
discovery plan.

2.40

2.40

456.00

07/01/2015

JCR

Draft report of results of

1.00

1.00

190.00

hearing on Motion

Pro Hae

Vice.
01!01!201S

CB

Review email exchange with
client re Plaintiff's Motion for
Pro Hae Vice.

.20

.20

18.00

07/01/2015

CB

Review emails re possible
mediation.

.10

.10

9.00

07/03/2015

JCR

E-message from Ms.
Schwager; finalize report of
pro hac vice hearing.

.30

.30

57.00

07/06/2015

.TCR

Draft correspondence to Ms .
Amrine re Court's Scheduling
Order.

.20

.20

38.00

07/06/2015

.TCR

Review Case ScheduJing

.30

.30

57.00

Order; e-mcssage to Mr.

Meadows re potential judge
challenges.
07/06/2015

JCR

Review Amended Note for
Hearing re Admission Pro Hae
Vice.

.20

.20

38.00

07/13/2015

JCR

Begin review of plaintiffs
Brief re Pro Hae Vice; emessage exchange with Ms.
Schwager.

.30

JO

57.00

11
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AX

Complete
Plaintifr s Brief re
Vice.
07/13/2015

JCR

.JO

.30

57.00

Review Declaration of Frantz
re dismissal of Adversary
Proceeding as moot; e-message
to Ms. Schwager re same.

.20

.20

38.00

Review additional Declaration

.30

JO

57.00

.40

.40

76.00

.20

.20

38.00

Begin review of file materials
of Merlyn Clark.

.80

.80

152.00

Review case Jaw cited by

.60

.60

114.00

Review Affidavit of Katz;

compare tu file materials to
date.

07/14/2015

.TCR

07/14/2015

JCR

of Frantz and review of

bankruptcy docket re whether
action has been dismissed.

.TCR

07/14/2015

Review e-message from Ms .
Schwager; draft Affidavit of
Ms. Schwag1;r re stalus of
Adversary Proceeding.

07/15/2015

JCR

E-message to/from Ms.
Schwager re Frantz position in

Bankruptcy Court re reasons
for waiver of discharge.
07/16/2015

JCR

07/17/2015

JCR

Frantz.
07/17/2015

.ICR

Draft response to Frantz Brief
re Pro Hae Vice admission.

1.00

1.00

190.00

07/18/2015

JCR

E-message exchange with Ms.

.10

.10

19.00

.80

.80

152.00

.30

.30

57.00

Schwager re Affidavit.
07/18/2015

JCR

Review pJaintiff s response to
Motion lo Abate and Affidavit

of Counsel Frantz.
07/18/2015

JCR

E-message exchange with Ms.

Schwager; review Affidavit of
Schwager and recommend
revisions.
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Troxell Ennis & Mawley' s files
from Merlyn Clark re polcnliaJ
confidential information
received from Frantz or

Owens.
07/20/2015

JCR

Review Response Brief of

.50

.50

95.00

plaintiff re Molion to Dismiss.
07/20/2015

JCR

1.00

1.00

190.00

·---·-"07/20/2015

Legal research re cases cited by
plaintiff in response.

JCR

Draft Reply Hrief re Motion to
Dismiss.

1.40

1.40

266.00

07/21/2015

JCR

Complete Reply Brief re

.80

.80

152.00

.40

36.00

Motion to Dismiss and Abate.
07/21/2015

CD

Review Case. Schedule Order
and docket dates.

.40

07/27/2015

CB

Tc]ephone call to Judge

.10

.10

9.00

.80

.80

152.00

2.00

2.00

380.00

2.10

399.00

95.00

1-,..............., _ , ,

Mitchell's chambers re hearing

tomorrow.
07/28/2015

JCR

Review materials, prepare
argument re Pro Hae Vice
admission.

07/28/2015

JCR

Review materials and filings,
prepare argument re Motions to
Dismiss or Abate and
Objection re l'ro Hae Vice

07/28/2015

JCR

To Court for hea.."-ing on
Motions re Admission Pro Hae
Vice; and Motion to Dismiss or
Abate, attend hearing, argue
motion, r~lurn 10 off'icc.

07/28/2015

JCR

Draft e-message report of
results of hearing on Motion to
Abate and for Admission Pro
Hae Vice.

.50

.50

07/29/2015

JCR

E-message

.10

.10

Lo

and from Ms.

Schwager re rcsuJts of hearing.

13

'1 If\
" ' · LV

I

I

19.00

,-r:,:1
vr~·:r:'II " '
~~

.E..
KP.~A

Ti.me.:,:'

, , .: ~htt-ged

Review Opinion Judge
Mitchell dismissing action.

07/30/201 S JCR

E-message to clients re Judge's
opinion and n.:sponscs.

JO

JO

57.00

07/31/2015

JCR

Research re basis for IC 12-121
, fee award; review case law re
lC 12-120(3) award.

L70

1.70

323.00

07/31/2015

JCR

Draft Memo of Authorities in
Support or Award of Fees and
Costs; draft Affidavit of JCR re
foes and costs; draft Judgment;
draft Motion for Award of Fees
and Costs.

l.60

1.60

304.00

07/31/2015

JCR

Review time entries and costs
to select fees to request, review
Memo of Costs and Affidavit
of Costs and Fees.

1.00

1.00

190.00

111.60

TOTALS:
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7 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007

Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

lN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE .FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,

)
)
Plaintiff,

CaseNo.CV15-1406

)
)

vs.

)
)
)
)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENN1S & I IA WLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES

)

_________
Defendant.

)

.)

Pursuant to Rules 54(d) and 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant

submits the following Memorandum of Costs and Fees:

Costs as a Matter of Right - IRCP 54(d)(l)(C):
Court Filing Fees:

$

140.95

Hearing Transcript Bankruptcy Cot1n:

$

1,208.15

TOTAL COSTS:

$

1,349.10

John C. Riseborough 75.40 hours at $190 per hour

$

14,326.00

Rebecca L. Stewart 26.50 hours at $175 per hour

$

4,637.50

Discretionary Costs - IRCP,,~4(d)(l)(D):

Attorney's Fees - IRCP 54(e)(l}:

MEMORANDUM 0~' COSTS JNCLUf)!N(; /\ TTORNEY
FEl!J8rt.if1 Frantz vs
Troxell,

V
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Lt..

Paralegal Fees:
at

Total Attorney and Paralegal Fees:

$

19,836.50

Total costs:

$

1,349.40

Total Attorney/Paralegal Fees:

$

19,836.50

TOTAL FEES AND COSTS CLAlMED:

$

21,185.60

Retapitulation:

The foregoing Statement of Costs and Attorney's fees incurred by defendants in this
action is correct and in compliance with Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The
foregoing Statement of Attorney's recs and Paralegal Fees is supported by the Atlidavit of
Counsel filed together herewith, pursuant to Rule 54(e)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this~ day of August, 2015.
PAlNR HAMBLEN LLP

By:~Jf~~~, C. Riseborough, 1S'1 #7898
ttomeys for Defendant
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Jonathon Frantz

U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MA 11.
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Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St Suite A
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PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DJSTRICT OF
THE STATE OF JDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,

)

)
)

Case No. CVlS-1406

)

vs.

) MOTION FOR AN A WARD OF
) ATTORNEY'S FEES

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & lIA WLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, as prevailing pany, and
moves the Court for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to IRCP 54(d), 54(e) and
I.C. §12-120(3) and §12-i21. This Motion is based on the records and files herein, the
Memorandum Decision and Order of this Court dated JuJy 29, 2015, the Memorandum of Costs
and Attorney's Fees, the Atlidavit of John C. Riseborough, and the Memorandum of Authorities
in support thereof.

DATED this

5

dayof_""'"j_ll"i_C._v.__
/_"7_ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2015.

PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

!?__~~------

By:_--:F-'~"""""-'...;..c.......

~C. Riseborough, ISB #7898
Attorneys for Defendant
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Jonathon Frantz
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7 West
Spokane, Washington 99201
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl
MARTIN FRANTZ,
Plaintiff,

vs.

)
)
)
)

)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,
Defendant.

Case No. CV15-1406

JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT is entered as follows:
Plaintiff's Complaint and each of the claims therein is dismissed with prejudice.
The amount of costs and Defendant's entitlement to attorney's fees will be determined in
a subsequent proceeding.
DONE this :t!'aay of--'-"~>-+,u"""--+J...,_,D-"-'-'=------' 2015.

JUDGMENT-1

By:_,#.JC..tt"-"--=C__,,_/_d
_ _ _ _ __

J¢inC. Riseborough, ISB #7898
Attorneys for Defendant

JUDGMENT-2

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRAi"JSMISSION

Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 8385.4

~3'6-000
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Jonathon Frantz
LAW,
Lincoln
Post Falls, Idaho 83815
Ph: 208-262-3893
Fax: 208-262-3894
Email: jonathon@cdalegal.com
ISB No. 9129
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,
Case No.: CVlS-1406
Plaintiff,
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

V.

HAWLEY TROXELL El'.~IS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,
Defendant.

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Martin Frantz ("Frantz") filed a legal malpractice action against Defendant Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley Troxell") on February 20, 2015 for Hawley Troxell 's
conflicted representation and revelation of confidential information submitted by Frantz to
Hawley Troxell within the scope of the representation.

II. Argument
Attorney Fees Cannot Be Awarded to Defendant under I.C. §12-120(3) because there is
no Commercial Transaction Integral to any Claim
This lawsuit, while one for malpractice, is not based off of the commercial transaction
which occurred in or about 2008 to 2009 when Martin Frantz hired Hawley Troxell Ennis &

Hawley, LLP ("HT') to represent him. Indeed, this complaint does not aver any misconduct in
AN
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fees are not awardable in this matter because there is no commercial transaction which is integral
to this claim.

To be sme, Idaho allows attorney fees in malpractice lawsuits; however, such fees are not
allowed when "[t]he gravamen of[the] case was an effort to enforce a statutory scheme ... "
Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 631 (1995). Instead, the commercial transaction
must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party seeks to recover.
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763 (1995).
In KeJly, the lawsuit sought dissolution of the partnership which was formed for
commercial purposes (real estate development). 127 Idaho at 626. The dissolution sought,
however, was to be go\l.erne.clex.r.h1si\l.ely by s.tate statute. lei. at 627. Thei:e, 1hf£ourt denied
attorney fees to the prevailing party under I.C.§ 12-120(3) because the suit was to enforce a
statutory scheme, not a commercial transaction. Id. at 631.

In the case at hand, the Frantzes sought to enforce a statutory scheme, the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct. The Frantzes had no quarrel with HT regarding the quality of work they

did during active representation, but their conduct years later; which conduct violated a statutory
scheme (the rules of professional conducl). Even though there are commercial lrnnsaclions
tangential to this case, none are the gravamen of this laws11it. The crnx is HT's violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. As such, since there is no commercial transaction integral
to this claim, attorney fees are not appropriate under l.C. § 12-120(3).

15:57
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both a good faith legal and factual bases

pursuing this action.

Specifically, in the Court's order dismissing this case, it found that res judicata did not bar this
case, but instead that the "other pending action" doctrine did, which doctrine is discretionary,
meaning the Court could have heard this case if it so chose. Klaue, 133 Idaho 437, 440 (1999).
Furthermore, the Frantzes had a good faith believe that there was no other pending action
because the action in whlch the disqualification hearing arose was dismissed as moot. See Deel.
of Jonathon Frantz (dated July 14, 2015), Ex. A ("this Adversary Proceeding is rendered MOOT.
The trial ... is hereby VACATED."). As a result, there will be no final judgment on the merits;
thus the Frantzes have no ability to appeal any decision therein, save any dispute over fees and
costs. However, a judgment for fees will not produce an appealable order as to all other
interlocutory orders in the case.
lt is true, the bankruptcy case (No. 11-21337-TLM) continues. But as pointed out above,
the adversary proceeding (No. 13-07024-TLM) has been mooted. Inside the bankruptcy case
(No. 11-21337-TLM) there has been no such ruling regarding the defendant Hawley Troxell
because Hawley Troxell has not used the Frantzes' confidential information therein. Thus, what
the Court has referred to as the other pending action has been dismissed as moot. As such, the
Frantzes had good faith grounds to believe there was no other pending action.
Additionally, this Court also found this case was ban-ed by judicial estoppel. However,
there too, the Frantzes bad a good faith belief that judiciaJ estoppel would not apply because this
malpractice claim is not owned by the bankruptcy estate. As noted by the Court, a debtor in a
banlauptcy proceeding is required to disclose all existing and potential assets, "including causes
action that belong to the debtor when the bankruptcy is filed." See Memo. Decision and
AN
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not

was not

until Hawley Troxell filed the adversary proceeding that this claim arose, for it was in that
proceeding where Hawley Troxe]l used confidential information and took a position directly
adverse to the Frantzes which could be subject to this lawsuit.
As a result, when the bankruptcy was filed in 2011, the Frantzes did not have any claim
against Hawley Troxell and therefore there is nothing to list. Instead, that claim arose nearly two
years after the Frantzes fi1ed for bankruptcy. Thus, the Frantzes had a good faith belief that this
claim is not property of the estate and therefore not subject to judicial estoppel.
After all, excluding clairvoyance, the Frantzes cannot list this lawsuit as property of the
estate two years before the claim exists. In 2011, the Frantzes did not know that the adversary
proceeding would be filed. Moreover, in 2011 the Frantzes did not know that Hawley Troxell
would represent an adverse party therein.
More importantly, a bankruptcy estate is only comprised of "property as of the
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case." 11 USC §54l(a). 3 Therefore, property acquired after
a person files bankruptcy generaHy belongs to the debtor and not the estate. Since this claim
arose two year after the Frantzes filed for bankruptcy, they had a good faith belief that this claim
was their property, not belonging to the bankruptcy estate.

m. Other Considerations
Further, the Court, in its opinion, seemed to take the position that the Frantzes were liable
for fraud in the adversary proceeding. Nothing could be further from the truth. In early 2013,
1
2

Note the case number's year of origin: 11-21337-TLM, representing the origin year of 2011.

This affidavit was mistakenly filed as "Ex. B" to Response of Defendant re Pro Hae Vice Objection. See
email from John Riseborough, July 29, 2015 to the Court and the Frantzes.
3
While there are exceptions for different chapters of the bankruptcy code, there is no relevant exception
here.
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discharge on his record, Mr. Frantz would not be able to work post-bankruptcy. See Ex. A,
attached hereto (Deel. of Martin Frantz in Support of Waiver of Discharge, filed February 16,
2015 in Case No. 11-21337-TLM) (explaining why the Frantzes filed their waiver of discharge).
The Frantzes bankruptcy discharge waiver had nothing to do with IJB 's pending discharge
litigation. Instead, it was purely a matter of whether or not the Frantzes would be able to revive
their development company.

IV. Conclusion
Because there is no commercial transaction integral to this claim and because the
Frantzes had a good faith basis for pursuing this claim, Defendant's Motion for an Award of
Attorney's Fees must be denied.

DATED THIS 25th day of Augst, 2015.
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
By: _ _Isl_ _ __
Jonathon Frantz
CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of August, 2015, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of this document upon:
John C. Riseborough

via fax at: 509-838-0007
Isl Jonathon Frantz
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West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 9920lw3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
f acsimilc: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell EMis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FTRST .TUD1CTAL DTSTRTCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND 1~·0R THE COUNTY OF KOOTF.NAT
MARTIN FRANTZ,

)

)
Plaintiff,
vs.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENN1S & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

______________
· Defendant.

Case No. CVIS-1406

)

)
)
)
)

RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT RTEH
TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
AWARD OF FEES

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff Frantz has filed its objection to defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley's
(HTEH) Motion for an Award of Fees. Significantly, the objection does not take issue with the
amount of fees or costs being sought. Rather the objection argues that (a) IC§ 12-120(3) does

not apply as the malpractice claim was not based on a commercial transaction and (b) no fees are
awardablc under lC § 12-121 because this malpractice claim was not pursued frivolously or
without foundation. Neither of the objections is valid and accordingly the CoUrt should award the
full amount of fees.

RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT HTEH TO PLAlN'l1Y:FS OBJECTION TO

OF FEES

Awa:rdable Under IC§ 12-120(3)

§1

sets out

20(3) and will not be repeated here.

gravamen of plaintiff's complaint against HTEH is that

its actions ca.used plaintiff financial losses in his commercial dealings with Idaho Independent
Bank Plaintiffs retention of Merlyn Clark as an expert witness was in support of litigation
which was likewise based on plaintiff Frantz's com.merciaJ dealings_ The statute applies and fees
are awaxdable.

Plaintiff's principal argument is that his claim against HTEH was really an effort to
enforce a statutory scheme. This argument fails for at least three reasons: (a) there is no statutory

scheme involved, (b) the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are enforced by the Supreme
Court and its Bar Association, not individuals and (c) Idaho would not recognize a cause of
action based on a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

That the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are not a "statutory scheme" is self evident.
Further, the majority of jurisdictions do not recognize a cause of action for the violation of the

Rules of Professional Conduct. l R. Ma1len & J. Smith. Legal Malpractice, pp. 759-761, §6.31,
2013 Edition. The Idaho rules recognize this. See Preamble Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,

,ifl l,

l 2, 19 and 20. Although such a violation may be evidence of a vioiation of the standard of

care, the violation itself is not actionable. 2 R. Mallen & J. Smith Legal Malpractice, pg. 1279,

§20:7, 2013 Edition. The provisions oflC §12-120(3) apply and fees should be awarded.

Fees Awardable Under IC §12-121
Plaintiff next argues that, despite the fact that the identical issue, i.e., whether Merlyn
Clark and HTEH ever formed an attorney-client relationship with him, had been previous1y

RESPONSE OF DEf'ENDANT HTEH TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION

AWARD OF

Bankruptcy

of

is

frivolous,

Plaintiff first argues that plaintiff had a good faith basis for his suit because "The pending
action in which the disqualification hearing arose was dismissed as moot." Plaintiff ignores the
facl that this suit was brought shortly after the adverse decision in the Bankruptcy court on his
Motion to Disqualify HTEH, and before plaintiffs decision to waive discharge and the resulting
finding that the adversary proceeding was thus moot. Indeed, while this action was pending,
plaintiff first attempted a limited waiver of discharge in favor of minority creditors only. Any
"good faith belief' that no other proceeding was pending must have been formed well after this
suit was brought_ and pursued. Finally the argument ignores the Court's correct observation that
the bankruptcy proceeding remains pending.
Plaintiff also argues that his prosecution of this case was; justified because the Court erred
in applying judicial estoppel. How that excuses his pursuit of this action is unc1ear. Nevertheless,
in making this argument, p1atntiff ignores the authority cited by the Court that causes of which
the debtor is aware during the pendency of an action arc likewise assets of the Estate. Plaintiff
continues to argue that the cause of action did not arise until HTEH used confidential
information in the adversary proceeding. Setting aside for a moment the fact that there is
absolutely no proof of HTEH's use of confidential information, use of confidential information is
not required for a cause of action based on a conilict of interest. Plaintiff knew or should have
known prior to filing his bankruptcy that Merlyn Clark was a partner at HTEH. (He paid
Mr. Clark's bill directly to HTEH.) He further was aware that HTEH was representing a party
adverse to him in an effort to collect a substantial indebtedness from him. Any cause of action

based on conflict ofintcrcst existed at the time of the bankruptcy filing.

RESPONSE OF DEFENDANT HTEH TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO AWARD OF FEES 3
Martin

VS

Troxell,

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs objections fail. Plaintiff concedes that the attorney's fees and costs being
sought are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court should make an award of fees and costs in the full

amount requested by defendant
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tbis

jJ_ day of September, 2015.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
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HAND DELIVERY
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Frantz Law~ PLLC
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FAX TRANSMISSION
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STATE OF fOAHO l
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI I
FILED:

S18;
SEP 21 PM

Email: jonathon@cdalegal.com
ISB No. 9129
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appeliant, Martin Frantz

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

MARTIN FRANTZ,
Case No.: CV-2015-1406
Plaintiff/Appellant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
V.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,

Fee Category: L4
Filing Fee: $129.00
Supreme Court No. _ _ _ _ _ __

Defendant/Respondent.

TO: The above-named parties: Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP and its attorneys:
John C. Riseborough
Pain Hamblen LLP
717 West Sprague Ave, Suite 1200
Spokane, WA 99201
[Attorney for Defendant]

AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Appellant, Martin Frantz, appeals against the above-named

Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court, from the Judgment entered in the aboveentitled action following a hearing upon a motion to dismiss entered on August 10, 2015

NOTICE OF APPEAL- Pg. 1

as

as

above is an appealable order under and pursuant to LA.R. 1l(a)(l).
3. Appellant's preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which may be supplemented,
is as follows:
a. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Frantz lacks standing to bring this
lawsuit?
b. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Frantz is judicially estopped from
bringing this lawsuit?
c. Did the district court err in dismissing sua sponte, as judicially estopped, Mr.
Frantz' s claims?
d. Did the district court err in dismissing this action pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(8)
fmding that "another action pending between the same parties for the same cause"
existed?
e. Did the district court err in fmding that Mr. Frantz has no damages unless he
admits he lied to his creditors and the bankruptcy court?
f.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Katz motion for pro hac vice admission?

g. Did the district court err in finding that Mr. Katz will likely have to testify in this
case?
h. Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees pursuant to 12-120(3 )?
1.

Did the district court err in awarding attorney fees pursuant to 12-121?

NOTICE OF APPEAL- Pg. 2

5. A reporter's transcript is requested

its entirety for the hearings conducted on or about

July 28, 2015 and September 17,2015.
6. Appellant requests that the following documents, including those automatically included
uner I.A.R. 28, be included in the clerk's record as well as the following documents:
a. February 20, 2015- Complaint and Jury Demand
b. April 7, 2015- Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission
c.

April 22, 2015- Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission

d. April 22, 2015- Affidavit of John C. Riseborough
e. April 24, 2015- Affidavit ofJohn F. Kurtz, Jr.
f.

May 4, 2015- Notice of Appearance (of John C. Riseborough)

g. May 7, 2015- Motion to Dismiss or Abate
h. May 7, 2015- Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
Dismiss or Abate
1.

May 7, 2015- Affidavit of John C. Riseborough

J.

June 1, 2015- Response to Objection to Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission

k. June 1, 2015- Declaration of Jonathon Frantz

l.

June 1, 2015- Objection to Affidavit of John F. Kurtz

m. June 1, 2015- Objection to Affidavit of John C. Riseborough
n. June 26, 2015- Affidavit ofJohn C. Riseborough
o. June 26, 201

NOTICE OF APPEAL- Pg. 3

Affidavit

Jack Gustavel

to

Vice Admission
s. July 13, 2015- Declaration of Jefferey Katz in Support of Motion for Pro Hae
Vice Admission

t.

July 14, 2015- Response to Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP's Motion to
Dismiss or Abate (IRCP I2(b)(8))

u. July 14, 2015- Declaration of Jonathon Frantz in Support of Response to Hawley
Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP's Motion to Dismiss or Abate
v. July 20, 2015- Response of Defendant re: Pro Hae Vice Objection

w. July 21, 2015- Defendantly Reply re: Dismissal/Abate
x. July 24, 2015- Plaintiff's Reply re: Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission
y. July 29, 2015- Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss or Abate, and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Pro Hae Vice
Admission
z. August 7, 2015-Defendant's Brief in Support of Award of Costs, Including
Reasonable Attorney Fees
aa. August 7, 2015- Motion for an Award of Attorney Fees
bb. August 10, 2015- Judgment
cc. August 25, 2015- Objection to Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees
dd. September 14, 2015- Reply of Defendant HTEH to Plaintiff's Objection to Award
of Fees

NOTICE OF APPEAL- Pg. 4

The deposit for preparation of the clerk's record (electronic copy) has been paid;
c. The appellate filing fee in the amount of $129.00 has been paid; and,
d. Service has been made upon the trial court reporter and all parties required to be
served pursuant to I.A.R. 20.
DATED THIS 21st day of September, 2015.
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
By: ____
Jonathon Frantz
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of September, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of this document upon:
Via 1st Class MailJohn C. Riseborough
Paine Hamblen LLP
717 West Sprague Ave. Suite 1200
Spokane, WA 99201
Via 1st Class MailJuiie Foland, Court Reporter
324 West Garden Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816

Isl Jonathon Frantz
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PAINE HAMBLEN LLP
717 West Sprague Avenue Suite 1200
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505
Telephone: (509) 455-6000
facsimile: (509) 838.0007
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Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DJSTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUOlClAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE Of IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)

MARTIN FRANTZ,

)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CVlS-1406

)

vs.

)
)
)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership.

)
)

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
CLERK'S RECORDS

)

Defendant.

)

The above.named Plaintiff and his attorney, JONATHON FRANTZ;
Reporter; \
Clerk of the above..entitled Court:

TO:
ANDTO:
ANOTO:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant in the above-entitled proceeding

hereby requests, pursuant to Rule 19, l.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the
reporter's transcript and of the Clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the

I.A.R. and the Notice of Appeal.

REQUEST FOR ADOTTIONAL CLERK'S RECORDS- I
Martfn

vs

3

PAlNt HAMBLEN LLP

ll) 003/004

Record:
Defendant's Reply re
dated June 26, 2015.

Admission,

b.

Defendant's Memorandum. of Costs lncJuding Attorney Fees, dated
August 7. 2015.

c.

Affidavit of John C. Riseborough in Support ofDefendant,s Memorandum
of Costs including Attorney Fees, dated August 7, 2015.

I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the Reporter and Clerk of the

2.

District Coun and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this

_j_ day of October, 2015.
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP

FOR ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORDS
vs

Troxell, etai

Docket No,
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CERTIFY that on the
day of October,
foregoing document to
following:
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X

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

Jonathon Frantz
Frantz Law, Pl.LC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854

Theresa Henry
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Telephone: (509) 455-6000
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007
Attorney for Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
MARTIN FRANTZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho Limited Liability Partnership,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV15-1406

JUDGMENT

Judgment is entered as follows:
As against plaintiff Martin Frantz and in favor of defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley, LLP, costs and attorney's fees awarded as follows:
Costs as a matter ofright

$

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C):

Discretionary Costs -I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D):

$ 1,208.15

Attorney's Fees and Paralegal Fees

$19,836.50

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l):

$21,185.60

TOTAL JUDGMENT:
DONE this lQ,~y of

{!)

cA:v Lt

, 2015.

e--
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JUDGMENT- I

140.95

JUDGE JOHN MITCHELL
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FAX TRANSMISSION

Jonathon Frantz
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Frantz Law, PLLC
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307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
~
Post Falls, Idaho 83854

HAND DELIVERY
U.S.MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

John C. Riseborough
Paine Hamblen LLP S()Cf-8'$-000 J
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200
Spokane, WA 99201
.
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JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE COURT
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Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720
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DOCKET NO. 43576
( MARTIN FRANTZ
(
( vs.

(
( HAWLEY TROXELL
( ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on October 20, 2015, I lodged a transcript
of 56 pages in length , including the July 28, 2015, Hearing Re: Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or Abate ; Plaintiff's Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission, and
the September 17, 2015, Hearing Re: Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, in
the above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of
Kootenai in the First Judicial District.

~D~
October 20 , 2015

Martin Frantz vs Hawley Troxell , etal

Docket No. 43576-2015
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PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,

)

VS.

)
)
)

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,

)
)
)

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

CASE NO. 43576

)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and Transcript to
each of the Attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

JONA THON FRANTZ
307 N. Lindon St., Ste A
Post Falls, ID 83854
IN WITNESS
said Court this

JOHN C. RISEBOROUGH
717 W. Sprague Ave., Ste 1200
Spokane, WA 9920 l
I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the

~~

Jim Brannon
Clerk of District Court

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho Limited
Liability Partnership,
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

)
)
)
)
)
)

I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the
County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was
compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case.
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record and
Transcript was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were mailed
by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
In witness whereof, I

set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County,

Idaho this ----=--JIM BRANNON
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy Clerk

